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56Norbert Anwander, Versprechen und Verpflichten (review)Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1): 117-119. 2010.
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132. Das Rätsel personaler AutonomieIn Selbst bestimmen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung personaler Autonomie., De Gruyter. pp. 38-64. 2016.
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16Personale Autonomie als praktische AutoritätDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59 (6): 897-915. 2011.Autonomy and authority are often regarded as opposites. In this paper, I argue that autonomy should be conceived of as a specific form of (practical) authority and that this perspective is useful for identifying the conditions of personal autonomy. I will first highlight some structural analogies in the functioning of the concepts "autonomy" and "authority" and explain the resulting constraints on accounts of personal autonomy. I will then show that the problems of certain internalist and extern…Read more
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5SachregisterIn Selbst bestimmen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung personaler Autonomie., De Gruyter. pp. 345-352. 2016.
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154. Ein reines Weltverhältnis? Externalistische TheorienIn Selbst bestimmen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung personaler Autonomie., De Gruyter. pp. 99-139. 2016.
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27Climate Justice: An IntroductionRoutledge. 2016.The link between justice and climate change is becoming increasingly prominent in public debates on climate policy. This clear and concise philosophical introduction to climate justice addresses the hot topic of climate change as a moral challenge. Using engaging everyday examples the authors address the core arguments by providing a comprehensive and balanced overview of this heated debate, enabling students and practitioners to think critically about the subject area and to promote discussion …Read more
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Die gute Ethikerin und der Platz der Moral. Zwischen Moralismus und Willensschwäche im LebenswandelIn Christoph Ammann, Barbara Bleisch & Anna Goppel (eds.), Müssen Ethiker moralisch sein? Essays über Philosophie und Lebensführung, Campus. pp. 85-100. 2011.
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7ZusammenfassungIn Selbst bestimmen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung personaler Autonomie., De Gruyter. pp. 324-328. 2016.
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217. Normative Bedingungen personaler AutonomieIn Selbst bestimmen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung personaler Autonomie., De Gruyter. pp. 259-323. 2016.
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8EinleitungIn Selbst bestimmen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung personaler Autonomie., De Gruyter. pp. 1-8. 2016.
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12Selbst bestimmen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung personaler Autonomie.De Gruyter. 2016.What is it for a person to be autonomous? Starting with a philosophical puzzle about personal autonomy and by way of critically discussing contemporary accounts, this monograph argues that AUTONOMY is a thick normative concept – the concept of a certain kind of practical authority. It then develops a conception of autonomy which solves the puzzle and offers an adequate understanding of what it means to determine oneself.
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32Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2019.Consequentialism is a focal point of discussion and a driving force behind important developments in moral philosophy. Recently, the debate has shifted in focus and in style. By seeking to consequentialize rival moral theories, in particular those with agent-relative characteristics, and by framing accounts in terms of reasons rather than in terms of value, an emerging new wave consequentialism has presented - at much higher levels of abstraction - theories which proved extremely flexible and po…Read more
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Eigene Gründe - wozu eigentlich? Einige Überlegungen in Richtung einer deflationären AuffassungIn Julian Nida-Rümelin & Elif Özmen (eds.), Welt der Gründe. Kolloquienbeiträge, Meiner. pp. 986-1004. 2012.
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41On 'imperfect' imperfect duties and the epistemic demands of integrationist approaches to justiceEthics, Policy and Environment 17 (1): 39-42. 2014.Christian Baatz claims that individuals have an imperfect duty to reduce emissions as far as can reasonably be demanded of them. His ‘epistemic’ argument roughly runs like this:(P1...
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136. Eine Diagnose: Autonomie als dicker normativer BegriffIn Selbst bestimmen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung personaler Autonomie., De Gruyter. pp. 189-258. 2016.
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18Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint (review)Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 62 (4): 609-614. 2008.
Christian Seidel
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
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Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)Professor
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Applied Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
1 more
Philosophy of Action |
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |
19th Century Philosophy |