Michael Bradie

Anthony O’Hear’s target is the claim that Darwinism provides a complete explanation of what it means to be human. The gist of his argument is that there are key normative dimensions to being human that escape the explanatory net of Darwinian or other naturalistic explanations. This is not to say that Darwinian and evolutionary accounts are not relevant to understanding what it means to be human. The point rather is that these accounts do not provide “complete” explanations. That human beings have evolved is not at issue. We are embodied natural beings. As such, we are material objects just like any other animals. But, we are much more as well. We have minds. We are not only conscious but self-conscious. Whereas our capacities for consciousness and self-consciousness have no doubt evolved, these capacities allow us to entertain and pursue “goals and projects puzzling or even inexplicable on biological terms” As conscious beings, we have beliefs. As self-conscious beings, we can and do reflect on and assess these beliefs. We can reason about them and, in so doing, come to sort out “good” beliefs from “bad” beliefs, true beliefs from false ones. We can develop projects such as pursuing “what is true because it is true, rather than because it serves some interest of ours.” In pursuing such a project, O’Hear argues, we have transcended the limitations of naturalistic accounts of our behavior.

The paper reviews the arguments for and against a number of criteria for event identity. The proliferation of such criteria in the 1970’s raises the question of how one is to choose between them. Eight adequacy conditions, whose own adequacy has been argued for elsewhere, are determined to be insufticient for deciding among the criteria. Some concluding remarks about the role of the adequacy conditions and the problem of choosing a criterion are offered. Finally, questions about the nature of and role of an identity criterion are raised.

Contents Preface Acknowledgments 1 Ethics and Evolution The Secret Chain Epistemology from an Evolutionary Point of View Ethics from an Evolutionary Point of View Morals and Models Evolution and Ethics 2 Altruism, Benevolence, and Self-Love in Eighteenth Century British Moral Philosophy Introduction Benevolence and Self-Love from Hobbes to Mackintosh The Eighteenth Century Legacy 3 The Moral Realm of Nature: Nineteenth Century Views on Ethics and Evolution Introduction Natural Facts and Natural Values Nature, Culture, and Conflict 4 Human Nature Introduction The Concept of Human Nature Human Nature and Moral Theory Human Nature and Ideology Does Darwinism Undermine the Concept of Human Nature? 5 Three Contemporary Approaches to Evolutionary Ethics Introduction The Wisdom of the Genes: The Sociobiology of Ethics Richard Alexander and the Biological Basis of Morality Robert Richards and the Revised Theory General Conclusion 6 Darwinism and the Moral Status of Animals Introduction Singer's Expanding Circle Argument James Rachels on "Moral Individualism" Rodd on the Rights of Animals and Our Duties Toward Them Conclusion 7 Final Reflections Summary of the Argument The Biological Roots of Morality The Relevance of Darwin for Moral Philosophy Bibliography Index.

In [1] Michael Polanyi argues that in order to understand how scientists come to recognize problems as problems, we must invoke a concept of “tacit knowing.” Tacit knowledge is a kind of knowledge of which we are aware but which cannot be made explicit. Polanyi argues that a paradox discussed in the Meno cannot be solved without appeal to this notion of tacit knowledge. Here I want to argue, quite simply, that Polanyi's formulation of the “paradox” can be easily subverted without an appeal to tacit knowing. Polanyi puts the paradox thus:... to search for the solution of a problem is an absurdity; for either you know what you are looking for, and then there is no problem; or you do not know what you are looking for, and then you cannot expect to find anything.

The compatibility of Darwinism with religious beliefs has been the subject of vigorous debate from 1859 to the present day. Darwin himself did not think that there was any incompatibility between his theory of natural selection and the existence of God. However, he did not think that appeals to the direct or indirect activity of a Creator substantially increased our understanding of any natural phenomenon. In effect, Darwin endorsed what we would today label as ’methodological naturalism,’ roughly the view that the only legitimate elements of the explanation of natural phenomena must appeal only to natural processes, natural laws and natural regularities. In section 2, Darwin’s commitment to methodological Darwinism is documented. Section 3 addresses the question of whether methodological naturalism does or does not rule out belief in a divine Creator. Section 4 raises the question of whether methodological naturalists are also metaphysical naturalists. Finally, section 5 assesses the.