Angus John Louis Menuge

Folk psychology affirms the existence of a persistent, unitary self at the center of each individual’s mental life. Darwinian psychologists have challenged this view with the selfish gene and selfish meme theories of the mind. Both theories claim that cognition arises from the interaction of blind, selfish replicators (genes or memes) and that the enduring self is an illusion. I argue that both theories suffer from an implausible atomism and an inability to explain human reasoning, subjectivity, points of view, and psychological unity. By contrast, a psychology premised on Intelligent Design is able to account for all these problems.

A naturalistic theory of rationalization is defended against a fundamental objection. The theory claims that: The rationalizing relation can be fully analysed in causal explanatory terms. However, is rendered problematic by the fact that: Rationalizations exhibit a higher degree of intensionality than ordinary physical causal explanations. To show that can be maintained in the face of , I develop an account of on which and may be reconciled. ;The opening chapter gives an account of the intensionality of ordinary physical causal explanations by developing a counterfactual analysis of causal relevance. Chapter II examines the nature and intensionality of rationalizations. It is argued that despite , a rationalization partly involves a causal relevance relation between its explanans and explanandum. ;In Chapter III, I consider an argument which implies that is false: Davidson's argument that there can be no psychophysical laws. An attempt is made to give a clear and compelling representation of this argument. As I interpret it, the argument depends on the alleged insolubility of the problem of causal deviance in action. ;Chapter IV develops a general theory of deviance according to which any functional system may produce output in a deviant way, and applies this theory to agents. A negative consequence of the theory is that an action may be performed in a deviant way even if the agent's intention causally explains the action . A positive consequence of the theory is that an action is performed in a non-deviant way just in case there is an appropriate causal explanation of why the agent's intention causes him to act. My specific suggestion is that an agent performs an action in a non-deviant way when and only when his intention causes him to act because he "knows how" to act in that way. ;In the last chapter, it is argued that our solution to the problem of deviance can be adapted to account for in causal explanatory terms. In this way and are reconciled