Michael Huemer

What gives some people the right to issue commands to everyone else and force everyone else to obey them? And why should people obey the commands of those with political power? These two key questions are the heart of the issue of political authority, and, in this volume, two philosophers debate the answers. Michael Huemer argues that political authority is an illusion and that no one is entitled to rule over anyone. He discusses and rebuts the major theories supporting political authority's rightfulness: implicit social contract theory, hypothetical contract theories, democratic theories of authority, and utilitarian theories. Daniel Layman argues that democratic governments have authority because they are needed to protect our rights and because they are accountable to the people. Each author writes two replies directly addressing the arguments and ideas of the other. Key Features Covers a key foundational problem of political philosophy: the authority of government. Debate format ensures a full hearing of both sides. A Glossary includes key concepts in political philosophy related to the issue of authority. Annotated Further Reading sections point students to additional resources. Clear, concrete examples and arguments help students clearly see both sides of the argument. A Foreword by Matt Zwolinski describes a broader context for political authority and then traces the key points and turns in the authors' debate.

Under what conditions is one justified in believing P on the basis of E? According to Richard Fumerton’s ‘inferential internalism,’ one must have justification for believing that E makes probable P. This chapter proposes that this condition is satisfied by a special sort of appearance, an ‘inferential appearance,’ by which it seems to one that P must be or is likely to be true _in the light of_ E. This account explains the sense in which one must ‘see the connection’ between premises and conclusion, it avoids Lewis Carroll’s problem of Achilles and the Tortoise, and it avoids skepticism about inferential justification. The appearance-based theory is superior to rival theories that appeal to acquaintance, in part because it correctly allows that one can have inferential justification even when no genuine logical relation exists.

It is widely believed that some kinds of infinite series are impossible (the “vicious regresses”), whereas other infinite series are possible (the “virtuous regresses”). This chapter refutes three common views about when an infinite series is impossible: (a) that there cannot be an actual infinite: (b) that an infinite series cannot be completed by successive addition: and (c) that there cannot be an endless series in which each member depends upon the next one. The chapter argues instead that an infinite series is vicious when it requires the instantiation of an infinite intensive magnitude. This theory helps us to evaluate infinite regress arguments and to resolve well-known paradoxes of the infinite.

I argue that when an enemy deploys human shields in war, it is permissible to discount the shields' presence to some degree in planning the sort of military options the human shields were meant to deter. I reject two proposed rationales for this – the argument that only the user of human shields will be responsible for their deaths and the argument that the initial victim of a rights-violation must bear the costs rather than transferring them to another innocent person. I propose a third, rule-utilitarian rationale, which argues that the rule allowing for human shields to be discounted discourages their use and avoids giving a large tactical advantage to those who violate international law.

This comprehensive anthology draws together classic and contemporary readings by leading philosophers on epistemology. Ideal for any philosophy student, it will prove essential reading for epistemology courses, and is designed to complement Robert Audi's textbook _Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction_ (Routledge, 1998). Themes covered include, perception, memory, inductive inference, reason and the a priori, the architecture of knowledge, skepticism, the analysis of knowledge, testimony. Each section begins with an introductory essay, guiding students into the topic. Includes articles by: Russell, Hume, Berkeley, Malcolm, Quine, Carnap, J.L. Austin, Pollock, Nozick, Putnam, G.E. Moore, Huemer, Reid, Plato, BonJour, Coady, Carroll, Fumerton, Edwards, Foster, Howson, Urbach, Stove, Empiricus, Oakley, Alston, Gettier, Clark, Goldman, Lehrer, Paxson, DeRose, Dretske, Klein and Chisholm.

When one recalls that P, how is one justified in believing that P? I refute the three most natural answers to this question: a memory belief is not justified by a belief in the reliability of memory; a memory experience does not provide a new, foundational justification for a belief; and memory does not merely preserve the same justification a belief had when first adopted. Instead, the justification of a memory belief is a product of both the initial justification for adopting it and the justification for retaining it provided by seeming memories.

This comprehensive anthology draws together classic and contemporary readings by leading philosophers on epistemology. Ideal for any philosophy student, it will prove essential reading for epistemology courses, and is designed to complement Robert Audi's textbook _Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction_ (Routledge, 1998). Themes covered include, perception, memory, inductive inference, reason and the a priori, the architecture of knowledge, skepticism, the analysis of knowledge, testimony. Each section begins with an introductory essay, guiding students into the topic. Includes articles by: Russell, Hume, Berkeley, Malcolm, Quine, Carnap, J.L. Austin, Pollock, Nozick, Putnam, G.E. Moore, Huemer, Reid, Plato, BonJour, Coady, Carroll, Fumerton, Edwards, Foster, Howson, Urbach, Stove, Empiricus, Oakley, Alston, Gettier, Clark, Goldman, Lehrer, Paxson, DeRose, Dretske, Klein and Chisholm.

The Shooting Room is set up such that (i) it is guaranteed that at least 90% of people who ever enter it are shot, but (ii) for any given person, whether they are shot or not depends on the flip of a fair coin. Given that V is called into the room, what is the probability that V is shot? Both “50%” and “90%” answers seem compelling. The paradox, however, depends on metaphysically impossible assumptions about an infinite population and infinite time or speed. Given any metaphysically possible (finitist) assumptions, the correct probability comes to 50%.

The liar sentence, “This sentence is false”, presents a paradox: it is true if and only if it is false. The solution is to hold that the sentence fails to express a proposition. Our language contains implicit rules for the interpretation of sentences. These rules are inconsistent as applied to this case, for they require that the liar sentence be interpreted as expressing the proposition that holds if and only if it does not hold. No proposition can satisfy this condition, so no proposition can be the content of the liar sentence. Analogous solutions apply to the Barber Paradox, Curry’s Paradox, Grelling’s Paradox, and Russell’s Paradox.

The PI holds that, given no reason for preferring any of a set of alternatives over any other, all are equally probable. There are cases in which the PI can seemingly be used to justify incompatible probability assignments, due to different ways of conceptualizing the same set of possibilities. These conflicts can generally be resolved by appealing to the principle that the PI should be applied to the most explanatorily fundamental hypotheses. This has applications to the Problem of Induction as well as the mystery of entropy.

You are asked to choose between taking box A and taking both A and B, where B contains $1000, and A contains either $1 million (if a reliable predictor thought you would take only A) or $0 (if the predictor thought you would take both). Dominance reasoning supports taking both boxes, but expected utility maximization seemingly supports taking only A. The correct choice is both boxes. Expected utility should be calculated using a weighted average of the expected utility conditional on each possible assumption about how the unalterable parts of the external world are. This is because rational individuals seek to cause good outcomes, not produce evidence of good outcomes. This reconciles the expected utility principle with the dominance principle.