Keya Maitra

Our claims of knowledge about our own mental states are considered epistemically privileged. This paper deals with the issue of whether there is a feature that is most typical of this epistemological phenomenon. I will first introduce a distinction between two kinds of privilege that a knowledge claim can enjoy, namely, in epistemic access and in epistemic authority. While privilege in epistemic access (P-access) deals with how we make these claims, privilege in epistemic authority (P-authority) deals with the certainty that these claims enjoy. I will term the trend popular in the traditional and contemporary literature to understand self-knowledge in terms of P-authority as the ‘P-authority thesis.’ The point of this paper is to pose a challenge that the proponents of P-authority thesis have to meet. The challenge is to show that P-access necessarily entails P-authority in all or most cases of self-knowledge claims. I will then point out some of the problems in meeting this challenge. In further defense of this point I will consider and reject an argument presented by Burge and others in support of the P-authority thesis. I will conclude by noting that if this challenge can’t be met then P-access would have to be accepted as the default position to understand the epistemic privilege of self-knowledge claims.