L. Anthony

A correspondência entre J. Locke e W. Molyneux é conhecida principalmente como a fonte da famosa questão relativa ao que pode ser aprendido por um homem cego de nascença e que depois ganha a visão. Curiosamente, a correspondência oferece muito pouco esclarecimento sobre a questão. Outros tópicos importantes, entretanto, são apontados e explorados: entusiasmo pela obra de Malebranche, liberdade e responsabilidade, identidade pessoal, etc. Além disso, a correspondência oferece um conhecimento profundo da recepção histórica do Ensaio de Locke, como estes dois correspondentes, que tinham obviamente muita simpatia um para com o outro, discutem a tradução da obra de Locke, suas futuras edições, e as críticas feitas a ela por Synge, King, Sergeant, Stllingfleet, Leibniz, etc

The last third of the twentieth century witnessed a burst of energy by philosophers sorting out the many-faceted claims of natural law theory. Natural law theory, rooted in the Nicomachean Ethics with some modifications by the Stoics, was studied in the twentieth century mainly through the writings of Thomas Aquinas, followed by those of the Salamanca school, which was central to the Second Scholasticism. The horrors of the Second World War and the trials following it, with their charges of “crimes against humanity,” prompted a renewed interested by English-speaking philosophers in natural law jurisprudence. Analytic philosophers followed Elizabeth Anscombe’s urging to venture beyond the limits of early twentieth-century moral philosophy; Alasdair MacIntyre’s writings buttressed the return to ethical naturalism; John Finnis’s “new natural law” theory also contributed to this renaissance. These many avenues form the conceptual backdrop to the eight books reviewed in this essay

This paper examines the function of Hume’s use of a peculiar example from A Treatise of Human Nature. The example in question is that of a burning piece of coal that is whirled around at a sufficient speed to present to a viewer an image of a circle of fire. The example is a common one; and Hume himself points to Locke as his source in this case. Hume’s reference appears accurate since both Locke and Hume seem to marshal the example in order to bolster a case for an upper and lower temporal threshold for perception. But several philosophical problems inherent in Hume’s appeal to the example make the case for Locke as Hume’s sole or even primary source difficult to sustain. The paper sketches a history of uses of the example from the seventeenth century through the twentieth century. An argument is presented that Pierre Bayle’s use of the example is most in accord with Hume’s, and that for this and other reasons, Bayle is his likeliest source. Further, making sense in this way of Hume’s use of the burning coal example illuminates Hume’s interesting contributions to the notions of time, identity, and individuation.

This paper investigates Aquinas’s thought on the vis cogitativa, in order to determine whether Aquinas’s use of the inner sense of the vis cogitative is an embarrassment (as Dorothea Frede recently suggested), or whether it is rather an important element in Aquinas’s philosophy of mind that calls for serious study (as John Haldane argued several years ago in an ACPA plenary address). An examination of Aquinas’s theory of inner sense (as found in the Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima) reveals that, for Aquinas, the vis cogitativa has two cognitive functions: (1) to be aware of an individual as an individual, and (2) to recognize an individual as a member of a kind. If Aquinas’ philosophy of mind did not include some account of the vis cogitativa, then it would not be able to accommodate what for Aquinas is a principal ontological category (namely, primary substance)

This is an important book for philosophers interested in working out a realist philosophy of religion and much that such a project entails. The foil against which Denys Turner addresses his realist theory is that found in the late nineteenth century writings of Nietzsche and developed in the twentieth century by Heidegger and the later postmodernists in philosophy and religion. Of course, much of this trend is rooted in the Kantian thrust in modern philosophy, a thrust that the late Henry Veatch once referred to as “The Transcendental Turn.” The shadow of Heidegger’s “onto-theology” hovers throughout this discussion, which results in Turner’s analysis of the differences between univocity of meaning in Scotus and analogous use in Aquinas. Turner remarks that one purpose of his extended essay is “to clear away the clutter of misconception” that surrounds discussions of these issues central to religious belief. Part of this conceptual muddle is, Turner argues, found in authors like John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, who have adroitly proposed a nonrealist account of theological propositions.

The last third of the twentieth century witnessed a burst of energy by philosophers sorting out the many-faceted claims of natural law theory. Natural law theory, rooted in the Nicomachean Ethics with some modifications by the Stoics, was studied in the twentieth century mainly through the writings of Thomas Aquinas, followed by those of the Salamanca school, which was central to the Second Scholasticism. The horrors of the Second World War and the trials following it, with their charges of “crimes against humanity,” prompted a renewed interested by English-speaking philosophers in natural law jurisprudence. Analytic philosophers followed Elizabeth Anscombe’s urging to venture beyond the limits of early twentieth-century moral philosophy; Alasdair MacIntyre’s writings buttressed the return to ethical naturalism; John Finnis’s “new natural law” theory also contributed to this renaissance. These many avenues form the conceptual backdrop to the eight books reviewed in this essay

This paper investigates Aquinas’s thought on the vis cogitativa, in order to determine whether Aquinas’s use of the inner sense of the vis cogitative is an embarrassment , or whether it is rather an important element in Aquinas’s philosophy of mind that calls for serious study . An examination of Aquinas’s theory of inner sense reveals that, for Aquinas, the vis cogitativa has two cognitive functions: to be aware of an individual as an individual, and to recognize an individual as a member of a kind. If Aquinas’ philosophy of mind did not include some account of the vis cogitativa, then it would not be able to accommodate what for Aquinas is a principal ontological category