Michael Bradie

There are two interrelated but distinct programs which go by the name evolutionary epistemology. One attempts to account for the characteristics of cognitive mechanisms in animals and humans by a straightforward extension of the biological theory of evolution to those aspects or traits of animals which are the biological substrates of cognitive activity, e.g., their brains, sensory systems, motor systems, etc. (EEM program). The other program attempts to account for the evaluation of ideas, scientific theories and culture in general by using models and metaphors drawn from evolutionary biology (EET program). The paper begins by distinguishing the two programs and discussing the relationship between them. The next section addresses the metaphorical and analogical relationship between evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary biology. Section IV treats the question of the locus of the epistemological problem in the light of an evolutionary analysis. The key questions here involve the relationship between evolutionary epistemology and traditional epistemology and the legitimacy of evolutionary epistemology as epistemology. Section V examines the underlying ontological presuppositions and implications of evolutionary epistemology. Finally, section VI, which is merely the sketch of a problem, addresses the parallel between evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary ethics.

One of the central themes of Hilary Putnam’s recent book, Reason, Truth and History, is the objectivity of values. The objectivity of values is a central component of the position Putnam calls “internal realism.” Internal realism is an attempt to delimit a point of view which is, on the one hand, objective, and, on the other, non-absolutistic. Internal realism is located precariously between an absolutist position which Putnam calls “metaphysical realism” and a sceptical relativism. The trick is to maintain the viability of the middle way without having the position collapse into either extreme. In this paper, I want, first, to outline the steps Putnam employs to articulate and defend his view, and second, to evaluate the extent to which Putnam is successful in threading his way between metaphysical realism and scepticism. Putnam is not completely successful insofar as the end of the book signals a partial return to the metaphysical realist position from which Putnam had been at such pains earlier to distance himself. The scheme of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I lay out the internal realist position and distinguish it from metaphysical realism and sceptical relativism. In section 3, Putnam’s central argument against metaphysical realism, which Putnam claims is also an argument against reductionism, is presented and discussed. In section 4, Putnam’s case for the objectivity of epistemic values, based upon considerations of rationality, is examined. In section 5, it is shown how the objectivity of epistemic values, conjoined with the anti-reductionist argument of section 3, leads Putnam to argue for the objectivity of ethical and aesthetic values as well. Finally, the extent to which Putnam’s position maintains its balance between realism and relativism is discussed.

The paper reviews the arguments for and against a number of criteria for event identity. The proliferation of such criteria in the 1970’s raises the question of how one is to choose between them. Eight adequacy conditions, whose own adequacy has been argued for elsewhere, are determined to be insufticient for deciding among the criteria. Some concluding remarks about the role of the adequacy conditions and the problem of choosing a criterion are offered. Finally, questions about the nature of and role of an identity criterion are raised.

Contents Preface Acknowledgments 1 Ethics and Evolution The Secret Chain Epistemology from an Evolutionary Point of View Ethics from an Evolutionary Point of View Morals and Models Evolution and Ethics 2 Altruism, Benevolence, and Self-Love in Eighteenth Century British Moral Philosophy Introduction Benevolence and Self-Love from Hobbes to Mackintosh The Eighteenth Century Legacy 3 The Moral Realm of Nature: Nineteenth Century Views on Ethics and Evolution Introduction Natural Facts and Natural Values Nature, Culture, and Conflict 4 Human Nature Introduction The Concept of Human Nature Human Nature and Moral Theory Human Nature and Ideology Does Darwinism Undermine the Concept of Human Nature? 5 Three Contemporary Approaches to Evolutionary Ethics Introduction The Wisdom of the Genes: The Sociobiology of Ethics Richard Alexander and the Biological Basis of Morality Robert Richards and the Revised Theory General Conclusion 6 Darwinism and the Moral Status of Animals Introduction Singer's Expanding Circle Argument James Rachels on "Moral Individualism" Rodd on the Rights of Animals and Our Duties Toward Them Conclusion 7 Final Reflections Summary of the Argument The Biological Roots of Morality The Relevance of Darwin for Moral Philosophy Bibliography Index.