•  2
    A Revolution In Logic?
    with Jaakko Hintikka
    Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 169-183. 1996.
  •  65
    Minimalism and the Definability of Truth
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 6 143-153. 2000.
    In this paper I am going to inquire to what extent the main requirements of a minimalist theory of truth and falsity (as formulated, for example, by Horwich and Field) can be consistently implemented in a formal theory. I will discuss several of the existing logical theories of truth, including Tarski-type (un)definability results, Kripke’s partial interpretation of truth and falsity, Barwise and Moss’ theory based upon non-well-founded sets, McGee’s treatment of truth as a vague predicate, and …Read more
  • IF first-order logic and truth-definitions
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 26. 1997.
    This paper shows that the logic known as Information-friendly logic (IF-logic) introduced by Jaakko Hintikka and Gabriel Sandu defines its own truth-predicate. The result is interesting given that IF logic is a much stronger logic than ordinary first-order logic and has also a well behaved notion of negation which, on its first-order subfragment, behaves like classical, contradictory negation.
  •  1
    Compositional Semantics
    ProtoSociology 23. 2006.
  •  1
    This book collects articles on knowledge and game-theoretical semantics dedicated to the memory of the Finnish philosopher and logician Jaakko Hintikka. Many of the contributors have been Hintikka's closed collaborators. The book contains a short overview of Hintikka's contributions to logic and an extensive bibliography of Hintikka's works.
  •  299
    What is Logic?
    with Hintikka Jaakko
    In Dale Jacquette (ed.), Philosophy of Logic, North Holland. pp. 13--39. 2002.
    It is far from clear what is meant by logic or what should be meant by it. It is nevertheless reasonable to identify logic as the study of inferences and inferential relations. The obvious practical use of logic is in any case to help us to reason well, to draw good inferences. And the typical form the theory of any part of logic seems to be a set of rules of inference. This answer already introduces some structure into a discussion of the nature of logic, for in an inference we can distinguish …Read more
  •  105
    The skeleton in Frege's cupboard: The standard versus nonstandard distinction
    with Jaakko Hintikka
    Journal of Philosophy 89 (6): 290-315. 1992.
    Against some very common views (e.g. Dummett), this paper argues that Frege did not have a standard interpretation of higher-order logic and for this reason his programme in the foundations of mathematics was a nonstarter.
  •  63
  •  56
    Erratum to: Between proof and truth
    with Julien Boyer
    Synthese 187 (3): 973-974. 2012.
  •  107
    The paper argues that there are two main kinds of joint action, direct joint bringing about (or performing) something (expressed in terms of a DO-operator) and jointly seeing to it that something is the case (expressed in terms of a Stit-operator). The former kind of joint action contains conjunctive, disjunctive and sequential action and its central subkinds. While joint seeing to it that something is the case is argued to be necessarily intentional, direct joint performance can also be noninte…Read more
  •  25
    Equilibrium semantics
    with Merlijn Sevenster
    Annals of Pure and Applied Logic. forthcoming.
  •  11
    entities in mathematics There is a line of argument which keeps ontological commitments to the minimum by making use of conservativity results. The argument goes back to Hilbert who set its general frame. Hilbert’s concern was with certain abstract (ideal) entities in mathematics but the argument has been applied without discrimination to avoid ontological commitment to mathematical entities in physics (Field) or to avoid an ontological commitment to substantial properties in the case of truth (…Read more
  •  66
    Deflationism and arithmetical truth
    with Tapani Hyttinen
    Dialectica 58 (3). 2004.
    Deflationists have argued that truth is an ontologically thin property which has only an expressive function to perform, that is, it makes possible to express semantic generalizations like 'All the theorems are true', 'Everything Peter said is true', etc. Some of the deflationists have also argued that although truth is ontologically thin, it suffices in conjunctions with other facts not involving truth to explain all the facts about truth. The purpose of this paper is to show that in the case o…Read more
  •  16
    Quantification and Anaphora in Natural Language
    In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 609-628. 2012.
  •  27
    Metaphor and the Varieties of Lexical Meaning
    with Jaakko Hintikka
    Dialectica 44 (1‐2): 55-78. 1990.
  •  19
    On a Combination of Truth and Probability: Probabilistic Independence-Friendly Logic
    In Alexandru Manafu (ed.), The Prospects for Fusion Emergence, Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, Vol. 313. 2015.
  •  2
    We fix a family of actions A which represents the set of possible choices of the players in a game. A sequence (a1, ..., an) of actions represents the consecutive choices of the players, ai ∈ A.
  •  2
    In order to give a compositional semantics for IF -languages, we shall describe their syntax in a different way. We shall not any longer have quantifiers of the form (∃y/{Q1x1, ..., Qkxk}), (∀y/{Q1x1, ..., Qkxk}), (Qi ∈ {∃, ∀}) but instead (∃xn/{xi1, ..., xim}), (∀xn/{xi1, ..., xim}).
  •  29
    Logic and linguistics in the twentieth century
    with Alessandro Lenci
    In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The development of modern logic, Oxford University Press. 2011.
    This chapter begins with a discussion of the three phases of the interaction between logic and linguistics on the nature of universal grammar. It then attempts to reconstruct the dynamics and interactions between these approaches in logic and in linguistic theory, which represent the major landmarks in the quest for the individuation of the universal structure of language.
  •  35
    Read on the Liar
    Discusiones Filosóficas 12 (19). 2011.
  •  21
    Partiality and games: propositional logic
    Logic Journal of the IGPL 9 (1): 101-121. 2001.
    We study partiality in propositional logics containing formulas with either undefined or over-defined truth-values. Undefined values are created by adding a four-place connective W termed transjunction to complete models which, together with the usual Boolean connectives is shown to be functionally complete for all partial functions. Transjunction is seen to be motivated from a game-theoretic perspective, emerging from a two-stage extensive form semantic game of imperfect information between two…Read more