•  13
    Reply to Clanton and Forcehimes
    Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (2): 185-189. 2009.
    In this reply I respond to the article "Can Peircean Epistemic Perfectionists Bid Farewell to Deweyan Democracy?" by J. Caleb Clanton and Andrew T. Forcehimes, in this journal issue
  •  132
    Precis of a pragmatist philosophy of democracy
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45 (1). 2009.
    This short paper summarizes the main line of argument in my book, *A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy* (Routledge, 2007), which is the subject of a forthcoming symposium issue of the journal *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*.
  •  14
    Responses to My Critics: TalisseRobert B.Pragmatist philosophy of democracy
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45 (1): 90-108. 2009.
  •  78
    Religion in politics: What's the problem?
    Think 12 (33): 65-73. 2013.
    ExtractA few years ago, I, an American, was giving a talk at a political philosophy conference in the United Kingdom. My topic was religion in democratic politics, and I delivered what I thought was a splendid line of argument supporting the idea that religion has at most a highly constrained role to play in democratic politics. The audience was appreciative enough, but during the question and answer session, there emerged the charge that my paper had addressed a uniquely ‘American’ problem, a p…Read more
  •  15
    My response to Ralston's paper "In Defense of Democracy as a Way of Life," both presented at the Eastern APA meeting (2008).
  •  12
    Problems with Galston’s Pluralist Liberalism
    Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (1): 221-229. 2004.
  •  77
    Contemporary liberal democracy employs a conception of legitimacy according to which political decisions and institutions must be at least in principle justifiable to all citizens. This conception of legitimacy is difficult to satisfy when citizens are deeply divided at the level of fundamental moral, religious, and philosophical commitments. Many have followed the later Rawls in holding that where a reasonable pluralism of such commitments persists, political justification must eschew appeal to…Read more
  •  25
    Reply to Karin Jønch-Clausen and Klemens Kappel
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1): 267-271. 2016.
  •  60
    Responses to my critics
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45 (1). 2009.
  •  30
    Religion, respect and Eberle’s agapic pacifist
    Philosophy and Social Criticism 38 (3): 313-325. 2012.
    Christopher Eberle has developed a powerful critique of justificatory liberalism. According to Eberle, justificatory liberalism’s doctrine of restraint , which requires religious citizens to refrain from publicly advocating for policies that can be supported only by their religious reasons, is illiberal. In this article, I defend justificatory liberalism against Eberle’s critique
  •  42
    Sustaining democracy: folk epistemology and social conflict
    Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (4): 500-519. 2013.
    No abstract
  •  21
    Response to Lever
    Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 18 (1): 82-85. 2015.
  •  40
    ExtractA few years ago, I, an American, was giving a talk at a political philosophy conference in the United Kingdom. My topic was religion in democratic politics, and I delivered what I thought was a splendid line of argument supporting the idea that religion has at most a highly constrained role to play in democratic politics. The audience was appreciative enough, but during the question and answer session, there emerged the charge that my paper had addressed a uniquely ‘American’ problem, a p…Read more
  •  45
    Skepticism and the democratic ideal
    Think 6 (16): 7. 2008.
    Robert Talisse argues that skepticism is required for a healthy democracy, and provides some illuminating and amusing examples of popular dismissive attitudes towards skepticism
  •  76
    Rawls on pluralism and stability
    Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 15 (1-2): 173-194. 2003.
    Rawls ‘s political liberalism abandons the traditional political‐theory objective of providing a philosophical account of liberal democracy. However, Rawls also aims for a liberal political order endorsed by citizens on grounds deeper than what he calls a “modus vivendi” compromise; he contends that a liberal political order based upon a modus vivendi is unstable. The aspiration for a pluralist and “freestanding” liberalism is at odds with the goal of a liberalism endorsed as something deeper th…Read more
  •  90
    On the Supposed Tension in Peirce’s “Fixation of Belief”
    Journal of Philosophical Research 26 561-569. 2001.
    Recent commentaries on “The Fixation of Belief” have located and emphasized an inconsistency or “tension” in Peirce’s central argument. On the one hand, Peirce maintains that “the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry”; on the other, he wants to establish that the method of science is superior to all other methods of inquiry. The tension arises from the fact that whereas Peirce dismisses the methods of tenacity, authority, and a priority on the grounds that they cannot fulfill the …Read more
  •  42
    Pluralism frustrates liberalism's conception of legitimacy. The attempts by Rawls and Galston to preserve liberal legitimacy in light of pluralism are critically engaged, and found lacking. The paper closes with a sketch of an "agonistic" liberalism.
  •  36
    Puzzles and Perplexities (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 27 (1): 87-89. 2004.
  •  23
    Pragmatism and the cold war
    In Cheryl Misak (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2008.
    This is a short essay written for the forthcoming *Handbook of American Pragmatism* (Cheryl Misak, ed., Oxford University Press). The author argues that the standard narrative, according to which pragmatism went into eclipse in the years of the Cold War is nonviable.
  •  26
    New Trouble For Deliberative Democracy
    Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 12 (1): 107-123. 2017.
    Robert Talisse | : In the past two decades, democratic political practice has taken a deliberative turn. That is, contemporary democratic politics has become increasingly focused on facilitating citizen participation in the public exchange of reasons. Although the deliberative turn in democratic practice is in several respects welcome, the technological and communicative advances that have facilitated it also make possible new kinds of deliberative democratic pathology. This essay calls attentio…Read more
  •  7
    Pluralism and Liberal Democracy (review)
    Social Theory and Practice 33 (1): 151-158. 2007.
  •  44
    Pragmatist Political Philosophy
    Philosophy Compass 9 (2): 123-130. 2014.
    This essay surveys three prominent trends in current pragmatist political philosophy: Deweyan Democratic Perfectionism, Rortyan Ironism, and Pragmatist Epistemic Deliberativism. After articulating the main commitments of each view, the author raises philosophical problems each must confront. The essay closes with the more general criticism that pragmatist political theory has been nearly exclusively focused on democracy, but needs to address additional topics
  •  89
    Pluralism and liberal democracy
    Social Theory and Practice 33 (1): 151-158. 2007.
  •  75
    Democracy After Liberalism (Routledge, 2005) argues for a non-liberal interpretation of democratic politics. The argument of the book moves in two stages. First, a case is made against liberalism, the dominant interpretation of democratic politics. I argue that liberalism suffers an internal tension between its conception of legitimacy and its neutralist stance towards the good; this internal tension manifests in palpable external social ills that liberalism cannot sufficiently remedy. Second, a…Read more
  • Precis
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45 (1): 45-49. 2009.
  •  56
    In this book, Robert Talisse critically examines the moral and political implications of pluralism, the view that our best moral thinking is indeterminate and that moral conflict is an inescapable feature of the human condition. Through a careful engagement with the work of William James, Isaiah Berlin, John Rawls, and their contemporary followers, Talisse distinguishes two broad types of moral pluralism: metaphysical and epistemic. After arguing that metaphysical pluralism does not offer a comp…Read more
  •  193
    Impunity and domination: A puzzle for republicanism
    European Journal of Political Theory 13 (2): 121-131. 2014.
    Republicans hold that freedom is non-domination rather than non-interference. This entails that any instance of interference that does not involve domination is not freedom-lessening. The case for thinking of freedom as non-domination proceeds mostly by way of a handful of highly compelling cases in which it seems intuitive to say of some person that he or she is unfree despite being in fact free from interference. In this essay, I call attention to a kind of case which directs attention to what…Read more
  •  20
    This brief text assists students in understanding Rawls' philosophy and thinking so they can more fully engage in useful, intelligent class dialogue and improve their understanding of course content. Part of the Wadsworth Notes Series,, ON RAWLS is written by a philosopher deeply versed in the philosophy of this key thinker. Like other books in the series, this concise book offers sufficient insight into the thinking of a notable philosopher, better enabling students to engage in reading and to …Read more