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936Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, eds., Naturalism in Question Reviewed by (review)Philosophy in Review 25 (2): 101-104. 2005.Book review: no abstract needed, despite what this program might demand.
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410My main reaction to MCGivern’s paper was one of dialectical puzzlement. Block argues that, Macro Non-Reduction: [all] macro properties are irreducible to the micro properties on which they supervene..
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128Between the lines of age: Reflections on the metaphysics of wordsPacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2). 2005.The central concern of this paper is the nature of the relation between words on the one hand and their occurrences on the other. I argue here that while Kaplan's “common currency” conception of words is immune to much of the criticism to which Cappelen has subjected it, it runs afoul of the role words play in communication. And I sketch an alternative conception – the type‐continuant model – which shares the virtues but avoids the vices of Kaplan's conception.
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98Simple and Sophisticated "Naive" SemanticsDialogue 39 (1): 101-122. 2000.RésuméJe critique dans cet article la théorie «naïve»des attributions de croyances, selon laquelle la signification d'un nom propre dans la clause qui figure comme complément d'une telle attribution est son référent. Je soutiens que l'usage que nous faisons de ces attributions dans l'explication du comportement oblige à rejeter la version simple de la sémantique «naïve» au profit de sa cousine plus sophistiquée. Et je soutiens que la théorie «naïve» sophistiquée se compare défavorablement à des …Read more
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97Identity Statements and Conversationally Salient ContentDialogue 54 (1): 121-138. 2015.In this paper, I argue that viewing Frege’s puzzle through a semantic lens results in the rejection of solutions to it on irrelevant grounds. As a result, I develop a solution to it that rests on a non-semantic sense of context-sensitivity. And I apply this picture to Frege’s puzzle when it arises through the use of identity statements designed to establish that distinct speakers are talking about the same thing.
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248Description, Disagreement, and Fictional NamesCanadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3): 423-448. 2011.In this paper, a theory of the contents of fictional names — names of fictional people, places, etc. — will be developed.1 The fundamental datum that must be addressed by such a theory is that fictional names are, in an important sense, empty: the entities to which they putatively refer do not exist.2 Nevertheless, they make substantial contributions to the truth conditions of sentences in which they occur. Not only do such sentences have truth conditions, sentences differing only in the fiction…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
| Metaphysics |
| Philosophy of Language |
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Aesthetics |
Areas of Interest
| Metaphysics |
| Philosophy of Language |
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Aesthetics |