•  4
    Book Review (review)
    Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (2-4): 409-413. 2007.
  •  1
    Are Most of Us Honest People? Or Dishonest? Or Neither?
    In Artur Szutta & Natasza Szutta (eds.), W poszukiwaniu moralnego charakteru, Academicon Publishing House. pp. 103-145. 2015.
    In section one of this paper, I review some of the leading research on cheating behavior, and in section two I do the same for cheating motivation. Section three then outlines several requirements for honesty and dishonesty, and I explain why, in light of the current psychological evidence, these requirements do not seem to be met. Finally in section four I step back and present some of the details of my Mixed Trait approach to thinking about the character traits which, I claim, most people actu…Read more
  •  3
    In this paper my goal is to extend my earlier discussion, at least in a preliminary way, to two additional areas – fairness and stealing. In doing so, I will consider whether the existing research is compatible with my Mixed Trait model, or whether instead it gives me reason to be concerned with how broadly applicable the model really is. My conclusion will be that the results are, so to speak, a mixed bag. With respect to fairness research, some careful conceived studies have been done which do…Read more
  •  46
    This is the second of three volumes on moral psychology edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and published by MIT Press in 2008.
  •  2
    Rationalism and Intuitionism
    In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology, Routledge. pp. 329-346. 2018.
    One of the liveliest areas in moral psychology in recent years has been research on the extent to which conscious reasoning leads to the formation of moral judgments. The goal of this chapter is to review and briefly assess three of the leading positions today on this topic - traditional rationalism, social intuitionism, and morphological rationalism - each of which has significant implications for moral epistemology.
  •  439
    Motivation in agents
    Noûs 42 (2). 2008.
    The Humean theory of motivation remains the default position in much of the contemporary literature in meta-ethics, moral psychology, and action theory. Yet despite its widespread support, the theory is implausible as a view about what motivates agents to act. More specifically, my reasons for dissatisfaction with the Humean theory stem from its incompatibility with what I take to be a compelling model of the role of motivating reasons in first-person practical deliberation and third-person acti…Read more