La Trobe University
Department of Politics, Media and Philosophy
PhD, 1975
Acton, Australian Capital Territory, Australia
  •  153
    Michael Tye on Perceptual Content (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1): 199-205. 2012.
  •  130
    First Published in 2004. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company
  •  106
    Mind, Meaning and Knowledge (review)
    Analysis 74 (4): 714-721. 2014.
  • Mind, Method and Conditionals: Selected Essays
    Mind 110 (437): 211-215. 2001.
  •  38
    20 Mind and Illusion
    In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary, Mit Press. pp. 421. 2004.
  •  186
    Mental causation
    Mind 105 (419): 377-413. 1996.
    I survey recent work on mental causation. The discussion is conducted under the twin presumptions that mental states, including especially what subjects believe and desire, causally explain what subjects do, and that the physical sciences can in principle give a complete explanation for each and every bodily movement. I start with sceptical discussions of various views that hold that, in some strong sense, the causal explanations offered by psychology are autonomous with respect to those offered…Read more
  •  81
    Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis (edited book)
    with Graham Priest
    Oxford University Press. 2004.
    David Lewis's untimely death on 14 October 2001 deprived the philosophical community of one of the outstanding philosophers of the 20th century. As many obituaries remarked, Lewis has an undeniable place in the history of analytical philosophy. His work defines much of the current agenda in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and the philosophy of mind and language. This volume, an expanded edition of a special issue of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, covers many of the topics for which Le…Read more
  •  87
    Metaphysics by Possible Cases
    The Monist 77 (1): 93-110. 1994.
    We often do metaphysics by intuitions about possible cases. An example is the argument for functionalism about belief and desire. The argument starts from the premise that, intuitively, it is not possible for belief and desire to vary independently of functional nature —functional duplicates are necessarily belief-desire duplicates—and concludes that belief and desire are functional states. An equally famous example is the argument against functionalism for sensory qualities. The argument starts…Read more
  • Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis (edited book)
    with Graham Priest
    Oxford University Press UK. 2004.
    David Lewis's untimely death on 14 October 2001 deprived the philosophical community of one of the outstanding philosophers of the 20th century. As many obituaries remarked, Lewis has an undeniable place in the history of analytical philosophy. His work defines much of the current agenda in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and the philosophy of mind and language. This volume, an expanded edition of a special issue of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, covers many of the topics for which Le…Read more
  •  22
    Locke-ing onto Content
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49 127-143. 2001.
    Our reading is a passage from John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book III, Chapter II, § 2.When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood; and the end of speech is that those sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer. … Words being voluntary signs, they cannot be voluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not. That would be to make them signs of nothing, sounds without signification.
  •  59
    Language, Names and Information
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2010.
    _Language, Names, and Information_ is an important contribution to philosophy of language by one of its foremost scholars, challenging the pervasive view that the description theory of proper names is dead in the water, and defending a version of the description theory from a perspective on language that sees words as a wonderful source of information about the nature of the world we live in. Challenges current pervasive view that the description theory of reference for proper names has been ref…Read more
  • Knowledge: The Qualia Argument
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Martine Nida-Rümelin 3. 2002.
  •  87
    Interactionism revived?
    Philosophy of Social Science 10 (September): 316-23. 1980.
  •  13
    II–Frank Jackson
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1): 269-282. 1997.
  •  26
    I. acting, trying, and essentialism
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 25 (2). 1982.
  •  143
    Is belief an internal state? (review)
    Philosophical Studies 132 (3): 571-580. 2007.
    This paper is a discussion of Michael Thau
  •  10
    Hesperus and Phosphorus I, John Tienson
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1). 1984.
  •  23
    Introduction
    with Graham Priest
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1). 2004.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  192
    Galen Strawson on panpsychism
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 62-64. 2006.
    We make powerful motor cars by suitably assembling items that are not themselves powerful, but we do not do this by 'adding in the power' at the very end of the assembly line; nor, if it comes to that, do we add portions of power along the way. Powerful motor cars are nothing over and above complex arrangements or aggregations of items that are not themselves powerful. The example illustrates the way aggregations can have interesting properties that the items aggregated lack. What can we say of …Read more
  • From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis
    Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197): 539-542. 1999.
  •  56
    Folk psychology and tacit theories : A correspondence between Frank Jackson and Steve Stich and kelby Mason
    with Kelby Mason and Steve Stich
    In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, Mit Press. pp. 99--112. 2009.
  •  86
    From reduction to type-type identity (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 644-647. 2002.
    I argue, first, that there is a problem for his account of reduction as it stands; second, that the change that needs to be made is relatively clear ; but, third, that when the needed change is made, his claim that the best form of physicalism is a reductive one amounts to the claim that the best form of physicalism is the ‘Australian’ type-type identity version. I do not see this as an objection—far from it.
  •  18
    From Reduction to Type-Type Identity
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 644-647. 2002.
    I argue, first, that there is a problem for his account of reduction as it stands; second, that the change that needs to be made is relatively clear ; but, third, that when the needed change is made, his claim that the best form of physicalism is a reductive one amounts to the claim that the best form of physicalism is the ‘Australian’ type-type identity version. I do not see this as an objection—far from it.
  •  192
    Functionalism and type-type identity theories
    with Robert Pargetter and Elizabeth W. Prior
    Philosophical Studies 42 (September): 209-25. 1982.
  •  2772
    Epiphenomenal qualia
    Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April): 127-136. 1982.