-
46Convolution and modal representations in Thagard and Stewart’s neural theory of creativity: a critical analysisSynthese 193 (5): 1535-1560. 2016.According to Thagard and Stewart :1–33, 2011), creativity results from the combination of neural representations, and combination results from convolution, an operation on vectors defined in the holographic reduced representation framework. They use these ideas to understand creativity as it occurs in many domains, and in particular in science. We argue that, because of its algebraic properties, convolution alone is ill-suited to the role proposed by Thagard and Stewart. The semantic pointer con…Read more
-
The concept of innateness and the destiny of evolutionary psychologyJournal of Mind and Behavior 29 (1-2): 17-47. 2008.According to a popular version of the current evolutionary attitude in cognitive science, the mind is a massive aggregate of autonomous innate computational devices, each addressing specific adaptive problems. Our aim in this paper is to show that although this version of the attitude, which we call GOFEP , does not suffer from fatal flaws that would make it incoherent or otherwise conceptually inadequate, it will nevertheless prove unacceptable to most cognitive scientists today. To show this, …Read more
-
22Les gardiens du bon usage : Étude critique de « Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience », de P. M. R. Hacker et M. R. Bennett (review)Philosophiques 34 (1): 183-200. 2007.
-
32À Harvard durant l’année académique 1940-41, les philosophes-mathématiciens Quine, Tarski et Carnap débattaient de la possibilité d’établir une distinction entre les énoncés analytiques et synthétiques qui soit suffisamment mordante pour dégager un statut spécial à l’épistémologie. Quine et Tarski s’objectaient à la distinction et l’objection de Quine verra notamment le jour sous le titre fameux « Les deux dogmes de l’empirisme ». Carnap, dans son autobiographie intellectuelle, se souvient avoir…Read more
-
André De Tienne, L'analytique de La représentation chez Peirce (review)Philosophy in Review 16 251-253. 1996.
-
62Philosophie de l'esprit: état des lieuxVrin. 2000.Cet ouvrage vise à délimiter le champ d'investigation de la philosophie de l'esprit. Il comprend huit chapitres. Le premier, le plus général, se veut une première délimitation du champ d'investigation de la philosophie de l'esprit à l'aide de ses trois concepts clés: l'intentionnalité, la rationalité et la conscience. Le chapitre suivant se veut une réflexion plus générale sur les motivations philosophiques qui commandent des jugements si opposés sur le statut ontologique et épistémologique de l…Read more
-
77Cognitive evolutionary psychology without representational nativismJournal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 15 (2): 143-159. 2003.A viable evolutionary cognitive psychology requires that specific cognitive capacities be (a) heritable and (b) ‘quasi-independent’ from other heritable traits. They must be heritable because there can be no selection for traits that are not. They must be quasi-independent from other heritable traits, since adaptive variations in a specific cognitive capacity could have no distinctive consequences for fitness if effecting those variations required widespread changes in other unrelated traits and cap…Read more
-
2Pascal Engel, La dispute: une introduction à la philosophie analytique (review)Philosophy in Review 18 (5): 324-326. 1998.
-
3Judith Genova, Wittgenstein: A way of seeing Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 16 (4): 257-259. 1996.
-
44By using the name of one of his first papers (See Clark 1987) for his latest book, Andy Clark proves how consistent his view of the mind has been over his career. Indeed Being There becomes the latest in a ten year effort, laid out over a series of books, to flesh out one of the few comprehensive proposals in philosophy of mind since Fodor’s Representational Theory of Mind (RTM). Each book in the series accentuates one aspect of Clark’s view. The first, Microcognition (Clark 1989), explores the …Read more
-
10The Electric Meme: A New Theory of How We ThinkRobert Aunger New York: Free Press, 2002, 392 pp., $41.00 (review)Dialogue 44 (2): 410-412. 2005.
-
28Jean-Frédéric de Pasquale ,Pierre Poirier
-
72Le véritable retour des définitionsDialogue 50 (1): 153-164. 2011.In our critical review of Doing without Concepts, we argue that although the heterogeneity hypothesis (according to which exemplars, prototypes and theories are natural kinds that should replace ‘concept’) may end fruitless debates in the psychology of concepts, Edouard Machery did not anticipate one consequence of his suggestion: Definitions now acquire a new status as another one of the bodies of information replacing ‘concept’. In order to support our hypothesis, we invoke dual-process models…Read more
-
244A framework for thinking about distributed cognitionPragmatics and Cognition 14 (2): 215-234. 2006.As is often the case when scientific or engineering fields emerge, new concepts are forged or old ones are adapted. When this happens, various arguments rage over what ultimately turns out to be conceptual misunderstandings. At that critical time, there is a need for an explicit reflection on the meaning of the concepts that define the field. In this position paper, we aim to provide a reasoned framework in which to think about various issues in the field of distributed cognition. We argue that …Read more
-
230Epistemological strata and the rules of right reasonSynthese 141 (3). 2004.It has been commonplace in epistemology since its inception to idealize away from computational resource constraints, i.e., from the constraints of time and memory. One thought is that a kind of ideal rationality can be specified that ignores the constraints imposed by limited time and memory, and that actual cognitive performance can be seen as an interaction between the norms of ideal rationality and the practicalities of time and memory limitations. But a cornerstone of naturalistic epistemol…Read more
-
2Peter K. Machamer, Rick Grush and Peter McLaughlin, eds., Theory and Method in the Neurosciences Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 22 (6): 422-424. 2002.
-
37Maxwell Bennett, Daniel Dennett, Peter Hacker, John Searle, Neuroscience and Philosophy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2007, 215p.Maxwell Bennett, Daniel Dennett, Peter Hacker, John Searle, Neuroscience and Philosophy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2007, 215p (review)Philosophiques 36 (1): 260-265. 2009.
-
31La théorie des systèmes développementaux et la construction sociale des maladies mentalesPhilosophiques 33 (1): 147-182. 2006.Dans ce texte, nous proposons un cadre, qui vise à intégrer les contributions des approches constructionnistes et biologiques dans un domaine précis, celui des maladies mentales. Pour ce faire, nous utiliserons quelques propositions récentes faites par des philosophes de la biologie — plus spécifiquement les idées avancées par les tenants de la « théorie des systèmes développementaux » ainsi que la notion d’« enracinement génératif » .In this paper, we are proposing a framework to integrate the …Read more
Montréal, Quebec, Canada