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31I. acting, trying, and essentialismInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 25 (2). 1982.
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29Viii notes on contributors Alvin Goldman is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. His principal research areas are episte-mology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. His most recent book is Simulating Minds (2006) (review)In Michael Bishop & Dominic Murphy (eds.), Stich and His Critics, Blackwell. 2009.
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25IntroductionAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1). 2004.This Article does not have an abstract
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21A reply to "induction and objectivity"Philosophy of Science 37 (3): 440-443. 1970.In “Induction and Objectivity” [1], F. John Clendinnen puts forwards a vindication of induction. I wish to argue that the vindication fails. As Clendinnen's argument is complex and presents certain difficulties it is necessary and only fair to quote his summary of it.“I shall attempt to vindicate induction by showing that it is the only possible way of predicting that is objective, and further that, while objectivity is not a necessary condition for success in predicting, objective methods are t…Read more
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21Causation in the Philosophy of MindIn Andy Clark & Peter Millican (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Clarendon Press. pp. 195-214. 1996.
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21Review of Irrationality (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3): 635-636. 1990.NA
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21The story of 'Fred'In Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2006.
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21From Recduction to Type‐ Type IdentityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 644-647. 2002.I argue, first, that there is a problem for his account of reduction as it stands; second, that the change that needs to be made is relatively clear ; but, third, that when the needed change is made, his claim that the best form of physicalism is a reductive one amounts to the claim that the best form of physicalism is the ‘Australian’ type-type identity version. I do not see this as an objection—far from it.
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15A slightly radical neuron doctrineBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5): 840-841. 1999.The element of truth in behaviorism tells us that some versions of a radical neuron doctrine must be false. However, the representational nature of many mental states implies that neuroscience may well bear on some topics traditionally addressed by philosophers of mind. An example is the individuation of belief states.
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15A Companion to David Lewis, edited by Barry Lower and Jonathan SchafferGrazer Philosophische Studien 93 (2): 323-327. 2016.
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14Philosophical Papers, volume II by David Lewis (review)Journal of Philosophy 86 (8): 433-437. 1989.
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13VIII*—Conditionals and PossibiliaProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1): 125-138. 1981.Frank Jackson; VIII*—Conditionals and Possibilia, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 125–138, https://doi.org/10.10.
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13Propositions and probabilityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3). 1970.This Article does not have an abstract
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13XIII*—Essentialism, Mental Properties and Causation1Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1): 253-268. 1995.Frank Jackson; XIII*—Essentialism, Mental Properties and Causation1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95, Issue 1, 1 June 1995, Pages 253–268, ht.
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10Review: Is Belief an Internal State? (review)Philosophical Studies 132 (3). 2007.This paper is a discussion of Michael Thau's interesting critique in Chapter 2 of Consciousness and Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, of the common view that beliefs are internal states.
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10Three Questions About Consciousness Review of Consciousness And Experience by William G. Lycan (review)PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 3. 1997.
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9Reply to a responsePhilosophy of Science 37 (3): 449-451. 1970.While disagreeing with some of the detail of my argument in [2] F. John Clendinnen accepts its conclusion, namely, that the vindication he proposed in [1] fails. I will thus confine myself to saying, very briefly, why I think the new vindication of induction that he sketches in [3] also fails.
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8Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis (edited book)Oxford University Press UK. 2004.David Lewis's untimely death on 14 October 2001 deprived the philosophical community of one of the outstanding philosophers of the 20th century. As many obituaries remarked, Lewis has an undeniable place in the history of analytical philosophy. His work defines much of the current agenda in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and the philosophy of mind and language. This volume, an expanded edition of a special issue of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, covers many of the topics for which Le…Read more
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621 Finding the Mind in the Natural WorldIn David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press. pp. 162. 2002.
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