Charles Taliaferro

Charles Taliaferro has written a dynamic narrative history of philosophical reflection on religion from the seventeenth century to the present, with an emphasis on shifting views of faith and the nature of evidence. The book begins with the movement called Cambridge Platonism, which formed a bridge between the ancient and medieval worlds and early modern philosophy. While the book provides a general overview of different movements in philosophy, it also offers a detailed exposition and reflection on key arguments. The scope is broad, from Descartes to contemporary feminist philosophy of religion. Written with clarity and verve, this is a book that will appeal to professionals and students in the philosophy of religion, religious studies, and the history of ideas, as well as informed lay readers.

H. D. Lewis once remarked he did not think ‘any case for immortality can get off the ground if we fail to make a case for dualism’. Lewis vigorously defended both mind body dualism, the theory that minds are nonphysical, spatially unextended things in causal interaction with physical, spatially extended things, as well as the conceivability of an after life. Lewis defended the intelligibility of supposing distinct, individual persons continue existing after bodily death, possibly even after all physical objects pass out of existence. Prominent philosophers such as Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Locke, Liebniz, and Reid have subscribed to both the truth of dualism and belief in continued personal existence after bodily death. Descartes' work might even be construed as reversing the order of Lewis' dictum. For Descartes, the case for dualism ‘gets off the ground’ because of the conceivability of an afterlife. Briefly put, Descartes sought to establish that a person is distinct from physical objects on the basis of it being metaphysically possible for a person to exist without his or her body, indeed without there being any physical objects whatever. If A can exist without B, then A is not identical with B. Thus, if it is possible for God to bring it about that I exist and there be no physical objects, I am not a physical object. The purpose of this article is not to develop a case for dualism, nor to query whether the case for immortality can get off the ground assuming nondualist theories of the self. I hope instead to assess a popular objection to dualism, and consequently to a dualist conception of the afterlife, which could be termed the problem of individuation

Garth Hallett’s way to the God of theism is charted in between the approaches commended by Richard Swinburne and Alvin Plantinga. Swinburne treats theism as a hypothesis which may be tested using confirmation theory. Swinburne stands in the tradition of natural theology which includes Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, and Butler who believe that unfettered and not already pre-disposed-totheism reason will show theism to be more reasonable than atheism or agnosticism. Plantinga has gone toe-to-toe with anti-theistic moves by Ayer, Flew, Solomon, Mackie, Russell et al and bolstered several classical theistic arguments: ontological, design, and religious experience arguments. But Plantinga is now best known for his sustained argument that theistic belief may be fully warranted as a basic belief not resting upon inference from more warranted convictions. This so-called “Reformed Epistemology” posits that within us lies a sensus divinitatus, a receptive capacity for apprehending God.

Philosophical assessments of different religious traditions face two substantial objections, among others. According to one, the very nature of religious traditions as embedded forms of life prevents this philosophical undertaking. According to the other, a philosophical inventory is possible but under its guise no religious tradition will be left standing. I reply to both and then comment on whether there is (or can be) an ideal observation post from which to philosophically elucidate and compare different religious beliefs and practices.

This chapter discusses the two kinds of philosophical critiques of natural theology: external and internal critiques. External critiques take aim at the whole project, objecting to the metaphysics, epistemology, or theory of values that make natural theology possible at all. Internal critiques allow that natural theology can succeed but none of its arguments are cogent or meet high philosophical standards. Among external critiques, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason seeks to undermine all metaphysics, as do contemporary forms of nonrealism. The chapter demonstrates that external philosophical critiques of natural theology have been less than successful, and also considers four internal critiques: the incoherence of theism, the poverty of theism, Humean uniqueness, and Kantian disappointment.

This book is a first-rate contribution to analytic philosophy of religion. The divine attributes that are the focus of this analytic enterprise are constitutive of theism. They include substantiality, incorporeality, necessary existence, eternality, omniscience, perfect virtue, moral admirability, and omnipotence. Hoffman and Rosenkrantz limit themselves to a conceptual goal; they argue for the coherence of theism not its truth. The book contains a useful glossary and terms are introduced with care, and without unnecessary jargon. A brave hearted undergraduate could use the book with profit, and specialists will see this text as a significant contribution to the growing library of volumes on the coherence of theism. Hoffman and Rosenkrantz join the ranks of Richard Swinburne, Ed Wieringa, Richard Gale and other analytic philosophers who have published systematic work on theism’s conceptual credibility. The Divine Attributes would work well in an advanced seminar in metaphysics, should you want to devote some attention to the metaphysics of theism along side other topics.

Is Christian faith compatible with a thoroughgoing naturalist view of the cosmos? Hardwick thinks so, and in this book he articulates and defends a naturalist form of Christianity. Hardwick argues that Christianity is not committed to the truth of theism, nor to any view that there is a God who created and redeems the cosmos through an incarnation. Instead, Christian faith witnesses to “events of grace” in which believers develop an “openness to being”. “To live a life of faith is to live with a fundamental openness toward the future”. This openness to being and the future is compatible with the denial that God exists, Jesus is the incarnate God-man, and other components of the various creeds of Christian tradition. While Hardwick does not think there is a God from a scientific or metaphysical point of view, he endeavors to read the Christian claim “God exists” as the referral to, and the affirmation of, a valuable way of life.

William Irwin defends a form of moral anti-realism, according to which there are no objective moral facts. He contends that moral realism is objectionable because of its being more complex or not as simple as anti-realism; moral realism is in conflict with science; moral realism is also challenged by the fact that our moral judgements would differ if we were subject to a different biology or evolutionary past. Irwin also argues that insofar as moral realism is supportable evidentially by experience this would lead to the absurdity of thinking theism may be supported evidentially by religious experience. In response, it is argued that there are many truths and practices that are not intelligible if there are no objective, normative truths and that objective moral truths are no more dispensable or odd than epistemic norms. It is further argued that Irwin's account of the evolution of morality is not able to escape presupposing objective moral facts. Finally, the appeal to moral and religious experience is defended in making the case for moral realism and theism.

This chapter aims to separate the caricatures of dualism from a serious philosophical and theological view of human, and nonhuman animal nature. It addresses one of the key sources for discontent with substance dualism: the assumption that people have a clear, problem‐free understanding of what it is to be physical. The chapter discusses author's argument for why people should believe that human persons are not numerically identical with their bodies. It also offers reasons why materialism is unacceptable in terms of mental‐physical identity. The chapter defends the possibility of persons ceasing to be while their bodies survive, and persons surviving death despite the annihilation of their bodies. It proposes that the way forward is to consider whether there is a reason to believe that what people know in their experience is the very same thing as what most physicalists claim is physical: their brains and brain processes or their bodies as a whole.

Chapter 1, “A Theory About Moral Theories,” sets forth Johnson’s central theme: “Normative ethical systems are best understood as attempts to seek out and justify ways of living a fulfilled human life in terms of the kind of fulfillment one believes to be possible given one’s beliefs about human nature and the ultimate nature of all things. Furthermore, any normative ethical system must also indicate just how one’s own quest for fulfillment is related to the experiences of other people and sentient beings, given, again, one’s view of human nature and the ultimate nature of all things”. Chapter 2, “The Point of Morality,” makes the case that morality is an unavoidable enterprise as persons seek to adjudicate competing wants, needs, and desires. The search for fulfillment inevitably raises concern for fair-minded reflection on appropriate and inappropriate modes of fulfillment.

ABSTRACT Thaddeus Metz is probably the leading expert on the meaning of life. His latest book admirably displays his intellectual agility and fairness: arguments, counter-arguments, examples and counter-examples come in wave after wave that may compel most of us to slow down the pace of reading. If you have ever had the delight of interacting with Professor Metz at a conference, you know his irrepressible energy and love for debate. In this brief essay, I challenge some of Metz’s terminology, raise a worry about the role of metaphysics in the meaning of life literature, suggest a reply to the religious relational account of meaning, and firm up the intuition that meaning is enhanced in a theistic cosmos.