Lou Marinoff

In the course of my evolution as an author and philosopher, I have written and published many different kinds of works. However, this is my maiden editorial for the first serial scholarly publication that I have ever edited, so I cannot draw from any well of direct experience in this role. Thus I beg your indulgence as a reader, to bear with me as I say some things that need to be said about this journal, about the Association whose journal it is, about the publisher who is committing it to print, about the Movement to which it will add both erudition and impetus, and about some opportunities and obstacles that philosophical practitioners are wont to confront.

This paper claims that the edifice of philosophical practice bears prima facie resemblance to other counseling-dispensing professions—e.g. medicine, law, psychology, accountancy. It defends virtues of professionalism in philosophical practice against accusations of sophism, and also rejects social constructivism as a politically extreme form of sophistry. It concludes that, notwithstanding prima facie resemblance to other counseling professions, philosophical practice is foundationally distinct from them. When elaborated, this distinction complicates the notion of inculcating virtue in philosophical practice.