Charles Taliaferro

We argue that, ideally, philosophy—as the love of wisdom—should not be practiced strategically. Among genuine lovers of wisdom, there should be no need for strategic skills; by “strategic” we refer to those skill used in the military and, by extension, in business and sports that involves deception, misrepresentation, the use of surprise to disorient opponents, and so on. We give regrettable examples of non-Christian and Christian philosophers using strategic skills. This paper is dedicated to the Muslim philosopher Morteza Mutahhari who gave his life for the practice of philosophy as the love of wisdom, shorn of strategy.

Kant’s negative, distorted views on black Africans, human sexuality, and revealed religion led him to undervalue the case for racial equality, healthy sexual intimacy, and the virtues of Christianity as a revealed religion with its commending worship, prayer, and rites. Kantian anthropology and critique of revealed religion is contrasted with the more capacious approach of the Cambridge Platonists. Challenging Kant’s methodological bias is important in removing the obstacles facing a fair assessment of matters of race, sexuality, and the virtues of Christianity as a religion based on revelation.

In philosophy of religion, when, if ever, is it better to philosophically engage one another as advocates of competing religions (or secular naturalism) as opposed to conducting a more detached philosophical investigation of each other’s actual religious convictions? We offer a narrative overview of a philosophy of religion seminar we participated in, highlighting questions about the possibility of even understanding persons of different religions and considering when, if ever, one’s own religious convictions should be put on exhibit in teaching philosophy of religion. We defend a “middle path,” advocating the permissibility of some disclosure of religious convictions, but with an openness to role play and a passionate commitment to impartiality in class discussion and grading. This middle path lies in between advocacy models (such as Peter Moser’s, Eleonore Stump’s, and Merold Westphal’s) and more strict neutrality models (such as Michael Rea’s).

Resumo O autor defenderá, por um lado, a existência dos objectos abstractos e, por outro, o seu papel causal, numa ontologia platónica, tal como enquadrada por Roderick Chisholm. Se plausível, a natureza e o papel dos abstracta sob a forma de estados de coisas, oferecem-nos razões para acreditar em uma descrição bem-sucedida e explicativa da intencionalidade humana e animal que não está encerrada no mundo físico. Palavras-chave : causalidade, encerramento causal, fisicalismo, objectos abstractos, platonismo, Roderick ChisholmA defense of the existence and causal role of abstract objects in a Platonic ontology as influenced by the work of Roderick Chisholm. If plausible, the nature and role of abstracta in the form of states of affairs gives us some reason to believe that a successful description and explanation of human and animal intentionality that is not closed to the physical world. Keywords : abstract objects, causal closure, causation, physicalism, platonism, Roderick Chisholm

Are there general precepts governing when philosophers should not conduct inquiry on a given topic? When, if ever, should a philosopher just be silent? In this paper we look at a number of practical, epistemic, and moral arguments for philosophical silence. Some are quite general, and suggest that it is best never to engage in philosophical inquiry, while others are more domain - or context - specific. We argue that these arguments fail to establish their conclusions. We do, however, try to identify and defend several substantive constraints on philosophical dialogue and inquiry. In practice, though, respecting these constraints needn't lead to much philosophical silence.

Surprisingly, materialists and dualists often appeal to the same factors in their depiction of being an embodied, human person: sensations, agency, and causal underpinnings. I propose that this picture be expanded to include epistemic, structural, and affective components. I further propose that these elements, taken together, be construed as virtues. Being an embodied, human person consists in the exercise of six types of virtues: Sensory Virtues, the Virtue of Agency, Constitutional Virtues, Epistemic Virtues, Structural Virtues, and Affective Virtues. This project draws on recent contributions to virtue epistemology and to the philosophical analysis of self-respect.

Charles Taliaferro has written a dynamic narrative history of philosophical reflection on religion from the seventeenth century to the present, with an emphasis on shifting views of faith and the nature of evidence. The book begins with the movement called Cambridge Platonism, which formed a bridge between the ancient and medieval worlds and early modern philosophy. While the book provides a general overview of different movements in philosophy, it also offers a detailed exposition and reflection on key arguments. The scope is broad, from Descartes to contemporary feminist philosophy of religion. Written with clarity and verve, this is a book that will appeal to professionals and students in the philosophy of religion, religious studies, and the history of ideas, as well as informed lay readers.