Frank Jackson

In “Induction and Objectivity” [1], F. John Clendinnen puts forwards a vindication of induction. I wish to argue that the vindication fails. As Clendinnen's argument is complex and presents certain difficulties it is necessary and only fair to quote his summary of it.“I shall attempt to vindicate induction by showing that it is the only possible way of predicting that is objective, and further that, while objectivity is not a necessary condition for success in predicting, objective methods are the only methods which we could have any possible reason to believe possessed a property which is a necessary condition for success. This property I will call ”concordance“. An objective method is one that ensures that all whose use it will agree in their conclusions.... To say that a method is concordant is simply to say that there are no contradictory conclusions drawn from it. A method could possess this property as a consequence of its being objective; but on the other hand it is possible for a method of predicting to be concordant merely by chance.If a predicting method is to be successful it must be concordant; for if there were a number of conflicting predictions made about the outcome of the one situation it would only be possible for one of them to be correct, and we should not describe as successful a method which had at least as many false applications as correct. Thus concordance is a necessary condition of success even in a single occasion of predicting. What, then is the relation between an objective and a concordant method?It would be possible to have a concordant method by chance; for example, if a method should never be used to make more than one prediction about the outcome of any one situation it would ipso facto be concordant. Alternatively, the different predictions of a non-objective method may by chance agree. Thus objectivity is not a necessary condition of concordance nor, consequently, of being a successful method. However, in selecting a satisfactory method of predicting we must ensure that it is concordant. If we choose an objective method we do ensure this. Further, there is no other way of doing this; for by definition any method which of its nature is concordant is objective. The possibility of a non-objective method being concordant depends on contingencies beyond the control of the method or of any particular person who adopts it; for it is always possible for others to adopt the same method and make predictions about the same situations.Thus, knowing that concordance is a necessary condition of a successful method and knowing that the only possible reason for expecting any method to be concordant is that it is objective, we may conclude that it is reasonable to adopt a method if it can be shown that it is the only objective method.“

What is the nature of, and what is the relationship between, external objects and our visual perceptual experience of them? In this book, Frank Jackson defends the answers provided by the traditional Representative theory of perception. He argues, among other things that we are never immediately aware of external objects, that they are the causes of our perceptual experiences and that they have only the primary qualities. In the course of the argument, sense data and the distinction between mediate and immediate perception receive detailed defences and the author criticises attempts to reduce perceiving the believing and to show that the Representative theory makes the external world unknowable. Jackson recognises that his views are unfashionable but argues in detail that they are to be preferred to their currently favoured competitors. It will become an obvious point of reference for all future work on the philosophy of perception.

David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson’s popular introduction to philosophy of mind and cognition is now available in a fully revised and updated edition. Ensures that the most recent developments in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science are brought together into a coherent, accessible whole. Revisions respond to feedback from students and teachers and make the volume even more useful for courses. New material includes: a section on Descartes’ famous objection to materialism; extended treatment of connectionism; coverage of the view that psychology is autonomous; fuller discussion of recent debates over phenomenal experience; and much more.

ONE way t0 defend narrow content is to produce a sentence 0f the form ‘S believes that P’, and show that this sentence is true 0f S if and 0nly if it is true 0f any duplicate from the skin in, any doppclgangcr, of S. N0toriously, this is hard to d0. Twin Earth examples are pervasivc.1 Another way to defend narrow content; is t0 show that Only 2. narrow notion can play thc causal explanatory r01c we require 0f contcnt in 2. properly scicntiicm psychology 0r cognitive science. Notoriously, this is hard t0 d0. The considerations—mcthod010gicaI solipsism, the principle 0f autonomy, 0r what:cvcr—invokcd to show that a broad notion 0f content cannot..

JP argue that expressivists must admit that becoming competent with ethical utterances involves learning to make them only when one believes one has the relevant attitude. For expressivists hold that communicating our attitudes is the function of ethical utterances, in which case sincerity demands that we not utter an ethical sentence unless we believe we have the relevant attitude. So (b) is false, as long as we suppose that this commitment, as reflected in well-entrenched and clear-cut (henceforth, 'robust' abbreviates 'well-entrenched and clear-cut') conventions, means that ethical utterances express one's belief that one has the relevant attitude. This, in turn, means that (a) is false, if we grant that a belief expressed in virtue of such conventions provides the utterance's truth-conditions.

Frank Jackson champions the cause of conceptual analysis as central to philosophical inquiry. In recent years conceptual analysis has been undervalued and widely misunderstood, suggests Jackson. He argues that such analysis is mistakenly clouded in mystery, preventing a whole range of important questions from being productively addressed. He anchors his argument in discussions of specific philosophical issues, starting with the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism and moving on, via free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, to ethics and the philosophy of color. In this way the book not only offers a methodological program for philosophy, but also casts new light on some much-debated problems and their interrelations