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1128Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect CommunityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4): 965-982. 1999.The object of this paper is to provide a solution to Nelson Goodman’s Imperfect Community difficulty as it arises for Resemblance Nominalism, the view that properties are classes of resembling particulars. The Imperfect Community difficulty consists in that every two members of a class resembling each other is not sufficient for it to be a class such that there is some property common to all their members, even if ‘x resembles y’ is understood as ‘x and y share some property’. In the paper I exp…Read more
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436Sobre los escepticos griegosIdea Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych 3 (3): 59-74. 1989.In this paper I argue that Ancient Greek Sceptics implicitly presupposed a Parmenidean ontology.
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221Modal realism and metaphysical nihilismMind 113 (452): 683-704. 2004.In this paper I argue that Modal Realism, the thesis that there exist non-actual possible individuals and worlds, can be made compatible with Metaphysical Nihilism, the thesis that it is possible that nothing concrete exists. Modal Realism as developed by Lewis rules out the possibility of a world where nothing concrete exists and so conflicts with Metaphysical Nihilism. In the paper I argue that Modal Realism can be modified so as to be compatible with Metaphysical Nihilism. Such a modification…Read more
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651Leibniz : mind-body causation and pre-established harmonyIn Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. pp. 109-118. 2009.Causation was an important topic of philosophical reflection during the Seventeenth Century. This reflection centred around certain particular problems about causation, one of which was the problem of causation between mind and body. The doctrine of the pre-established harmony is Leibniz's response to the problem of causation between mind and body. In this chapter I shall (a) explain the problem of mind-body causation; (b) explain Leibniz's pre-established harmony; and (c) assess his case for it…Read more
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1215The Principles of Contradiction, Sufficient Reason, and Identity of IndiscerniblesIn Maria Rosa Antognazza (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Leibniz, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.Leibniz was a philosopher of principles: the principles of Contradiction, of Sufficient Reason, of Identity of Indiscernibles, of Plenitude, of the Best, and of Continuity are among the most famous Leibnizian principles. In this article I shall focus on the first three principles; I shall discuss various formulations of the principles (sect. 1), what it means for these theses to have the status of principles or axioms in Leibniz’s philosophy (sect. 2), the fundamental character of the Principle…Read more
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1790Grounding is not a strict orderJournal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3): 517-534. 2015.The paper argues that grounding is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive. In arguing for that conclusion the paper also arguesthat truthmaking is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive.
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352The Language of Publication of "Analytic" PhilosophyCritica 45 (133): 83-90. 2013.This note argues that research in analytical philosophy broadly conceived should be published exclusively in English. Reasons are given for this and the thesis is defended against thirteen objections
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85Searle's correspondence theory of truth and the slingshotPhilosophical Quarterly 48 (193): 513-522. 1998.
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159Nominalism About Properties: New Essays (edited book)Routledge. 2015.Nominalism, which has its origins in the Middle Ages and continues into the Twenty-First Century, is the doctrine that there are no universals. This book is unique in bringing together essays on the history of nominalism and essays that present a systematic discussion of nominalism. It introduces the reader to the distinction between particulars and universals, to the difficulties posed by this distinction, and to the main motivations for the rejection of universals. It also describes the main v…Read more
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41Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor (edited book)Routledge. 2002.Real Metaphysics brings together new articles by leading metaphysicians to honour Hugh Mellor's outstanding contribution to metaphysics. Some of the most outstanding minds of current times shed new light on all the main topics in metaphysics: truth, causation, dispositions and properties, explanation, and time. At the end of the book, Hugh Mellor responds to the issues raised by each of the thirteen contributors and gives us new insight into his own highly influential work on metaphysics
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148Leibniz's Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in his Correspondence with ClarkeAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4). 1999.In Section 21 of his fifth letter to Clarke Leibniz attempts to derive the Identity of Indiscernibles from an application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason to God´s act of creation, namely that God has a reason to create the world he creates. In this paper I argue that this argument fails, not just because the Identity of Indiscernibles is false, but because there is a counterexample to one of the premises that Leibniz cannot satisfactorily rule out.
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910Truthmaker maximalism defendedAnalysis 66 (3). 2006.Peter Milne has tried to refure Truthmaker Maximalism. the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker, by producing a simple and direct counterexample to it, the sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. I argue that, contrary to what Milne argues, on Truthmaker Maximalism M is equivalent to the Liar, which gives the truthmaker maximalist a way to defend his position from Milne's counterexample: to argue that M expresses no proposition.
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2942Descartes's substance dualism and his independence conception of substanceJournal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1): 69-89. 2008.Descartes maintained substance dualism, the thesis that no substance has both mental and material properties. His main argument for this thesis, the so-called separability argument from the Sixth Meditation (AT VII: 78) has long puzzled readers. In this paper I argue that Descartes’ independence conception of substance (which Descartes presents in article 51 of the Principles) is crucial for the success of the separability argument and that Descartes used this conception of substance to defend h…Read more
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69Truthmaking and the SlingshotIn Uwe Meixner & Peter Simons (eds.), Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age: Papers of the 22nd International Wittgenstein Symposium, Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. 1999.In this paper I shall show how the Correspondence Theory of Truth can block Davidson’s Slingshot (Davidson 1984), which threatens to make the Correspondence Theory collapse. In particular I shall show that the Slingshot is unsound − and in so doing I shall show that the Correspondence Theory has some metaphysical commitments about the nature of facts.
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590Resemblance nominalism and counterparts: Reply to BirdAnalysis 63 (3). 2003.In my book *Resemblance Nominalism* I argued that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In his "Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts" Alexander Bird objects to my claim that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In this paper I respond to Bird´s objections.
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359Sobre una version del Nominalismo de SemejanzasRevista de Filosofía (Misc.) 11 (1/2). 1996.The concern of this paper is a version of Resemblance Nominalism according to which resemblance classes, i.e. classes of resembling things, are determined by paradigms. I show that the theory is false, since paradigms do not generally determine resemblance classes. Although I concentrate upon the version of the theory which was delineated by H. H. Price, my results apply to any other theory constructing resemblance classes out of paradigms.
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983Leibniz on Substance in the Discourse on MetaphysicsIn T. Stoneham & P. Lodge (eds.), Locke and Leibniz on Substance, Routledge. 2015.In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz put forward his famous complete-concept definition of substance. Sometimes this definition is glossed as stating that a substance is an entity with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates, and it is thought that it follows directly from Leibniz’s theory of truth. Now, an adequate definition of substance should not apply to accidents. But, as I shall point out, if Leibniz’s theory of truth is correct then an accident is an entity with a c…Read more
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504What is the problem of universals?Mind 109 (434): 255-273. 2000.In this article I address the Problem of Universals by answering questions about what facts a solution to the Problem of Universals should explain and how the explanation should go. I argue that a solution to the Problem of Universals explains the facts the Problem of Universals is about by giving the truthmakers (as opposed to the conceptual content and the ontological commitments) of the sentences stating those facts. I argue that the sentences stating the relevant facts are those like 'a has …Read more
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866How not to trivialise the identity of indiscerniblesIn P. F. Strawson & A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Concepts, Properties and Qualities, Ashgate. 2006.
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13The language of PhilosophyRevista de Filosofia Aurora 26 (38): 157. 2014.This note argues that research in Analytical Philosophy broadly conceived should be published exclusively in English. Reasons are given for this and the thesis is defended from eleven objections.
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858Infinite analysis, lucky proof, and guaranteed proof in LeibnizArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93 (2): 222-236. 2011.According to one of Leibniz's theories of contingency a proposition is contingent if and only if it cannot be proved in a finite number of steps. It has been argued that this faces the Problem of Lucky Proof , namely that we could begin by analysing the concept ‘Peter’ by saying that ‘Peter is a denier of Christ and …’, thereby having proved the proposition ‘Peter denies Christ’ in a finite number of steps. It also faces a more general but related problem that we dub the Problem of Guaranteed Pr…Read more
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2175TruthmakersPhilosophy Compass 1 (2). 2006.This bulletin contains a summary of the main topics of discussion in truthmaker theory, namely: the definition of truthmakers, problems with Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Truthmaker Maximalism, the ontological burden of truthmakers and the recalcitrant topic of truthmakers for negative truths.
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920Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of UniversalsOxford University Press. 2002.Gardeners, poets, lovers, and philosophers are all interested in the redness of roses; but only philosophers wonder how it is that two different roses can share the same property. Are red things red because they resemble each other? Or do they resemble each other because they are red? Since the 1970s philosophers have tended to favour the latter view, and held that a satisfactory account of properties must involve the postulation of either universals or tropes. But Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra …Read more
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360Kripke y las descripciones rígidasRevista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 19 (1): 109-113. 1993.In this paper I discuss a passage from *Naming and Necessity* where Kripke assumes that the essential properties by means of which a definite description designates are a sufficient condition of its rigidity. I put forward two examples that show the falsity of this assumption. Then I examine the non-rigid character of definite descriptions that designate by means of properties that are sufficient conditions of identity of the objects designated by those descriptions. I conclude that the properti…Read more
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168Metaphysical nihilism defended: Reply to Lowe and PaseauAnalysis 62 (2). 2002.I believe in metaphysical nihilism, the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects, because I believe in a version of the subtraction argument, the subtraction argument*, that proves it. But both Jonathan Lowe (2002) and Alexander Paseau (2002) express doubts about the subtraction argument*. Paseau thinks the argument is invalid, and Lowe argues that invoking concrete* objects is unnecessary. Furthermore Lowe attempts to rebut my objections (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2000) to his anti-nihilis…Read more
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96Leibniz's argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in Primary TruthsIn M. Carrara, A. M. Nunziante & G. Tomasi (eds.), Individuals, minds and bodies: themes from Leibniz, Franz Steiner Verlag. 2004.In this paper I reconstruct Leibniz's argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in his *Primary Truths*. I criticise the alternative interpretation put forward by Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne and defend my own interpretation, both on philosophical and hermeneutical grounds.
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927Truthmaker Maximalism defended againAnalysis 75 (1): 3-8. 2015.In this note we shall argue that Milne’s new effort does not refute Truthmaker Maximalism. According to Truthmaker Maximalism, every truth has a truthmaker. Milne has attempted to refute it using the following self-referential sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. Essential to his refutation is that M is like the Gödel sentence and unlike the Liar, and one way in which Milne supports this assimilation is through the claim that his proof is essentially object-level and not semantic. In Sec…Read more
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |