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5Review: Responses (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3). 2001.I hope the Précis makes clear some of what I would say to the interesting issues my commentators raise. The responses that follow are focussed on a selection of these issues. There are many things I do not discuss for lack of space.
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177Ramsey Sentences and Avoiding the Sui GenerisIn Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2005.
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138Procrastinate RevisitedPacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4): 634-647. 2014.How is what an agent ought to do at time t related to what they ought to do over a period of time that includes t? I revisit an example that sheds light on this question, taking account of issues to do with the agent's intentions and the distinction between subjective and objective obligation
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10Review: Is Belief an Internal State? (review)Philosophical Studies 132 (3). 2007.This paper is a discussion of Michael Thau's interesting critique in Chapter 2 of Consciousness and Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, of the common view that beliefs are internal states.
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123Representation and experienceIn Hugh Clapin, Phillip Staines & Peter Slezak (eds.), Representation in Mind, Elsevier. pp. 107--124. 2004.
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135Responses (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3): 653-664. 2001.I hope the Précis makes clear some of what I would say to the interesting issues my commentators raise. The responses that follow are focussed on a selection of these issues. There are many things I do not discuss for lack of space.
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152ResponsesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3): 653-664. 2001.My summary is organised around themes.
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14Philosophical Papers, volume II by David Lewis (review)Journal of Philosophy 86 (8): 433-437. 1989.
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235Postscript on QualiaIn Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, Mit Press. pp. 417-420. 2004.
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POLLOCK, J. L., "Subjunctive Reasoning" (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (n/a): 413. 1980.
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193On the semantics and logic of obligationMind 94 (374): 177-195. 1985.This paper develops an informal semantics for 'ought to be' and 'ought to be given...' and argues for its plausibility. A feature of the semantics is that it invalidates 'if a entails b, And o(a), Then o(b)' and 'if o(a) & o(b), Then o(a&b)', While validating detachment for conditional obligation
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2Philosophizing about colorIn Color Perception: Philosophical, Psychological, Artistic, and Computational Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2000.
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144PerceptionPhilosophical Books 19 (May): 49-56. 1978.Two Themes to the Course: a.) How are we to understand the contrast between direct and indirect or immediate and mediate perception? b.) Is there any cogent reason to think we don’t have sense experience of the world around us?
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89Robert C. Stalnaker: Our knowledge of the internal worldJournal of Philosophy 107 (12): 659-663. 2010.
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195On ensuring that physicalism is not a dual attribute theory in sheep's clothingPhilsophical Studies 131 (1): 227-249. 2006.Physicalists are committed to the determination without remainder of the psychological by the physical, but are they committed to this determination being a priori? This paper distinguishes this question understood de dicto from this question understood de re, argues that understood de re the answer is yes in a way that leaves open the answer to the question understood de dicto.
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311On assertion and indicative conditionalsPhilosophical Review 88 (4): 565-589. 1979.I defend the view that the truth conditions of the ordinary indicative conditional are those of the material conditional. This is done via a discussion of assertability and by appeal to conventional implicature rather than conversational implicature
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36On an argument from properties of words to broad contentIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 319-328. 2004.
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3Non-Cognitivism, Validity and ConditionalsIn Dale Jamieson (ed.), Singer and His Critics, Blackwell. pp. 18--37. 1999.
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193Naturalism and the Fate of the M-Worlds: Frank JacksonAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1). 1997.We make a huge variety of claims framed in vocabularies drawn from physics and chemistry, everyday talk, neuroscience, ethics, mathematics, semantics, folk and professional psychology, and so on and so forth. We say, for example, that Jones feels cold, that Carlton might win, that there are quarks, that murder is wrong, that there are four fundamental forces, and that a certain level of neurological activity is necessary for thought. If we follow Huw Price's Carnapian lead, we can put this by sa…Read more
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215Narrow content and representation--or twin earth revisitedProceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 77 (2): 55-70. 2003.Intentional states represent. Belief represents how we take things to be; desire represents how we would like things to be; and so on. To represent is to make a division among possibilities; it is to divide the possibilities into those that are consistent with how things are being represented to be and those that are not. I will call the possibilities consistent with how some intentional state represents things to be, its content. There is no suggestion that this is the only legitimate notion of…Read more
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