-
869Intellectual GestaltsIn Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality, Oxford University Press. pp. 174. 2013.Phenomenal holism is the thesis that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are parts of certain wholes. The first aim of this paper is to defend phenomenal holism. I argue, moreover, that there are complex intellectual experiences (intellectual gestalts)—such as experiences of grasping a proof—whose parts instantiate holistic phenomenal characters. Proponents of cognitive phenomenology believe that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experienc…Read more
-
1635The Rational Roles of IntuitionIn Anthony Booth & Darrell Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions, Oxford University Press. 2014.NOTE: this is a substantial revision of a previously uploaded draft. Intuitions are often thought of as inputs to theoretical reasoning. For example, you might form a belief by taking an intuition at face value, or you might take your intuitions as starting points in the method of reflective equilibrium. The aim of this paper is to argue that in addition to these roles intuitions also play action-guiding roles. The argument proceeds by reflection on the transmission of justification through infe…Read more
-
43Mathematical Knowledge, edited by Mary Leng, Alexander Paseau, and Michael Potter (review)Mind 118 (471): 846-850. 2009.Review of Mathematical Knowledge eds. Leng, Paseau, and Potter.
-
1198What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do?Dialectica 65 (4): 561-579. 2011.The Gettier Problem is the problem of revising the view that knowledge is justified true belief in a way that is immune to Gettier counter-examples. The “Gettier Problem problem”, according to Lycan, is the problem of saying what is misguided about trying to solve the Gettier Problem. In this paper I take up the Gettier Problem problem. I distinguish giving conditions that are necessary and sufficient for knowledge from giving conditions that explain why one knows when one does know. I argue tha…Read more
-
1133Consciousness and KnowledgeIn Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness, Oxford University Press. 2020.This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular on the role perceptual consciousness might play in justifying beliefs about the external world. We outline a version of phenomenal dogmatism according to which perceptual experiences immediately, prima facie justify certain select parts of their content, and do so in virtue of their having a distinctive phenomenology with respect to those contents. Along the way we take up various issues in connection…Read more
-
1218Is Intuition Based On Understanding?[I thank Jo]Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1): 42-67. 2013.According to the most popular non-skeptical views about intuition, intuitions justify beliefs because they are based on understanding. More precisely: if intuiting that p justifies you in believing that p it does so because your intuition is based on your understanding of the proposition that p. The aim of this paper is to raise some challenges for accounts of intuitive justification along these lines. I pursue this project from a non-skeptical perspective. I argue that there are cases in which …Read more
-
723The reality of the intuitiveInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (4): 371-385. 2017.According to current methodological orthodoxy philosophers rely on intuitions about thought experiments to refute general claims about the nature of knowledge, freedom, thought, reference, justice, beauty, etc. Philosophers working under the banner of ‘negative experimental philosophy’ have criticized more traditional philosophers for relying on this method. They argue that intuitions about thought experiments are influenced by factors that are irrelevant to the truth of their contents. Cappelen…Read more
-
1872What Intuitions Are LikePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3): 625-654. 2011.What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception …Read more
-
949Moral Perception: High-Level Perception or Low-Level Intuition?In Thiemo Breyer & Christopher Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking, . 2015.Here are four examples of “seeing.” You see that something green is wriggling. You see that an iguana is in distress. You see that someone is wrongfully harming an iguana. You see that torturing animals is wrong. The first is an example of low-level perception. You visually represent color and motion. The second is an example of high-level perception. You visually represent kind properties and mental properties. The third is an example of moral perception. You have an impression of moral propert…Read more
-
1173Gurwitsch’s Phenomenal HolismPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3): 559-578. 2013.Aron Gurwitsch made two main contributions to phenomenology. He showed how to import Gestalt theoretical ideas into Husserl’s framework of constitutive phenomenology. And he explored the light this move sheds on both the overall structure of experience and on particular kinds of experience, especially perceptual experiences and conscious shifts in attention. The primary focus of this paper is the overall structure of experience. I show how Gurwitsch’s Gestalt theoretically informed phenomenologi…Read more
Coral Gables-Miami, Florida, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Mathematics |