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44By using the name of one of his first papers (See Clark 1987) for his latest book, Andy Clark proves how consistent his view of the mind has been over his career. Indeed Being There becomes the latest in a ten year effort, laid out over a series of books, to flesh out one of the few comprehensive proposals in philosophy of mind since Fodor’s Representational Theory of Mind (RTM). Each book in the series accentuates one aspect of Clark’s view. The first, Microcognition (Clark 1989), explores the …Read more
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10The Electric Meme: A New Theory of How We ThinkRobert Aunger New York: Free Press, 2002, 392 pp., $41.00 (review)Dialogue 44 (2): 410-412. 2005.
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28Jean-Frédéric de Pasquale ,Pierre Poirier
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72Le véritable retour des définitionsDialogue 50 (1): 153-164. 2011.In our critical review of Doing without Concepts, we argue that although the heterogeneity hypothesis (according to which exemplars, prototypes and theories are natural kinds that should replace ‘concept’) may end fruitless debates in the psychology of concepts, Edouard Machery did not anticipate one consequence of his suggestion: Definitions now acquire a new status as another one of the bodies of information replacing ‘concept’. In order to support our hypothesis, we invoke dual-process models…Read more
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244A framework for thinking about distributed cognitionPragmatics and Cognition 14 (2): 215-234. 2006.As is often the case when scientific or engineering fields emerge, new concepts are forged or old ones are adapted. When this happens, various arguments rage over what ultimately turns out to be conceptual misunderstandings. At that critical time, there is a need for an explicit reflection on the meaning of the concepts that define the field. In this position paper, we aim to provide a reasoned framework in which to think about various issues in the field of distributed cognition. We argue that …Read more
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2Peter K. Machamer, Rick Grush and Peter McLaughlin, eds., Theory and Method in the Neurosciences Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 22 (6): 422-424. 2002.
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230Epistemological strata and the rules of right reasonSynthese 141 (3). 2004.It has been commonplace in epistemology since its inception to idealize away from computational resource constraints, i.e., from the constraints of time and memory. One thought is that a kind of ideal rationality can be specified that ignores the constraints imposed by limited time and memory, and that actual cognitive performance can be seen as an interaction between the norms of ideal rationality and the practicalities of time and memory limitations. But a cornerstone of naturalistic epistemol…Read more
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37Maxwell Bennett, Daniel Dennett, Peter Hacker, John Searle, Neuroscience and Philosophy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2007, 215p.Maxwell Bennett, Daniel Dennett, Peter Hacker, John Searle, Neuroscience and Philosophy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2007, 215p (review)Philosophiques 36 (1): 260-265. 2009.
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31La théorie des systèmes développementaux et la construction sociale des maladies mentalesPhilosophiques 33 (1): 147-182. 2006.Dans ce texte, nous proposons un cadre, qui vise à intégrer les contributions des approches constructionnistes et biologiques dans un domaine précis, celui des maladies mentales. Pour ce faire, nous utiliserons quelques propositions récentes faites par des philosophes de la biologie — plus spécifiquement les idées avancées par les tenants de la « théorie des systèmes développementaux » ainsi que la notion d’« enracinement génératif » .In this paper, we are proposing a framework to integrate the …Read more
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1Martin Montminy, Les fondements empiriques de la signification Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 19 (2): 130-132. 1999.
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175Embodied thoughts. Concepts and compositionality without languageTheoria Et Historia Scientarum 1 53-72. 2006.Is thinking necessarily linguistic? Do we _think with words_, to use Bermudez’s (2003) phrase? Or does thinking occur in some other, yet to be determined, representational format? Or again do we think in various formats, switching from one to the other as tasks demand? In virtue perhaps of the ambiguous nature of first-person introspective data on the matter, philosophers have traditionally disagreed on this question, some thinking that thought had to be pictorial, other insisting that it could …Read more
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18A Framework For Thinking About Distributed CognitionPragmatics and Cognition 14 (2): 215-234. 2006.As is often the case when scientific or engineering fields emerge, new concepts are forged or old ones are adapted. When this happens, various arguments rage over what ultimately turns out to be conceptual misunderstandings. At that critical time, there is a need for an explicit reflection on the meaning of the concepts that define the field. In this position paper, we aim to provide a reasoned framework in which to think about various issues in the field of distributed cognition. We argue that …Read more
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3Susan Oyama, Paul E. Griffiths, and Russell D. Gray, eds., Cycles of Contingency Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 23 (3): 201-204. 2003.
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141Structured Thoughts: The Spatial-Motor ViewIn Gerhard Schurz, Edouard Machery & Markus Werning (eds.), Applications to Linguistics, Psychology and Neuroscience, De Gruyter. pp. 229-250. 2005.Is thinking necessarily linguistic? Do we think with words, to use Bermudez’s (2003) phrase? Or does thinking occur in some other, yet to be determined, representational format? Or again do we think in various formats, switching from one to the other as tasks demand? In virtue perhaps of the ambiguous na- ture of first-person introspective data on the matter, philosophers have tradition- ally disagreed on this question, some thinking that thought had to be pictorial, other insisting that it could…Read more
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100Representation and indicationIn Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind, Elsevier. pp. 21--40. 2004.This paper is about two kinds of mental content and how they are related. We are going to call them representation and indication. We will begin with a rough characterization of each. The differences, and why they matter, will, hopefully, become clearer as the paper proceeds
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31L'empire contre-attaque : le retour de la réduction psychophysiquePhilosophiques 27 (1): 39-62. 2000.En refusant à la psychologie la latitude accordée aux autres sciences, l’argument concluant à l’irréductibilité des propriétés psychologiques à partir de leur réalisation multiple manifeste une attitude antinaturaliste à l’égard de cette science. En science, il est possible de relativiser les réductions à des domaines bien définis, c’est-à-dire des domaines qui découpent la nature d’une manière non ad hoc , et de corriger en conséquence l’appareil conceptuel des théories. Et en science, il est p…Read more
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Des Neurones A La Conscience: Neurophilosophie Et Philosophie Des Neurosciences (edited book)Bruxelles: De Boeck Universite. 2005.
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6André De Tienne, L'analytique de La représentation chez Peirce Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 16 (4): 251-253. 1996.
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