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199Puzzles about descriptive namesLinguistics and Philosophy 32 (4): 409-428. 2009.This article explores Gareth Evans’s idea that there are such things as descriptive names, i.e. referring expressions introduced by a definite description which have, unlike ordinary names, a descriptive content. Several ignored semantic and modal aspects of this idea are spelled out, including a hitherto little explored notion of rigidity, super-rigidity. The claim that descriptive names are (rigidified) descriptions, or abbreviations thereof, is rejected. It is then shown that Evans’s theory l…Read more
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23Frege's Definition of Number: No Ontological Agenda?Hungarian Philosophical Review 54 (4): 76-92. 2010.Joan Weiner has argued that Frege’s definitions of numbers constitute linguistic stipulations that carry no ontological commitment: they don’t present numbers as pre-existing objects. This paper offers a critical discussion of this view, showing that it is vitiated by serious exegetical errors and that it saddles Frege’s project with insuperable substantive difficulties. It is first demonstrated that Weiner misrepresents the Fregean notions of so-called Foundations-content, and of sense, referen…Read more
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168The Ideality of Space and Time: Trendelenburg versus Kant, Fischer and BirdKantian Review 18 (2): 263-288. 2013.Trendelenburg argued that Kant's arguments in support of transcendental idealism ignored the possibility that space and time are both ideal and real. Recently, Graham Bird has claimed that Trendelenburg (unlike his contemporary Kuno Fischer) misrepresented Kant, confusing two senses of . I defend Trendelenburg's : the ideas of space and time, as a priori and necessary, are ideal, but this does not exclude their validity in the noumenal realm. This undermines transcendental idealism. Bird's attem…Read more
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22Ludwig WittgensteinReaktion Books. 2007.Ludwig Wittgenstein is generally considered as the greatest philosopher since Immanuel Kant, and his personal life, work, and his historical moment intertwined in a fascinating, complex web. Noted scholar Edward Kanterian explores these intersections in Ludwig Wittgenstein, the newest title in the acclaimed Critical Lives series. Wittgenstein’s works—from Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the posthumously published Philosophical Investigations —are notoriously dense, and Kanterian carefully dist…Read more
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37Bodies in Prolegomena§13: Noumena or Phenomena?Hegel Bulletin 34 (2): 181-202. 2013.This article discusses Kant's transcendental idealism in relation to his perplexing use of ‘body’ and related terms inProlegomena§13. Here Kant admits the existence of bodies external to us, although unknown as what they might be in themselves. It is argued that we need to distinguish between a phenomenal and a noumenal use of ‘body’ to make sense of Kant's argument. The most important recent discussions of this passage, i.e., Prauss (1977), Langton (1998) and Bird (2006), are presented and show…Read more
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15What is Enlightenment?, by SamuelFleischacker. London & New York: Routledge, 2013, 235 pp. ISBN Paperback 978‐0‐415–49781‐7 (review)European Journal of Philosophy 22 (S3): 1-3. 2014.
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59Philosophy as Poetry? Reflections on Wittgenstein's StyleWittgenstein-Studien 3 (1): 95-132. 2012.
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11Hegel's Tale in RomaniaIn Lisa Herzog (ed.), Hegel's Thought in Europe: Currents, Crosscurrents and Undercurrents, . pp. 49. 2013.
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Timothy McCarthy/Sean C. Stidd : Wittgenstein in America (review)Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 55 (4). 2002.
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25This article explores the possibility of locating an ‘ethics of memory’ respecting commission of mass atrocities via the link between justice, truth and memory. First, it suggests a typology for memory in relation to justice in its retributive and restorative aspects. Second, it explores how so-called ‘memory-justice’ arises in the course of international proceedings—and particularly given its significance under the Rome Statute—by considering, critically, the international community's ability t…Read more
Areas of Interest
17th/18th Century Philosophy |