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244A framework for thinking about distributed cognitionPragmatics and Cognition 14 (2): 215-234. 2006.As is often the case when scientific or engineering fields emerge, new concepts are forged or old ones are adapted. When this happens, various arguments rage over what ultimately turns out to be conceptual misunderstandings. At that critical time, there is a need for an explicit reflection on the meaning of the concepts that define the field. In this position paper, we aim to provide a reasoned framework in which to think about various issues in the field of distributed cognition. We argue that …Read more
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230Epistemological strata and the rules of right reasonSynthese 141 (3). 2004.It has been commonplace in epistemology since its inception to idealize away from computational resource constraints, i.e., from the constraints of time and memory. One thought is that a kind of ideal rationality can be specified that ignores the constraints imposed by limited time and memory, and that actual cognitive performance can be seen as an interaction between the norms of ideal rationality and the practicalities of time and memory limitations. But a cornerstone of naturalistic epistemol…Read more
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2Peter K. Machamer, Rick Grush and Peter McLaughlin, eds., Theory and Method in the Neurosciences Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 22 (6): 422-424. 2002.
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37Maxwell Bennett, Daniel Dennett, Peter Hacker, John Searle, Neuroscience and Philosophy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2007, 215p.Maxwell Bennett, Daniel Dennett, Peter Hacker, John Searle, Neuroscience and Philosophy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2007, 215p (review)Philosophiques 36 (1): 260-265. 2009.
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31La théorie des systèmes développementaux et la construction sociale des maladies mentalesPhilosophiques 33 (1): 147-182. 2006.Dans ce texte, nous proposons un cadre, qui vise à intégrer les contributions des approches constructionnistes et biologiques dans un domaine précis, celui des maladies mentales. Pour ce faire, nous utiliserons quelques propositions récentes faites par des philosophes de la biologie — plus spécifiquement les idées avancées par les tenants de la « théorie des systèmes développementaux » ainsi que la notion d’« enracinement génératif » .In this paper, we are proposing a framework to integrate the …Read more
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1Martin Montminy, Les fondements empiriques de la signification Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 19 (2): 130-132. 1999.
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175Embodied thoughts. Concepts and compositionality without languageTheoria Et Historia Scientarum 1 53-72. 2006.Is thinking necessarily linguistic? Do we _think with words_, to use Bermudez’s (2003) phrase? Or does thinking occur in some other, yet to be determined, representational format? Or again do we think in various formats, switching from one to the other as tasks demand? In virtue perhaps of the ambiguous nature of first-person introspective data on the matter, philosophers have traditionally disagreed on this question, some thinking that thought had to be pictorial, other insisting that it could …Read more
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18A Framework For Thinking About Distributed CognitionPragmatics and Cognition 14 (2): 215-234. 2006.As is often the case when scientific or engineering fields emerge, new concepts are forged or old ones are adapted. When this happens, various arguments rage over what ultimately turns out to be conceptual misunderstandings. At that critical time, there is a need for an explicit reflection on the meaning of the concepts that define the field. In this position paper, we aim to provide a reasoned framework in which to think about various issues in the field of distributed cognition. We argue that …Read more
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3Susan Oyama, Paul E. Griffiths, and Russell D. Gray, eds., Cycles of Contingency Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 23 (3): 201-204. 2003.
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100Representation and indicationIn Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind, Elsevier. pp. 21--40. 2004.This paper is about two kinds of mental content and how they are related. We are going to call them representation and indication. We will begin with a rough characterization of each. The differences, and why they matter, will, hopefully, become clearer as the paper proceeds
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141Structured Thoughts: The Spatial-Motor ViewIn Gerhard Schurz, Edouard Machery & Markus Werning (eds.), Applications to Linguistics, Psychology and Neuroscience, De Gruyter. pp. 229-250. 2005.Is thinking necessarily linguistic? Do we think with words, to use Bermudez’s (2003) phrase? Or does thinking occur in some other, yet to be determined, representational format? Or again do we think in various formats, switching from one to the other as tasks demand? In virtue perhaps of the ambiguous na- ture of first-person introspective data on the matter, philosophers have tradition- ally disagreed on this question, some thinking that thought had to be pictorial, other insisting that it could…Read more
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30L'empire contre-attaque : le retour de la réduction psychophysiquePhilosophiques 27 (1): 39-62. 2000.En refusant à la psychologie la latitude accordée aux autres sciences, l’argument concluant à l’irréductibilité des propriétés psychologiques à partir de leur réalisation multiple manifeste une attitude antinaturaliste à l’égard de cette science. En science, il est possible de relativiser les réductions à des domaines bien définis, c’est-à-dire des domaines qui découpent la nature d’une manière non ad hoc , et de corriger en conséquence l’appareil conceptuel des théories. Et en science, il est p…Read more
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Des Neurones A La Conscience: Neurophilosophie Et Philosophie Des Neurosciences (edited book)Bruxelles: De Boeck Universite. 2005.
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6André De Tienne, L'analytique de La représentation chez Peirce Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 16 (4): 251-253. 1996.
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48Psychologie évolutionniste et théories interdomainesDialogue 40 (3): 453-. 2001.Evolutionary psychology presupposes relations between theories of different domains that the two traditional models, reduction and autonomy, cannot properly account for. We aim to construct a model of relations between theories that succeeds where traditional models fail. We show that the multiple realizability argument, on which the autonomist model is thought to rest, is compatible with reductionism and, following Kim, that an autonomist reading of the argument deprives psychology of its scien…Read more
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87Va Savoir! De la connaissance en général -- Pascal Engel (review)Dialogue 48 (1): 217-221. 2009.
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Martin Montminy, Les fondements empiriques de la signification (review)Philosophy in Review 19 130-132. 1999.
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53Finding a place for elimination in inter-level reductionist activities: Reply to WimsattSynthese 151 (3). 2006.According to Wimsatt, a proper treatment of reduction must distinguish between two types of reductionist activities scientists engage in. One of the benefits of better understanding the nature of reduction, he believes, is that it shows that eliminativism, that is, the elimination of concepts and theories from science, is a rather circumscribed and limited affair, especially in the case of inter-level reductionist activities. While I agree with Wimsatt that it is important to distinguish the two…Read more
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480Atomistic learning in non-modular systemsPhilosophical Psychology 18 (3): 313-325. 2005.We argue that atomistic learning?learning that requires training only on a novel item to be learned?is problematic for networks in which every weight is available for change in every learning situation. This is potentially significant because atomistic learning appears to be commonplace in humans and most non-human animals. We briefly review various proposed fixes, concluding that the most promising strategy to date involves training on pseudo-patterns along with novel items, a form of learning …Read more
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