L. Anthony

Until recently, the ocular surface is thought by many to be sterile and devoid of living microbes. It is now becoming clear that this may not be the case. Recent and sophisticated PCR analyses have shown that microbial DNA‐based “signatures” are present within various ethnic, geographic, and contact lens wearing communities. Furthermore, using a mouse model of ocular surface disease, we have shown that the microbe, Corynebacterium mastitidis (C. mast), can stably colonize the ocular mucosa and that a causal relationship exists between ocular C. mast colonization and beneficial local immunity. While this constitutes proof‐of‐concept that a bona fide ocular microbiome that tunes immunity can exist at the ocular surface, there remain numerous unanswered questions to be addressed before microbiome‐modulating therapies may be successfully developed. Here, the authors will briefly outline what is currently known about the local ocular microbiome as well as microbiomes associated with other sites, and how those sites may play a role in ocular surface immunity. Understanding how commensal microbes affect the ocular surface immune homeostasis has the potential revolutionize how we think about treating ocular surface disease.

Both scienticity and artistry have been listed in cluster concept definitions for both science and art. However, these clusters have not been considered together before. I contrast and combine these different clusters for the first time, and I argue that doing so better elucidates the properties of the natural sciences, humanities and fine arts than the science and art cluster concepts do separately. This is because all disciplines have varying levels of scienticity and artistry, but this is not captured fully by the science or art cluster concepts separately. An integrated scienticity and artistry cluster provides a new way of describing the commonly argued notion that the sciences and arts share qualities, methods and practices, but the integrated scienticity-artistry cluster shows how, when and where these qualities blend into each other across disciplines.

This paper examines the function of Hume’s use of a peculiar example from A Treatise of Human Nature. The example in question is that of a burning piece of coal that is whirled around at a sufficient speed to present to a viewer an image of a circle of fire. The example is a common one; and Hume himself points to Locke as his source in this case. Hume’s reference appears accurate since both Locke and Hume seem to marshal the example in order to bolster a case for an upper and lower temporal threshold for perception. But several philosophical problems inherent in Hume’s appeal to the example make the case for Locke as Hume’s sole or even primary source difficult to sustain. The paper sketches a history of uses of the example from the seventeenth century through the twentieth century. An argument is presented that Pierre Bayle’s use of the example is most in accord with Hume’s, and that for this and other reasons, Bayle is his likeliest source. Further, making sense in this way of Hume’s use of the burning coal example illuminates Hume’s interesting contributions to the notions of time, identity, and individuation.

Critiquing any practice, theory, or law, requires understanding the characteristics of the environment which created a need for this law. There are hundreds of different cultures in the world, and each one has its own set of norms, characteristics, and values. What in one country is perceived normal, ethical or unethical, right or wrong, may not be the same somewhere else in the world. The first civilizations begun in Africa and Europe many thousands of years ago when people were hunters and nomads, it is not unreasonable to suspect that many of those traits and characteristics have been socially transferred and/or inherited by future generations.

Anthony J. Lisska presents a new analysis of Thomas Aquinas's theory of perception. While much work has been undertaken on Aquinas's texts, little has been devoted principally to his theory of perception and less still on a discussion of inner sense. The thesis of intentionality serves as the philosophical backdrop of this analysis while incorporating insights from Brentano and from recent scholarship. The principal thrust is on the importance of inner sense, a much-overlooked area of Aquinas's philosophy of mind, with special reference to the vis cogitativa. Approaching the texts of Aquinas from contemporary analytic philosophy, Lisska suggests a modest 'innate' or 'structured' interpretation for the role of this inner sense faculty. He argues that were it not for the vis cogitativa, Aquinas would be unable to account for an awareness of the principal ontological category in his metaphysics.