Brian Garrett

This note criticizes Andrew Brennan's attempt to defend best‐candidate theories of the identity of artefacts over time against certain now familiar objections. Adoption of a mereological conception of individuals does not, in itself, provide the means for a satisfactory response to objections of Wiggins and Noonan (some of which are anyway ill‐focused). The way forward consists in recognizing that the consequences of best‐candidate theories which have been thought objectionable (in particular, commitment to the extrinsicness of identity) do not violate the necessity of identity and imply ‐ what anyway ought to seem unexceptionable ‐ that a predicate such as ‘constituting the ship which is the Ship of Theseus’ does not denote a genuine property of the hunk of matter of which the predicate is true. Once these consequences have been clearly mapped out, the best‐candidate theorist's commitment to the extrinsicness of identity does not appear absurd.

This essay examines some aspects of the early history of the vitalism/mechanism controversies by examining the work of Nehemiah Grew (1641–1712) in relation to that of Henry More (1614–87), Francis Glisson (1599–1677) and the more mechanistically inclined members of the Royal Society. I compliment and critically comment on John Henry's exploration of active principles in pre-Newtonian mechanist thought. The postulation of ‘active matter’ can be seen as an important support for the new experimental philosophy, but it has theological drawbacks, allowing for a self-sufficient nature relatively independent of God. Grew resists this view and, like Henry More, advocates the need for a vital principle to direct material nature towards its ends. I illustrate the connection Grew sees between teleology and vitalism and the paper closes with Pierre Bayle's reaction to Grew's attempt to support his religious commitments by appeal to vital principles. So many Arts, hath the Divine Wisdom put together; only for the hull and tackle, of a sensible and Thinking creature. Nehemiah Grew, Cosmologia.

David Chalmers claims that the logical possibility of ‘zombie worlds’ — worlds physically indiscernible from the actual world, but that lack consciousness — reveal that consciousness is a distinct fact, or property, in addition to the physical facts or properties.The ‘existence’ or possibility of Zombie worlds violates the physicalist demand that consciousness logically supervene upon the physical. On the assumption that the logical supervenience of consciousness upon the physical is, indeed, a necessary entailment of physicalism, the existence of zombie worlds implies the falsity of physicalism. How do we determine the logical possibility of zombie worlds? By conceptual analysis of the concepts involved, keeping empirical facts in mind.

Michael Dummett’s fecund and uncharacteristically brief article “A Defence of McTaggart’s Proof of the Unreality of Time” offers a well-known interpretation of McTaggart’s proof, and makes a number of controversial claims about a range of inter-connected theses concerning time and space. I want to sort out what is plausible in what Dummett says from what is not, and identify which theses should be endorsed by A theorists and which by B theorists. It is important, even today, to get clear about these issues and their bearing on Dummett’s interpretation of McTaggart.

Resumo Neste texto, o autor concentra-se em dois artigos históricos: o de Max Black “Why cannot an effect precede its cause”? e o de Michael Dummett “Bringing about the Past”. O autor irá mostrar onde falha o “bilking argument” de Black, contra a possibilidade da causalidade invertida. Por conseguinte, o autor irá concordar com Dummett, na possibilidade de um agente actuar a fim de que algo possa ocorrer no passado, contudo, discordando da argumentação de Dummett face a um desafio céptico, que tenta mostrar a inutilidade de afectar o passado. Palavras-chave : Black, causalidade invertida, Dummett, razões, tempoIn this discussion I focus on two classic articles: Max Black’s ‘Why cannot an effect precede its cause?’ and Michael Dummett’s ‘Bringing about the Past’. I argue that Black’s bilking argument against the possibility of backwards causation fails. I agree with Dummett that the idea of an agent acting in order that something should have happened in the past is not absurd, but I disagree with Dummett’s response to a sceptical challenge which attempts to show that it is pointless to attempt to affect the past. Keywords : backwards causation, Black, Dummett, reasons, time

Sur la base de ce qu’il a appelé « le principe d’héritabilité causale », Jaegwon Kim a soutenu que les propriétés réalisables de façons multiples ne constituent pas des sortes causales scientifiques. Mon principal objectif est de répondre aux arguments de Kim contre le physicalisme non réductionniste. Je défends l’idée qu’il existe plus de pouvoirs causaux que les seuls pouvoirs causaux physiques. Cela n’a rien de surprenant puisqu’il existe plus de particuliers que le nombre total de particules physiques fondamentales. Et la réflexion sur la nature des individus, et plus spécifiquement sur leur capacité à préserver leur identité à travers le changement ou le remplacement de leurs parties, indique que les individus ont des pouvoirs causaux distincts de ceux des particuliers physiques qui les constituent. Je soutiens que si cela est plausible, alors l’abandon du principe d’héritabilité causale l’est tout autant.Jaegwon Kim has recently argued, using what he calls “The Causal Inheritance Principle”, that multiply realizable properties are not causal, scientific kinds. My primary concern is to reply to Kim's arguments against nonreductive physicalism. I shall defend the idea that there are, indeed, more causal powers than the physical. But this should come as no surprise, since there are more individuals than the total number of fundamental physical particles. Reflections on the nature of individuals, specifically, on their ability to survive through change or replacement of their parts, indicates that individuals have causal powers nonidentical with the causal powers of the physical individuals that constitute them. I claim that, if this is plausible, the rejection of The Causal Inheritance Principle is also plausible

Davidson argues that mental properties are causally relevant properties. I argue that Davidson cannot appeal to ceteris paribus causal laws to ensure that these properties are causally relevant, if he wishes to retain his argument for anomalous monism. Second, I argue that the appeal to supervenience cannot, by itself, give us an account of the causal relevancy of mental properties. I argue that, while mental properties may indeed 'make a difference' to the causally efficacious properties of events, this is not sufficient to show that mental properties are causally relevant

Kim's exclusion argument threatens to show that irreducible constituted objects are epiphenomenal. Kim's arguments are examined and found to be unconvincing; that a constituted cause requires its constituent to be a cause is not an adequate reason to reject the causation of the constituted object (event or property-instance). However, I introduce and argue for, the Causal Power Uniqueness Condition (CPUC). I argue that CPUC and the causal closure of the physical, implies that constituted objects or property-instances are not novel causal powers

Why is there something rather than nothing? Does God exist? Does time flow? What are we? Do we have free will? What is truth? Metaphysics is concerned with ourselves and reality, and the most fundamental questions regarding existence. This clear and accessible introduction covers the central topics in metaphysics in a concise but comprehensive way. Brian Garrett discusses the crucial concepts in a highly readable manner, easing the reader in with a look at some important philosophical problems. He addresses key areas of metaphysics: God Existence Modality Universals and particulars Facts Paradoxes of material constitution Causation Time Free will Personal identity Truth. This second edition has been thoroughly revised. Most chapters include substantial amounts of new material, and there are additional chapters on Existence, Modality, Facts and Paradoxes of Material Constitution. _What is this thing called Metaphysics?_ contains many helpful student-friendly features. Each chapter concludes with a useful summary of the main ideas discussed, a glossary of important terms, study questions, annotated further reading, and a guide to web resources. Text boxes provide bite-sized summaries of key concepts and major philosophers, and clear and interesting examples are used throughout.

Elementary Logic explains what logic is, how it is done, and why it can be exciting. The book covers the central part of logic that all students have to learn: propositional logic. It aims to provide a crystal-clear introduction to what is often regarded as the most technically difficult area in philosophy. The book opens with an explanation of what logic is and how it is constructed. Subsequent chapters take the reader step-by-step through all aspects of elementary logic. Throughout, ideas are explained simply and directly, with the chapters packed with overviews, illustrative examples, and summaries. Each chapter builds on previous explanation and example, with the final chapters presenting more advanced methods. After a discussion of meta-logic and logical systems, the book closes with an exploration of how paradoxes can exist in the world of logic. Elementary Logic's clarity and engagement make it ideal for any reader studying logic for the first time