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74The puzzle about conditionalsThink 2 (6): 19-23. 2004.Frank Jackson introduces a seemingly intractable mystery concerning ‘if…then…’ statements
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71Review symposium : Sir Karl Popper and sir John Eccles. The self and its brain. New York: Springer verlag, 1977. Pp. XVI + 597. $17.90. Unpacking some dualities inherent in a mind/brain dualism Karl H.Pribram psychology, Stanford university (review)Philosophy of the Social Sciences 10 (3): 295-308. 1980.
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70A note on incorrigibility and authorityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3): 358-363. 1967.This Article does not have an abstract
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67A priori physicalismIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2007.
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65Confirmation and the NomologicalCanadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3). 1980.We argue that it is a mistake to approach goodman's new riddle of induction by demarcating projectible from non-Projectible predicates and hypotheses, And put forward an alternative way of looking at the whole question
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58Indefinite probability statementsSynthese 26 (2). 1973.Indefinite probability statements can be analysed in terms of statements which attribute probability to propositions. Therefore, there is no need to find a special place in probability theory for them; once we have an adequate account of statements that straightforwardly attribute probability to propositions, we will automatically have an adequate account of indefinite probability statements
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5320 Mind and IllusionIn Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary, Mit Press. pp. 421. 2004.
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51Learning from What Color Experiences Are Good ForThe Harvard Review of Philosophy 27 49-58. 2020.Color is an incredibly controversial topic. Here is a sample of views taken seriously: colors are dispositions to look coloured; colors are physical properties of surfaces or of light; colors are properties of certain mental states, which get projected onto the surfaces of objects or onto reflected or transmitted light; colors are an illusion; colors are sui generis. One hopes to break the impasse by finding a compelling starting point—one drawing on obvious points that are common ground—which n…Read more
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44Eliminativism and the theory of referenceIn Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 14--62. 2009.
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40Conditionals and PossibiliaProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81. 1981.Frank Jackson; VIII*—Conditionals and Possibilia, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 125–138, https://doi.org/10.10.
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38Locke-ing onto ContentRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49 127-143. 2001.Our reading is a passage from John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book III, Chapter II, § 2.When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood; and the end of speech is that those sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer. … Words being voluntary signs, they cannot be voluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not. That would be to make them signs of nothing, sounds without signification.
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38Two theories of indicative conditionals: Reply to Brian EllisAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1). 1984.This Article does not have an abstract
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36On an argument from properties of words to broad contentIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 319-328. 2004.
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35Critical noticeAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4). 1992.This Article does not have an abstract
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32The epistemological objection to opaque teleological theories of contentIn Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics, Oxford University Press. pp. 85--99. 2006.
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