Matthias Neuber

It is a common view in cognitive psychology that there is a fundamental difference between what may be called descriptive information, on the one hand, and depictive information, on the other. While the first kind of information is — ideally spoken — non-pictorial and usually equated with the content of a proposition, the second kind of information is pictorial by defmition and accordingly equated with the content of a mental image. Granting the correctness of this distinction, cognitive scientists differ on the role played by mental images in epistemic processes. One faction, represented by the writings of Zenon Pylyshyn, asserts that mental images are merely an epiphenomenon of a more general and abstract processing system, and that they are in principle dispensable since they do not have any truth value.1 Another faction, represented by the writings of Stephen Kosslyn, favors the opposite view, maintaining that mental images are indispensable since they play, in spite of their lack of truth value, a fundamental role in human thinking.2 As Arthur I. Miller has proposed in his book Imagery in Scientific Thought , these two factions may be labeled as the “antiimagist” and the “pro-imagist” view, respectively

Torsten Wilholt’s book on the freedom of research is a remarkable contribution to a long-standing debate over an issue which is becoming increasingly important today. As Wilholt points out in the preface, the topic ‘freedom of research’ has a twofold face: On the one hand, freedom of research is the presupposition of an engaged and unprejudiced search for knowledge; on the other hand, it implies the risk of borderless and ‘untamed’ research. In considering this contradiction, Wilholt makes recourse to the history of ideas, his central thesis being that freedom of research still has “a meaningful normative function” (11).After briefly discussing the various forms of freedom of research in current debates, Wilholt, in chapter 2, elaborates on what he calls the “argument from reasons of autonomy”. This type of argument for freedom of research can be found in the respective writings of such diverse authors as Eugene Wigner, Hilary Putnam and Immanuel Kant. Its most important pioneer, thou

It is a common view in cognitive psychology that there is a fundamental difference between what may be called descriptive information, on the one hand, and depictive information, on the other. While the first kind of information is — ideally spoken — non-pictorial and usually equated with the content of a proposition, the second kind of information is pictorial by defmition and accordingly equated with the content of a mental image. Granting the correctness of this distinction, cognitive scientists differ on the role played by mental images in epistemic processes. One faction, represented by the writings of Zenon Pylyshyn, asserts that mental images are merely an epiphenomenon of a more general and abstract processing system, and that they are in principle dispensable since they do not have any truth value.1 Another faction, represented by the writings of Stephen Kosslyn, favors the opposite view, maintaining that mental images are indispensable since they play, in spite of their lack of truth value, a fundamental role in human thinking.2 As Arthur I. Miller has proposed in his book Imagery in Scientific Thought, these two factions may be labeled as the “antiimagist” and the “pro-imagist” view, respectively.