University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Department of Philosophy
PhD
Hanover, New Hampshire, United States of America
  •  426
    Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8): 828-874. 2015.
    This paper is about philosophical disputes where the literal content of what speakers communicate concerns such object-level issues as ground, supervenience, or real definition. It is tempting to think that such disputes straightforwardly express disagreements about these topics. In contrast to this, I suggest that, in many such cases, the disagreement that is expressed is actually one about which concepts should be employed. I make this case as follows. First, I look at non-philosophical, every…Read more
  •  1113
    Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms
    Philosophers' Imprint 13 (23): 1-37. 2013.
    In constructing semantic theories of normative and evaluative terms, philosophers have commonly deployed a certain type of disagreement -based argument. The premise of the argument observes the possibility of genuine disagreement between users of a certain normative or evaluative term, while the conclusion of the argument is that, however differently those speakers employ the term, they must mean the same thing by it. After all, if they did not, then they would not really disagree. We argue that…Read more