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25Et pourquoi pas une explication non représentationnelle de l'action motrice? Considérations neurophénoménologiquesDialogue 46 (2): 353-360. 2007.
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22Les gardiens du bon usage : Étude critique de « Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience », de P. M. R. Hacker et M. R. Bennett (review)Philosophiques 34 (1): 183-200. 2007.
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19A New Hope: A better ICM to understand human cognitive architectural variabilitySynthese 199 (1-2): 871-903. 2020.How can we best understand human cognitive architectural variability? We believe that the relationships between theories in neurobiology, cognitive science and evolutionary biology posited by evolutionary psychology’s Integrated Causal Model has unduly supported various essentialist conceptions of the human cognitive architecture, monomorphic minds, that mask HCA variability, and we propose a different set of relationships between theories in the same domains to support a different, non-essentia…Read more
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18A Framework For Thinking About Distributed CognitionPragmatics and Cognition 14 (2): 215-234. 2006.As is often the case when scientific or engineering fields emerge, new concepts are forged or old ones are adapted. When this happens, various arguments rage over what ultimately turns out to be conceptual misunderstandings. At that critical time, there is a need for an explicit reflection on the meaning of the concepts that define the field. In this position paper, we aim to provide a reasoned framework in which to think about various issues in the field of distributed cognition. We argue that …Read more
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15After phrenology : Neural Reuse and the Interactive Brain de Michael L. AndersonPhilosophiques 43 (2): 533-537. 2016.Mélyssa Thibodeau-Doré,Pierre Poirier
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10The Electric Meme: A New Theory of How We ThinkRobert Aunger New York: Free Press, 2002, 392 pp., $41.00 (review)Dialogue 44 (2): 410-412. 2005.
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10Convolution and modal representations in Thagard and Stewart’s neural theory of creativity: a critical analysisSynthese 193 (5): 1535-1560. 2016.According to Thagard and Stewart :1–33, 2011), creativity results from the combination of neural representations, and combination results from convolution, an operation on vectors defined in the holographic reduced representation framework. They use these ideas to understand creativity as it occurs in many domains, and in particular in science. We argue that, because of its algebraic properties, convolution alone is ill-suited to the role proposed by Thagard and Stewart. The semantic pointer con…Read more
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7Et pourquoi pas une explication non représentationnelle de l’action motrice?: Considérations neurophénoménologiquesDialogue 46 (2): 353-360. 2007.
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6André De Tienne, L'analytique de La représentation chez Peirce Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 16 (4): 251-253. 1996.
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3Judith Genova, Wittgenstein: A way of seeing Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 16 (4): 257-259. 1996.
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3Susan Oyama, Paul E. Griffiths, and Russell D. Gray, eds., Cycles of Contingency Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 23 (3): 201-204. 2003.
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2Pascal Engel, La dispute: une introduction à la philosophie analytique (review)Philosophy in Review 18 (5): 324-326. 1998.
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2Peter K. Machamer, Rick Grush and Peter McLaughlin, eds., Theory and Method in the Neurosciences Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 22 (6): 422-424. 2002.
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1Martin Montminy, Les fondements empiriques de la signification Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 19 (2): 130-132. 1999.
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Martin Montminy, Les fondements empiriques de la signification (review)Philosophy in Review 19 130-132. 1999.
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The concept of innateness and the destiny of evolutionary psychologyJournal of Mind and Behavior 29 (1-2): 17-47. 2008.According to a popular version of the current evolutionary attitude in cognitive science, the mind is a massive aggregate of autonomous innate computational devices, each addressing specific adaptive problems. Our aim in this paper is to show that although this version of the attitude, which we call GOFEP , does not suffer from fatal flaws that would make it incoherent or otherwise conceptually inadequate, it will nevertheless prove unacceptable to most cognitive scientists today. To show this, …Read more
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André De Tienne, L'analytique de La représentation chez Peirce (review)Philosophy in Review 16 251-253. 1996.
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Des Neurones A La Conscience: Neurophilosophie Et Philosophie Des Neurosciences (edited book)Bruxelles: De Boeck Universite. 2005.
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