Dmitri Nikulin

In recent decades, memory has become one of the major concepts and a dominant topic in philosophy, sociology, politics, history, science, cultural studies, literary theory, and the discussions of trauma and the Holocaust. In contemporary debates, the concept of memory is often used rather broadly and thus not always unambiguously. For this reason, the clarification of the range of the historical meaning of the concept of memory is a very important and urgent task. This volume shows how the concept of memory has been used and appropriated in different historical circumstances and how it has changed throughout the history of philosophy. In ancient philosophy, memory was considered a repository of sensible and mental impressions and was complemented by recollection-the process of recovering the content of past thoughts and perceptions. Such an understanding of memory led to the development both of mnemotechnics and the attempts to locate memory within the structure of cognitive faculties. In contemporary philosophical and historical debates, memory frequently substitutes for reason by becoming a predominant capacity to which one refers when one wants to explain not only the personal identity but also a historical, political, or social phenomenon. In contemporary interpretation, it is memory, and not reason, that acts in and through human actions and history, which is a critical reaction to the overly rationalized and simplified concept of reason in the Enlightenment. Moreover, in modernity memory has taken on one of the most distinctive features of reason: it is thought of as capable not only of recollecting past events and meanings, but also itself. In this respect, the volume can be also taken as a reflective philosophical attempt by memory to recall itself, its functioning and transformations throughout its own history.

This paper considers the problem of evil as it has been discussed and formulated by Plotinus and polemically taken over by Proclus. Contrary to Plotinus, Proclus does not consider matter as evil. Rather, evil in its elusive indefinite nature has to be characterized by the redefined concepts of privation, subcontrary and parypostasis. In its inescapable deficiency, evil, then, is the privation and subcontrary of the good that exists parypostatically, that is, as elusively present in its absence as the misplacement of being and the displacement of the good.

_Collected writings on Plato's unwritten teachings._ Offering a provocative alternative to the dominant approaches of Plato scholarship, the Tübingen School suggests that the dialogues do not tell the full story of Plato's philosophical teachings. Texts and fragments by his students and their followers-most famously Aristotle's _Physics_-point to an "unwritten doctrine" articulated by Plato at the Academy. These unwritten teachings had a more systematic character than those presented in the dialogues, which according to this interpretation were meant to be introductory. The Tübingen School reconstructs a historical, critical, and systematic account of Plato that takes into account testimony about these teachings as well as the dialogues themselves. _The Other Plato_ collects seminal and more recent essays by leading proponents of this approach, providing a comprehensive overview of the Tübingen School for English readers.

Most of the core concepts of the Western philosophical tradition originate in antiquity. Yet boredom is strikingly absent from classical thought. In this philosophical study, Dmitri Nikulin explores the concept's genealogy to argue that boredom is the mark of modernity. Nikulin contends that boredom is a specifically modern phenomenon. He provides a critical reconstruction of the concept of the modern subject as universal, rational, autonomous, and self-sufficient. Understanding itself in this way, this subject is at once the protagonist, playwright, director, and spectator of the staged drama of human existence. It is therefore inevitably monological, lonely, and alone, and can neither escape its own presence nor get rid of it. In other words, it is bored-and this boredom is the fundamental expression and symptom of the modern condition. Considering such thinkers as Descartes, Pascal, Kant, Kierkegaard, Kracauer, Heidegger, and Benjamin, Critique of Bored Reason places boredom on center stage in the philosophical critique of modernity. Nikulin also considers the alternative to the notion of the autonomous subject in the-nonbored and nonboring-dialogic and comic subject capable of shared existence with others.

The paper discusses the concept of the beautiful based on Agnes Heller’s philosophical genealogy of beauty in Plato, Plotinus, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Benjamin. For Heller, experience of the beautiful begins as heterogeneous (anything can be beautiful) and negative (with the realization that this is not beautiful but something else is). The demise of the beautiful, then, comes with the establishment and self-affirmation of the modern subject, whose claim to universality and rational autonomy entails the rejection of the everyday lived experience, which was once the locus for beauty in all its multiple expressions. In the modern world, beauty remains only a promise of happiness ( “warm beauty”) and truth ( “cold beauty”). As Heller argues, this promise can be fulfilled, if we acknowledge that there is no privileged access to the beautiful but rather accept beauty in its utter negativity and radical heterogeneity.

Most of the core concepts of the Western philosophical tradition originate in antiquity. Yet boredom is strikingly absent from classical thought. In this philosophical study, Dmitri Nikulin explores the concept's genealogy to argue that boredom is the mark of modernity. Nikulin contends that boredom is a specifically modern phenomenon. He provides a critical reconstruction of the concept of the modern subject as universal, rational, autonomous, and self-sufficient. Understanding itself in this way, this subject is at once the protagonist, playwright, director, and spectator of the staged drama of human existence. It is therefore inevitably monological, lonely, and alone, and can neither escape its own presence nor get rid of it. In other words, it is bored-and this boredom is the fundamental expression and symptom of the modern condition. Considering such thinkers as Descartes, Pascal, Kant, Kierkegaard, Kracauer, Heidegger, and Benjamin, Critique of Bored Reason places boredom on center stage in the philosophical critique of modernity. Nikulin also considers the alternative to the notion of the autonomous subject in the-nonbored and nonboring-dialogic and comic subject capable of shared existence with others.

This paper is a critical interpretation of the role of laughter in the work of Agnes Heller. Following the distinction between innate affect and culturally conditioned emotion, Heller argues that laughter is an affect that comes as the expressive reaction to the hiatus between the social and the natural. As such, laughter is ubiquitous and yet remains ultimately undefinable, because it signifies the unbridgeable gap between the two worlds that we inhabit at the same time. Laughter thus sonorously presents our human condition as expressible yet not graspable according to a single theory of laughter (superiority, relief, incongruity, and ambivalence, as defined by D. H. Monro), or any combination thereof. Paraphrasing Immanuel Kant, laughter is ultimately the instinct of reason that liberates us from the illusion that a resolution between the two conflicting constituents of our existence is ultimately possible.

This article investigates the constitutive ties of modernity and the modern subject to the phenomenon of boredom, through its interpretation by Walter Benjamin. The nineteenth century—with Paris as its capital—forms the material for this interpretation, and the fragmentary constellations of quotation and reflection in Convolute D of The Arcades Project present boredom both in its social aspect (the city as protagonist) and as experience. A number of the forms of boredom is thus elaborated: the relation of city dweller to nature and the cosmos, as weather; in its temporal orientation, as waiting; the mechanistic character of the modern world and its subject, as repetition; in the cycles of production and consumption, as the ideological boredom of the ruling class. Among three of Benjamin’s typologies for the bored modern subject—the gambler, the flaneur, and the one who waits—I turn particularly to the experience of the flaneur, the dedicatee of Convolute D. In flaneurie the experience of boredom is accumulated and distributed, and in this way the flaneur is in the city but also constitutes and memorializes it, as boredom. This ambivalent relation to the urban fabric and landscape is also captured in his characteristic observation and exhibition, his consumption without acquisition and without production. After considering some possible antitheses to Benjamin’s types of boredom, I conclude with the reflection that passing over boredom to its opposite would require the overcoming of modern subjectivity itself.

This paper considers the problem of evil as it has been discussed and formulated by Plotinus and polemically taken over by Proclus. Contrary to Plotinus, Proclus does not consider matter as evil. Rather, evil in its elusive indefinite nature has to be characterized by the redefined concepts of privation, subcontrary and parypostasis. In its inescapable deficiency, evil, then, is the privation and subcontrary of the good that exists parypostatically, that is, as elusively present in its absence as the misplacement of being and the displacement of the good.

:Beginning with an outline of memory and recollection in Plato and Aristotle, this paper argues that establishing the role of memory and recollection in their mutual relation in Plotinus requires a careful reconstruction. Whereas memory for Plotinus is not a storage of images or imprints that come either from the sensible or the intelligible but rather is a power capable of producing memories, recollection takes the form of a discursive rational rethinking and reproduction of the soul’s experience of the noetic objects. Recollection, then, is a triple motion of the descent, stay, and return of the soul to the intelligible.

The article provides a close hermeneutical reading and philosophical interpretation of a short text by Mikhail Bakhtin from 1943, quoted and translated in the beginning. Contra the modern Cartesian interpretation of the subject as always open to itself in an act of self-reflection, it is argued that one’s self is not immediately accessible and fully transparent to itself. Looking at oneself in the mirror stands for an attempt of self-cognition, in which one both recognizes and misses oneself, seeing oneself as another with no “seamy side.” Thinking oneself, then, constitutes a constant dialogue with oneself, in which one is always involved in a process of non-finalizable explanation of oneself to oneself as one’s own other