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32Meaning, Expression, and Thought (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3): 744-747. 2005.
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51Knocked out senseless: Naturalism and analyticityIn Dunja Jutronić (ed.), The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics, Pedagoška Fakulteta Maribor. pp. 82. 1997.
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35On the first day of the class for Introduction to Philosophy, your professor tells you that if you keep perfect attendance, complete every homework satisfactorily, participate in class discussion actively, and score 100% in every examination, you will certainly get an A+ for the course. You work hard and by the end of the semester, you think you have accomplished all these things. You are pleased. Why? Because you think as follows: “I have kept perfect attendance, completed every homework satisf…Read more
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DefinitionIn Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. pp. 213--215. 1995.
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28The eleven original essays in this collection competently cover a wide range of Robert Stalnaker’s philosophical work, and Stalnaker’s replies to them are clear, well-thought out, and informative. Anyone interested in Stalnaker’s philosophy or the areas covered in this volume is well advised to read it.
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13Holism: A Consumer UpdateGrazer Philosophische Studien 46 213-230. 1993.Meaning Solipsism says that it is possible for there to be a meaningful state without any other meaningful state. The meaning of such a solo meaningful state should be non-natural. The best strategy for establishing Meaning Solipsism is to argue for the determination of the meaning of a possible solo meaningful state via the set of entities the meaning of the state fits. Embracing merely possible and impossible entities is the most straightforward way to do so. Also, a good way to honor analayti…Read more
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113Impossibilia and Modally Tensed PredicationActa Analytica 30 (4): 317-323. 2015.Mark Jago’s four arguments against Takashi Yagisawa’s extended modal realism are examined and shown to be ineffective. Yagisawa’s device of modal tense renders three of Jago’s arguments harmless, and the correct understanding of predications of modal properties of world stages blocks the fourth one
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A somewhat russellian theory of intensional contexts: Language and world: Realism and intentionalityPhilosophical Perspectives 11 43-82. 1997.
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62Deflationary ExistenceAnnals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 22 1-16. 2014.I propose and defend a surprisingly simple yet useful analysis of existence according to which existence is a relation between a thing and a set: a thing x bears the relation of existence to a set S if and only if x is a member of S . This simple set-theoretic analysis of existence demystifies existence and is powerful and flexible enough to serve important theoretical purposes
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199A new argument against the existence requirementAnalysis 65 (1). 2005.It may appear that in order to be any way at all, a thing must exist. A possible – worlds version of this claim goes as follows: (E) For every x, for every possible world w, Fx at w only if x exists at w. Here and later in (R), the letter ‘F’ is used as a schematic letter to be replaced with a one – place predicate. There are two arguments against (E). The first is by analogy. Socrates is widely admired now but he does not exist now. So, it is not the case that for every x, for every time t, Fx …Read more
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216Against Creationism in FictionNoûs 35 (s15): 153-172. 2001.Sherlock Holmes is a fictional individual. So is his favorite pipe. Our pre-theoretical intuition says that neither of them is real. It says that neither of them really, or actually, exists. It also says that there is a sense in which they do exist, namely, a sense in which they exist “in the world of” the Sherlock Holmes stories. Our pre-theoretical intuition says in general of any fictional individual that it does not actually exist but exists “in the world of” the relevant fiction. I wish to …Read more
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61A somewhat Russellian theory of intensional contextsPhilosophical Perspectives 11 43-82. 1997.Consider the following sentence schemata: (1) The proposition that P is F; (2) The property of being Q is F; (3) The relation of being R is F, where `P' is a schematic letter for a sentence, `Q' and `F' are schematic letters for a nonrelational predicate, and `R' is a schematic letter for a relational predicate. For example, if we substitute `Snow is white' for `P', `famous' for `F' in (1), `round' for `Q', `instantiated' for `F' in (2), `a father of' for `R', and `asymmetric' for `F' in (3), th…Read more
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Belief and SynonymyDissertation, Princeton University. 1981.My general contention is to defend the compositional principle of meaning--that the meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings of its parts --with respect to belief contexts, which do not always appear to allow salva veritate substitutivity of synonyms. I argue that this appearance is an illusion which results from confusing beliefs that are not about linguistic expressions with beliefs that are about linguistic expressions. In doing so, I invoke and elaborate the Gricean dist…Read more
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74Review: Judith Thomson and Alex Byrne (eds): Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker (review)Mind 117 (466): 532-537. 2008.
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Ghosts Are ChillyIn Peter van Inwagen & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Persons: Human and Divine, Clarendon Press. 2007.
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De Re Modality |
Varieties of Modality |
Theories of Modality |
Modal Epistemology |
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Possible Worlds |
Modality |
De Re Modality |
Varieties of Modality |
Theories of Modality |
Modal Epistemology |