-
35Chisholm's Definition of Organic UnityIn Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent work on intrinsic value, Springer. pp. 319--323. 2005.
-
60Common Sense and A Priori EpistemologyThe Monist 81 (3): 473-487. 1998.Some philosophers have adopted both a commonsense approach to the theory of knowledge and held that some epistemic principles are knowable a priori. Roderick Chisholm is a prominent example of a philosopher who does both. In The Problem of the Criterion, Chisholm holds that in attempting to discover criteria of evidence we should begin with particular commonsense examples of knowledge, such as I know that I have two hands and I know that there are other people. According to Chisholm, our knowled…Read more
-
30What’s Wrong With Methodism?Metaphilosophy 29 (1&2): 79-94. 1998.I distinguish between two theses, DPJ and DGP. DPJ asserts that one’s justification for accepting particular epistemic propositions positively depends on one’s being justified in believing general epistemic principles. DGP claims that one’s justification in believing general epistemic propositions positively depends on one’s being justified in believing particular epistemic propositions. I claim that methodism accepts DPJ and rejects DGP and particularism accepts DGP and rejects DPJ. I argue tha…Read more
-
56Moral goodness, esteem, and acting from dutyJournal of Value Inquiry 25 (2): 103-117. 1991.There is a long tradition in moral philosophy which maintains that a necessary condition for moral goodness is that one act from a sense of duty. Kant is perhaps the best known and most discussed representative of this view, but one finds others prior to Kant, such as Butler and Price, and Kant's contemporaries, such as Reid, expressing similar ideas. Price, for example writes, ". . . what I have chiefly insisted on, is, that we characterize as virtuous no actions flowing merely from instinctive…Read more
-
22
-
9Justification and Considered Moral JudgmentsSouthern Journal of Philosophy 24 (4): 503-516. 2010.
-
49Justification and considered moral judgmentsSouthern Journal of Philosophy 24 (4): 503-516. 1986.
-
12"Promising, Intending, and Moral Autonomy" by Michael H. Robins (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4): 685. 1987.
-
14High accessibility and justificationPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (3): 463-476. 1989.
-
13The Highest Moral Knowledge and Internalism: Some CommentsSouthern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1): 161-165. 1991.
-
14The highest moral knowledge and internalism: Some commentsSouthern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1): 161-165. 1991.
-
5Practical Reasoning, by Robert Audi (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4): 998-1001. 1992.
-
101Organic unitiesThe Journal of Ethics 2 (4): 321-337. 1998.I defend the view that there are organic unities mainly by presenting examples of organic unities. I also defend the view against two objections. The first objection appeals to the notion of an evaluatively incomplete state of affairs. The second objection holds that the intrinsic value of a state of affairs can be different in different contexts. I argue that neither objection provides a compelling reason for rejecting these examples.
-
25Commonsensism in ethics and epistemologyIn Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, truth, and duty: essays on epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue, Oxford University Press. pp. 204--218. 2001.
-
11Ethical SkepticismIn Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford handbook of epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 486. 2002.
-
40Epistemology and ethicsIn Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford handbook of epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 479--512. 2002.In ”Epistemology and Ethics,” Noah Lemos suggests that moral epistemology is mainly concerned with “whether and how we can have knowledge or justified belief” about moral issues. After addressing skeptical arguments, he considers how the moral epistemologist and moral philosopher should begin their account of moral knowledge. Lemos favors a particularist approach whereby we begin with instances of moral knowledge and use these to formulate and evaluate criteria for moral knowledge. After relatin…Read more
-
56Common Sense: A Contemporary DefenseCambridge University Press. 2004.In this 2004 book, Noah Lemos presents a strong defense of the common sense tradition, the view that we may take as data for philosophical inquiry many of the things we ordinarily think we know. He discusses the main features of that tradition as expounded by Thomas Reid, G. E. Moore and Roderick Chisholm. For a long time common sense philosophers have been subject to two main objections: that they fail to give any non-circular argument for the reliability of memory and perception; and that they…Read more
-
101Rational Desire and the GoodBusiness Ethics Quarterly 14 (2): 329-336. 2004.essay on the theory of value. It is among the best defenses of a rational desire/preference theory of the good. Even those not inclined to accept such theories will profit from reading Carson's discussion. Moreover, it would be worthwhile reading for scholars and students in various areas of applied ethics. The book is divided into two parts. The first half of the book addresses firstorder questions about what things are good and bad. The second half discusses various metaethical questions which…Read more
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Value Theory |