Carlo Martini

Distributed Cognition and the Will is a very ambitious collection of 13 essays exploring different facets of the relation between an “old problem” and a relatively recent field of studies . As Don Ross, one of the editors, points out in the very opening lines of the introduction, if there were a ranking of the major problems that have been discussed in roughly two and a half millennia of philosophical enquiry, the problem of the will would figure among the top hits. But recent studies and empirical work on cognition and behavioral sciences come to conclusions in stark contrast with the traditional notions of agency, free will and will-causes-action accounts. One of the authors’ opening claims illustrates the general spirit of the collection: P. S. Davies writes that “the traditional notions of agency are dead or dying and their replacements are yet to be born or yet to reach maturity” . These 13 essays are an interdisciplinary attempt to contribute to a better understanding of the flaws embedded in the classical conceptions of will and agency and to put forward some proposals for new or revised ones

In recent decades much literature has been produced on disagreement; the puzzling conclusion being that epistemic disagreement is, for the most part, either impossible (e.g. Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976)), or at least easily resolvable (e.g. Elga (Noûs 41(3):478–502, 2007)). In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, an equally puzzling result arises: that is, disagreement cannot be rationally resolved by belief updating. I suggest a solution to the puzzle which makes use of some of the principles of Hintikka’s Socratic epistemology

Social epistemology is a relatively new and booming field of research. It studies the social dimension of the pursuit of acquiring true beliefs and requires philosophical as well as sociological and economic expertise. The insights gained in social epistemology are not only of theoretical interest; they also improve our understanding of social and political processes, as the field includes the analysis of group deliberation and group decision-making. However, surprisingly little work has so far been done on the epistemic properties of group deliberation, belief aggregation, and decision-making procedures. To close this gap, the construction and analysis of formal models are especially promising as formal modeling combines representational adequacy with instructive analytical results. This special issue collects papers that follow this strategy from the point of view of different disciplines.

Is subjective expert judgment a source of evidence in economics? In this paper, I will argue that it is, on a par with other sources like modeling, statistics, experimental, etc. I will also argue that it is not derivative, that is, reducible to the previous ones. But what is exactly the role of experts in economics? The contribution to the current methodological debate that I propose not only takes the role of expertise in economics as indispensable, but also suggests a need for a methodology associated with that role. I defend an indispensability argument, and indirectly David Colander's plea for refocusing the methodological debate on the lost art of economics. Finally, I indicate where to look for guidelines in formulating a methodology of economic expertise.

This paper applies the theory of networks to the problem of how agents should assign weights to other agents in the Lehrer-Wagner model for consensus formation. The Lehrer- Wagner theory of consensus is introduced, and the problem of weight assignment is highlighted as one of the open prob- lems for the theory. The paper argues that the application of the theory of networks to the Lehrer-Wagner model con- stitutes an interesting and fruitful option, among others, for the problem of weight assignment.