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160Michael Tye on Perceptual Content (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1): 199-205. 2011.
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141Mind, Method and Conditionals: Selected PapersRoutledge. 1998.First Published in 2004. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company
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5320 Mind and IllusionIn Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary, Mit Press. pp. 421. 2004.
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265Mental causationMind 105 (419): 377-413. 1996.I survey recent work on mental causation. The discussion is conducted under the twin presumptions that mental states, including especially what subjects believe and desire, causally explain what subjects do, and that the physical sciences can in principle give a complete explanation for each and every bodily movement. I start with sceptical discussions of various views that hold that, in some strong sense, the causal explanations offered by psychology are autonomous with respect to those offered…Read more
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105Lewisian themes: the philosophy of David K. Lewis (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2004.David Lewis's untimely death on 14 October 2001 deprived the philosophical community of one of the outstanding philosophers of the 20th century. As many obituaries remarked, Lewis has an undeniable place in the history of analytical philosophy. His work defines much of the current agenda in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and the philosophy of mind and language. This volume, an expanded edition of a special issue of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, covers many of the topics for which Le…Read more
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103Metaphysics by Possible CasesThe Monist 77 (1): 93-110. 1994.We often do metaphysics by intuitions about possible cases. An example is the argument for functionalism about belief and desire. The argument starts from the premise that, intuitively, it is not possible for belief and desire to vary independently of functional nature —functional duplicates are necessarily belief-desire duplicates—and concludes that belief and desire are functional states. An equally famous example is the argument against functionalism for sensory qualities. The argument starts…Read more
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8Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis (edited book)Oxford University Press UK. 2004.David Lewis's untimely death on 14 October 2001 deprived the philosophical community of one of the outstanding philosophers of the 20th century. As many obituaries remarked, Lewis has an undeniable place in the history of analytical philosophy. His work defines much of the current agenda in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and the philosophy of mind and language. This volume, an expanded edition of a special issue of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, covers many of the topics for which Le…Read more
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38Locke-ing onto ContentRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49 127-143. 2001.Our reading is a passage from John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book III, Chapter II, § 2.When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood; and the end of speech is that those sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer. … Words being voluntary signs, they cannot be voluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not. That would be to make them signs of nothing, sounds without signification.
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79Language, Names and Information (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2010._Language, Names, and Information_ is an important contribution to philosophy of language by one of its foremost scholars, challenging the pervasive view that the description theory of proper names is dead in the water, and defending a version of the description theory from a perspective on language that sees words as a wonderful source of information about the nature of the world we live in. Challenges current pervasive view that the description theory of reference for proper names has been ref…Read more
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Knowledge: The Qualia ArgumentStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Martine Nida-Rümelin 3. 2002.
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147Is belief an internal state? (review)Philosophical Studies 132 (3): 571-580. 2007.This paper is a discussion of Michael Thau
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31I. acting, trying, and essentialismInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 25 (2). 1982.
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25IntroductionAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1). 2004.This Article does not have an abstract
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205Galen Strawson on panpsychismJournal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 62-64. 2006.We make powerful motor cars by suitably assembling items that are not themselves powerful, but we do not do this by 'adding in the power' at the very end of the assembly line; nor, if it comes to that, do we add portions of power along the way. Powerful motor cars are nothing over and above complex arrangements or aggregations of items that are not themselves powerful. The example illustrates the way aggregations can have interesting properties that the items aggregated lack. What can we say of …Read more
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6Finding the Mind in the Natural WorldIn Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993), Holder-pichler-tempsky. pp. 227-49. 1994.
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621 Finding the Mind in the Natural WorldIn David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press. pp. 162. 2002.
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20From Recduction to Type‐ Type IdentityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 644-647. 2002.I argue, first, that there is a problem for his account of reduction as it stands; second, that the change that needs to be made is relatively clear ; but, third, that when the needed change is made, his claim that the best form of physicalism is a reductive one amounts to the claim that the best form of physicalism is the ‘Australian’ type-type identity version. I do not see this as an objection—far from it.
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1From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual AnalysisPhilosophical Quarterly 49 (197): 539-542. 1999.
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99Folk psychology and tacit theories : A correspondence between Frank Jackson and Steve Stich and kelby MasonIn David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, Mit Press. pp. 99--112. 2009.
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101From reduction to type-type identity (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 644-647. 2002.I argue, first, that there is a problem for his account of reduction as it stands; second, that the change that needs to be made is relatively clear ; but, third, that when the needed change is made, his claim that the best form of physicalism is a reductive one amounts to the claim that the best form of physicalism is the ‘Australian’ type-type identity version. I do not see this as an objection—far from it.
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160From H2O to water: The relevance to A Priori passageIn Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics, Routledge. pp. 84-97. 2003.
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237Functionalism and type-type identity theoriesPhilosophical Studies 42 (September): 209-25. 1982.
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95Essentialism, mental properties, and causationProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 253-268. 1995.Frank Jackson; XIII*—Essentialism, Mental Properties and Causation1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95, Issue 1, 1 June 1995, Pages 253–268, ht.
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