Marek A. Pepliński

My aim in this paper is to show that some parts of J. M. Bocheński’s account of the logic of religion are useful for epistemological investigation of a religious belief, particularly for the questions of realistic and cognitive interpretations of a religious discourse, the problems of justification and warrant of a religious belief and for the problem of the place of criticism in a religious discourse. Referring to Bocheński's understanding of the structure of religious/theological thinking, I present the criteria for the gradual rationality of religion and claim that religions may differ in rationality and that there may be a rational and critical religion that uses the achievements of science and philosophy - contrary to what the New Atheists claim.

Alvin Plantinga claims that Christian believer can rationally disbelieve in some elements of the theory of evolution: the Common Ancestry Thesis; Darwinism, taken as explanation of origin of life by the mechanism of natural selection operating on random genetic mutation, and Naturalistic Origins Thesis - the view that present life itself developed from nonliving matter without special activity of God. After the justification of the possibility of conflicts between faith and science, Plantinga's arguments are examined and assessed as successful, with a few exceptions. The main thesis of this paper is that Plantinga is right claiming that rational disbelieving in evolution is possible, but his arguments are not enough to justify special creationism as theistic knowledge, supposing that knowledge warrants the truth

I present argument for different than traditional continental classification of epistemological issues. Paper has two parts, first concerned with K. Ajdukiewicz and J. Woleński conception of epistemology and its branches and with different methods of epistemological inquiry based on different task posed for epistemology. Second part discuss main important topics of current postgettieral analytic epistemology like virtue epistemology, ethics of belief, problems of epistemic value, epistemic value monism and pluralism, metaepistemology and concludes that in traditional continental classification the issues of a truth and the issues of nature of knowledge should be united in broaden set of topics concerned with valuable cognition and knowledge, which has descriptive, normative, and regulative subparts.