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111Epistemic scorekeepingIn Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions, Oxford University Press. 2012.
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14Evidentness, Justification, and BeliefIn T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents, Oxford University Press. pp. 207. 2011.
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22Goldman’s Knowledge in a Social WorldProtoSociology 18 409-422. 2003.Knowledge in a Social World (KSW) is Alvin Goldman’s sustained treatment of social epistemology. As in his previous, ‘individualistic’ epistemology, Goldman’s lodestar is the idea that it is the truth-aptness of certain processes/methods which marks them out for our epistemic approval. Here, I focus on issues concerning the framework of KSW: Goldman’s claim that a correspondence theory of truth is favoured/required by his veritistic social epistemology (VSE); and the issue of whether a VSE of th…Read more
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14EditorialPhilosophical Studies 171 (1): 1-1. 2014.This special issue of Philosophical Studies consists of a selection of papers and Author-Meets-Critics sessions presented at the 2013 meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association in San Francisco. Members of the 2012–2013 Program Committee chose the papers for presentation and offered recommendations for publication. The members of that committee are:Patrick Rysiew, ChairChrisoula AndreouNeera BadhwarTim BlackElizabeth BrakeJuan ComesañaPhilip CorkumAngela CoventrySh…Read more
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127Beyond words: Communication, truthfulness, and understandingEpisteme 4 (3): 285-304. 2007.Testimony is an indispensable source of information. Yet, contrary to ‘literalism’, speakers rarely mean just what they say; and even when they do, that itself is something the hearer needs to realize. So, understanding instances of testimony requires more than merely reading others' messages off of the words they utter. Further, a very familiar and theoretically well-entrenched approach to how we arrive at such understanding serves to emphasize, not merely how deeply committed we are to testimo…Read more
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184Epistemic ContextualismThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2007.Epistemic contextualism is a recent and hotly debated position. In its dominant form, EC is the view that the proposition expressed by a given knowledge sentence depends upon the context in which it is uttered. What makes this view interesting and controversial is that ‘context’ here refers, not to certain features of the putative subject of knowledge or his/her objective situation, but rather to features of the knowledge attributor' psychology and/or conversational-practical situation. As a res…Read more
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78Book Review: Assurance: An Austinian View of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims, written by Krista Lawlor (review)International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (1). 2016._ Source: _Page Count 7
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78Contesting contextualismGrazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1): 51-70. 2005.According to Keith DeRose, the invariantist's attempt to account for the data which inspire contextualism fares no better, in the end, than the "desperate and lame" maneuvers of "the crazed theory of 'bachelor'", whereby S's being unmarried is not among the truth conditions of 'S is a bachelor', but merely an implicature generated by an assertion thereof. Here, I outline the invariantist account I have previously proposed. I then argue that the prospects for sophisticated invariantism — either a…Read more
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30Argumentation and the Social Significance of ReasonsEpisteme 12 (2): 309-317. 2015.Jennifer Nagel suggests that Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory of reasoning can shed light on “why we commonly think of perceptually and testimonially supported judgments as justified despite feeling worried, on reflection, that only what is internally available can justify”. While I agree that there is indeed a natural path (or paths) from the argumentative theory to this asymmetry, and instability, in our epistemic judgments, I am not sure that it is quite the one that Nagel identifie…Read more
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67Assurance: An Austinian View of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims, written by Krista Lawlor (review)International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (1): 65-72. 2016._ Source: _Page Count 7
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41Review of Michael Blome-Tillmann, Knowledge and Presuppositions (review)Philosophical Review 126 (1): 126-132. 2017.
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29Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology (review)Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (2): 260-261. 2002.Patrick Rysiew - Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.2 260-261 Book Review Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology Nicholas Wolterstorff. Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xiii + 265. Cloth, $54.95. Interest in Thomas Reid has undergone a resurgence over the past several decades. Nicolas Wolterstorff's book is the latest addition to the growing Reid…Read more
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101Experience FirstIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 2. 2013.
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124What Is Knowledge-first Epistemology?In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 10. 2013.
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375Fallibilism, epistemic possibility, and concessive knowledge attributionsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1): 123-132. 2008.If knowing requires believing on the basis of evidence that entails what’s believed, we have hardly any knowledge at all. Hence the near-universal acceptance of fallibilism in epistemology: if it's true that "we are all fallibilists now" (Siegel 1997: 164), that's because denying that one can know on the basis of non-entailing evidence1is, it seems, not an option if we're to preserve the very strong appearance that we do know many things (Cohen 1988: 91). Hence the significance of concessive kno…Read more
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96Review: Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth (review)Mind 116 (464): 1154-1158. 2007.
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32Still Nowhere Else to StartIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 25. 2013.
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162Clarity about concessive knowledge attributions: reply to DoddSynthese 181 (3): 395-403. 2011.Recently, Dylan Dodd (this Journal ) has tried to clear up what he takes to be some of the many confusions surrounding concessive knowledge attributions (CKAs)—i.e., utterances of the form “S knows that p , but it’s possible that q ” (where q entails not- p ) (Rysiew, Noûs 35(4): 477–514, 2001). Here, we respond to the criticisms Dodd offers of the account of the semantics and the sometime-infelicity of CKAs we have given (Dougherty and Rysiew, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(1): 121…Read more
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy, Miscellaneous |
Philosophy, General Works |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |