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ConstructivismIn David Sander & Klaus R. Scherer (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences, . 2009.Encyclopedia entry for Constructivism.
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286Ambivalent emotions and the perceptual account of emotionsAnalysis 65 (3): 229-233. 2005.This paper replies to an argument due to Greenspan (1980) and to Morton (2002) against the view that emotions are perceptions of values. The argument holds that this view cannot make room for ambivalent emotions both of which are appropriate, such as when it is appropriate to feel fear and attraction towards something. This would make for a contradiction, for appropriate emotions are supposed to present things as they are. The problem, I argue, is that this line of thoughts forgets that things c…Read more
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800The Philosophy of Normativity, or How to Try Clearing Things Up a LittleDialogue 50 (2): 233-238. 2011.This introduction to a collection of papers on normativity provides a framework modelled on the division in ethics to approach normative issues. It suggests that is is useful to divide questions about normativity into five groups: normative ontology, normative semantics, normative epistemology, normative psychology, and substantial normative theory.
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991Facts and Values in Emotional PlasticityIn Louis Charland & Peter Zachar (eds.), Fact and Value in Emotion, John Benjamins. pp. 101--137. 2008.How much can we shape the emotions we experience? Or to put it another way, how plastic are our emotions? It is clear that the exercise of identifying the degree of plasticity of emotion is futile without a prior specification of what can be plastic, so we first propose an analysis of the components of emotions. We will then turn to empirical data that might be used to assess the degree of plasticity of emotions.
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ValueIn David Sander & Klaus R. Scherer (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences, Oxford University Press. 2009.This entry specifies the possible relations between values and emotions.
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324Mixed inferences: A problem for pluralism about truth predicatesAnalysis 57 (3). 1997.In reply to Geach's objection against expressivism, some have claimed that there is a plurality of truth predicates. I raise a difficulty for this claim: valid inferences can involve sentences assessable by any truth predicate, corresponding to 'lightweight' truth as well as to 'heavyweight' truth. To account for this, some unique truth predicate must apply to all sentences that can appear in inferences. Mixed inferences remind us of a central platitude about truth: truth is what is preserved in…Read more
