Wiebe Van Der Hoek

We study several modal languages in which some (sets of) generalized quantifiers can be represented; the main language we consider is suitable for defining any first order definable quantifier, but we also consider a sublanguage thereof, as well as a language for dealing with the modal counterparts of some higher order quantifiers. These languages are studied both from a modal logic perspective and from a quantifier perspective. Thus the issues addressed include normal forms, expressive power, completeness both of modal systems and of systems in the quantifier tradition, complexity as well as syntactic characterizations of special semantic constraints. Throughout the paper several techniques current in the theory of generalized quantifiers are used to obtain results in modal logic, and conversely.

We propose an epistemic logic in which knowledge is fully introspective and implies truth, although truth need not imply epistemic possibility. The logic is presented in sequential format and is interpreted in a natural class of partial models, called balloon models. We examine the notions of honesty and circumscription in this logic: What is the state of an agent that only knows and which honest enable such circumscription? Redefining stable sets enables us to provide suitable syntactic and semantic criteria for honesty. The rough syntactic definition of honesty is the existence of a minimal stable expansion, so the problem resides in the ordering relation underlying minimality. We discuss three different proposals for this ordering, together with their semantic counterparts, and show their effects on the induced notions of honesty

We present an epistemic default logic, based on the metaphore of a meta-level architecture. Upward reflection is formalized by a nonmonotonic entailment relation, based on the objective facts that are either known or unknown at the object level. Then, the meta (monotonic) reasoning process generates a number of default-beliefs of object-level formulas. We extend this framework by proposing a mechanism to reflect these defaults down. Such a reflection is seen as essentially having a temporal flavour: defaults derived at the meta-level are projected as facts in a next object level state. In this way, we obtain temporal models for default reasoning in meta-level formalisms which can be conceived as labeled branching trees. Thus, descending the tree corresponds to shifts in time that model downward reflection, whereas the branching of the tree corresponds to ways of combining possible defaults. All together, this yields an operational or procedural semantics of reasoning by default, which admits one to reason about it by means of branching-time temporal logic. Finally, we define sceptical and credulous entailment relations based on these temporal models and we characterize Reiter extensions in our semantics.

Qualitative Coalitional Games are a variant of coalitional games in which an agent's desires are represented as goals that are either satisfied or unsatisfied, and each choice available to a coalition is a set of goals, which would be jointly satisfied if the coalition made that choice. A coalition in a QCG will typically form in order to bring about a set of goals that will satisfy all members of the coalition. Our goal in this paper is to develop and study logics for reasoning about QCGs. We begin by introducing a logic for reasoning about “static” QCGs, where participants play a single game, and we then introduce and study Temporal QCGs, i.e., games in which a sequence of QCGs is played. In order to represent and reason about such games, we introduce a linear time temporal logic of QCGs, called ℒ. We give a complete axiomatisation of ℒ, use it to investigate the properties of TQCGs, identify its expressive power, establish its complexity, characterise classes of TQGCs with formulas from our logical language, and use it to formulate several solution concepts for TQCGs.

We introduce a logic specifically designed to support reasoning about social choice functions. The logic includes operators to capture strategic ability, and operators to capture agent preferences. We establish a correspondence between formulae in the logic and properties of social choice functions, and show that the logic is expressively complete with respect to social choice functions, i.e., that every social choice function can be characterised as a formula of the logic. We prove that the logic is decidable, and give a complete axiomatization. To demonstrate the value of the logic, we show in particular how it can be applied to the problem of determining whether a social choice function is strategy-proof

In this paper a formal framework is proposed in which variousinformative actions are combined, corresponding to the different ways in whichrational agents can acquire information. In order to solve the variousconflicts that could possibly occur when acquiring information fromdifferent sources, we propose a classification of the informationthat an agent possesses according to credibility. Based on this classification, we formalize what itmeans for agents to have seen or heard something, or to believesomething by default. We present a formalization of observations,communication actions, and the attempted jumps to conclusions thatconstitutes default reasoning. To implement these informative actionswe use a general belief revision action which satisfies theAGM postulates; dependent on the credibility of the incominginformation this revision action acts on one or more parts ofthe classified belief sets of the agents. The abilities of agents formalizeboth the limited capacities of agents to acquire information, and the preference of one kind of information acquisition to another. A very important feature of our approach is that it shows how to integratevarious aspects of agency, in particular the (informational) attitudesof dealing with information from observation, communication and defaultreasoning into one coherent framework, both model-theoretically andsyntactically.

Understanding the flow of knowledge in multi-agent protocols is essential when proving the correctness or security of such protocols. Current logical approaches, often based on model checking, are well suited for modeling knowledge in systems where agents do not act strategically. Things become more complicated in strategic settings. In this paper we show that such situations can be understood as a special type of game – a knowledge condition game – in which a coalition “wins” if it is able to bring about some epistemic condition. This paper summarizes some results relating to these games. Two proofs are presented for the computational complexity of deciding whether a coalition can win a knowledge condition game with and without opponents (Σ2P-complete and NP-complete respectively). We also consider a variant of knowledge condition games in which agents do not know which strategies are played, and prove that under this assumption, the presence of opponents does not affect the complexity. The decision problem without opponents is still NP-complete, but requires a different proof.

Although normative systems, or social laws, have proved to be a highly influential approach to coordination in multi-agent systems, the issue of compliance to such normative systems remains problematic. In all real systems, it is possible that some members of an agent population will not comply with the rules of a normative system, even if it is in their interests to do so. It is therefore important to consider the extent to which a normative system is robust, i.e., the extent to which it remains effective even if some agents do not comply with it. We formalise and investigate three different notions of robustness and related decision problems. We begin by considering sets of agents whose compliance is necessary and/or sufficient to guarantee the effectiveness of a normative system; we then consider quantitative approaches to robustness, where we try to identify the proportion of an agent population that must comply in order to ensure success; and finally, we consider a more general approach, where we characterise the compliance conditions required for success as a logical formula. We furthermore introduce a logic for specifying properties of norm compliance in general and norm robustness in particular.

We introduce a logic specifically designed to support reasoning about social choice functions. The logic includes operators to capture strategic ability, and operators to capture agent preferences. We establish a correspondence between formulae in the logic and properties of social choice functions, and show that the logic is expressively complete with respect to social choice functions, i.e., that every social choice function can be characterised as a formula of the logic. We prove that the logic is decidable, and give a complete axiomatization. To demonstrate the value of the logic, we show in particular how it can be applied to the problem of determining whether a social choice function is strategy-proof.

Qualitative coalitional games (QCGs) were introduced as abstract formal models of goal-oriented cooperative systems. A QCG is a game in which each agent is assumed to have some goal to achieve, and in which agents must typically cooperate with others in order to satisfy their goals. In this paper, we show how it is possible to reason about QCGs using Coalition Logic (CL), a formalism intended to facilitate reasoning about coalitional powers in game-like multiagent systems. We introduce a correspondence relation between QCGs and interpretations for CL, which defines the circumstances under which a CL interpretation correctly characterises a QCG. The complexity of deciding correspondence between QCGs and interpretations for CL is shown to vary from being tractable up to Πp 2-complete, depending on the representation chosen for the QCG and interpretation. We then show how various properties and solution concepts of QCGs can be characterised as CL formula schemes. The ideas are illustrated via a detailed worked example, in which we demonstrate how a model checker can be deployed to investigate whether a particular system has the properties in question.

In this paper a formal framework is proposed in which variousinformative actions are combined, corresponding to the different ways in whichrational agents can acquire information. In order to solve the variousconflicts that could possibly occur when acquiring information fromdifferent sources, we propose a classification of the informationthat an agent possesses according to credibility. Based on this classification, we formalize what itmeans for agents to have seen or heard something, or to believesomething by default. We present a formalization of observations,communication actions, and the attempted jumps to conclusions thatconstitutes default reasoning. To implement these informative actionswe use a general belief revision action which satisfies theAGM postulates; dependent on the credibility of the incominginformation this revision action acts on one or more parts ofthe classified belief sets of the agents. The abilities of agents formalizeboth the limited capacities of agents to acquire information, and the preference of one kind of information acquisition to another. A very important feature of our approach is that it shows how to integratevarious aspects of agency, in particular the (informational) attitudesof dealing with information from observation, communication and defaultreasoning into one coherent framework, both model-theoretically andsyntactically.

Branching-time temporal logics have proved to be an extraordinarily successful tool in the formal specification and verification of distributed systems. Much of their success stems from the tractability of the model checking problem for the branching time logic CTL, which has made it possible to implement tools that allow designers to automatically verify that systems satisfy requirements expressed in CTL. Recently, CTL was generalised by Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman in a logic known as Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). The key insight in ATL is that the path quantifiers of CTL could be replaced by cooperation modalities, of the form , where is a set of agents. The intended interpretation of an ATL formula is that the agents can cooperate to ensure that holds (equivalently, that have a winning strategy for ). In this paper, we extend ATL with knowledge modalities, of the kind made popular in the work of Fagin, Halpern, Moses, Vardi and colleagues. Combining these knowledge modalities with ATL, it becomes possible to express such properties as group can cooperate to bring about iff it is common knowledge in that . The resulting logic — Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic (ATEL) — shares the tractability of model checking with its ATL parent, and is a succinct and expressive language for reasoning about game-like multiagent systems.