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211The self and the phenomenalRatio 17 (4): 365-89. 2004.As is widely appreciated and easily demonstrated, the notion that we are essentially experiential (or conscious) beings has a good deal of appeal; what is less obvious, and more controversial, is whether it is possible to devise a viable account of the self along such lines within the confines of a broadly naturalistic metaphysical framework. There are many avenues to explore, but here I confine myself to outlining the case for one particular approach. I suggest that we should think of ourselves…Read more
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228Time, Passage and Immediate ExperienceIn Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time, Oxford University Press. pp. 382. 2011.
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130Time and SpaceMcgill-Queen's University Press. 2001.These are just some of the fundamental questions addressed in Time and Space. Writing for a primary readership of advanced undergraduate and graduate philosophy students, Barry Dainton introduces the central ideas and arguments that make space and time such philosophically challenging topics. Although recognising that many issues in the philosophy of time and space involve technical features of physics, Dainton has been careful to keep the conceptual issues accessible to students with little sci…Read more
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35Reviews - Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. By Galen Strawson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp.448Philosophy 86 (1): 127-134. 2011.
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986Higher-order consciousness and phenomenal space: Reply to MeehanPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 10. 2004.Meehan finds fault with a number of my arguments, and proposes that better solutions to the problems I was addressing are available if we adopt a higher-order theory of consciousness. I start with some general remarks on theories of this sort. I connect what I had to say about the A-thesis with different forms of higher-order sense theories, and explain why I ignored higher-order thought theories altogether: there are compelling grounds for thinking they cannot provide a viable account of phenom…Read more
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88Causation and laws of natureIn John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy, Wiley-blackwell. 2009.
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1064Time in experience: Reply to GallagherPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9. 2003.Consciousness exists in time, but time is also to be found within consciousness: we are directly aware of both persistence and change, at least over short intervals. On reflection this can seem baffling. How is it possible for us to be immediately aware of phenomena which are not (strictly speaking) present? What must consciousness be like for this to be possible? In "Stream of Consciousness" I argued that influential accounts of phenomenal temporality along the lines developed by Broad and Huss…Read more
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209Sensing changePhilosophical Issues 18 (1): 362-384. 2008.We can anticipate what is yet to happen, remember what has already happened, but our immediate experience is confined to the present, the here and now. So much seems common sense. So much so that it is no surprise to see Thomas Reid, that pre-eminent champion of common sense in philosophy, advocating precisely this position
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196Precis: Stream of ConsciousnessPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 10. 2004.That our ordinary everyday experience exhibits both unity and continuity is uncontroversial, and on the face of it utterly unmysterious. At any moment we have some conscious awareness of both the world about us, as revealed through our perceptual experiences, and our own inner states – our bodily sensations, thoughts, mental images and so on. Since once wakened we tend to stay awake for several hours, tracing out continuous routes through whatever environment we happen to find ourselves in, it i…Read more
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71From Phenomenal Selves to HyperselvesRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76 161-197. 2015.The claim that we are subjects of experience, i.e. beings whose nature is intimately bound up with consciousness, is in many ways a plausible one. There is, however, more than one way of developing a metaphysical account of the nature of subjects. The view that subjects are essentially conscious has the unfortunate consequence that subjects cannot survive periods of unconsciousness. A more appealing alternative is to hold that subjects are beings with the capacity to be conscious, a capacity whi…Read more
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965Unity and introspectibility: Reply to GilmorePSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 10. 2004.Gilmore concentrates on two arguments which I took to undermine the claim that introspectibility is necessary for co-consciousness: the.
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325In ordinary conscious experience, consciousness of time seems to be ubiquitous. For example, we seem to be directly aware of change, movement, and succession across brief temporal intervals. How is this possible? Many different models of temporal consciousness have been proposed. Some philosophers have argued that consciousness is confined to a momentary interval and that we are not in fact directly aware of change. Others have argued that although consciousness itself is momentary, we are never…Read more
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The Nature and Identity of the SelfDissertation, University of Oxford (United Kingdom). 1989.Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;We are mental beings whose identity is absolute, intrinsic and real. This conception of the self, which, it is argued, corresponds to our deeper beliefs about, and attitudes towards, ourselves and others, is a consequence of taking the experienced unity and continuity of consciousness as the key to self-identity. Some of the difficulties often taken as fatal to this "subjectivist" view of the self, considerations c…Read more
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139_Stream of Consciousness_ is about the phenomenology of conscious experience. Barry Dainton shows us that stream of consciousness is not a mosaic of discrete fragments of experience, but rather an interconnected flowing whole. Through a deep probing into the nature of awareness, introspection, phenomenal space and time consciousness, Dainton offers a truly original understanding of the nature of consciousness
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174Review of Consciousness and its Place in Nature (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1): 238-261. 2011.
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
20th Century Philosophy |
Philosophy of Physical Science |