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34Charles Parsons, Mathematics in Philosophy: Selected Essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (2005), 368 pp., $35.00 (paper) (review)Philosophy of Science 74 (4): 549-552. 2007.
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33Axioms for tense logic. I. "Since" and "until"Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (4): 367-374. 1982.
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32Chapter Five. RealismIn José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth, Blackwell. pp. 68-82. 2005-01-01.
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32Platonism and anti-platonism in mathematicsPhilosophical Review 110 (1): 79-82. 2001.Mathematics tells us there exist infinitely many prime numbers. Nominalist philosophy, introduced by Goodman and Quine, tells us there exist no numbers at all, and so no prime numbers. Nominalists are aware that the assertion of the existence of prime numbers is warranted by the standards of mathematical science; they simply reject scientific standards of warrant.
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32Axioms for tense logic. II. Time periodsNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (4): 375-383. 1982.
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32Review: Stewart Shapiro, Foundations without Foundationalism. A Case for Second-Order Logic (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 58 (1): 363-365. 1993.
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32From preference to utility: A problem of descriptive set theoryNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 26 (2): 106-114. 1985.
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32Synthetic mechanics revisitedJournal of Philosophical Logic 20 (2). 1991.Earlier results on eliminating numerical objects from physical theories are extended to results on eliminating geometrical objects
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30Chapter Seven. KripkeIn José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth, Blackwell. pp. 102-115. 2005-01-01.
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29In this era when results of empirical scientific research are being appealed to all across philosophy, when we even find moral philosophers invoking the results of brain scans, many profess to practice "naturalized epistemology," or to be "epistemological naturalists." Such phrases derive from the title of a well-known essay by Quine,[1] but Paul Gregory's thesis in the work under review is that there is less connection than is usually assumed between Quine's variety of naturalized epistemology …Read more
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29Is There a Problem about the Deflationary Theory of Truth?In Leon Horsten & Volker Halbach (eds.), Principles of Truth, De Gruyter. pp. 37-56. 2003.
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27Chapter Four. IndeterminacyIn José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth, Blackwell. pp. 52-67. 2005-01-01.
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27Brouwer and Souslin on Transfinite CardinalsMathematical Logic Quarterly 26 (14-18): 209-214. 1980.
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26Chapter Six. AntirealismIn José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth, Blackwell. pp. 83-101. 2005-01-01.
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26Hailperin Theodore. Sentential probability logic. Origins, development, current status, and technical applications. Lehigh University Press, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, and Associated University Presses, London, 1996, 304 pp (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 62 (3): 1040-1041. 1997.
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24Chapter Three. DeflationismIn José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth, Blackwell. pp. 33-51. 2005-01-01.
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24C. L. Hamblin. The modal “probably.”Mind, n.s. vol. 68 , pp. 234–240Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (4): 582-583. 1970.
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24Proofs about Proofs: a defense of classical logic. Part I: the aims of classical logicIn Michael Detlefsen (ed.), Proof, Logic and Formalization, Routledge. 1992.
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24Chapter Eight. Insolubility?In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth, Blackwell. pp. 116-134. 2005-01-01.
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23On the Hanf number of souslin logicJournal of Symbolic Logic 43 (3): 568-571. 1978.We show it is consistent with ZFC that the Hanf number of Ellentuck's Souslin logic should be exactly $\beth_{\omega_2}$
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22Lewis on Mereology and Set TheoryIn Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to David Lewis, Wiley. 2015.David Lewis in the short monograph Parts of Classes (PC) undertakes a fundamental re‐examination of the relationship between mereology, the general theory of parts, and set theory, the general theory of collections. Given Lewis's theses, to be an element of a set or member of class is just to have a singleton that is a part thereof. Lewis in PC adds a claim of kind of ontological innocence, comparable to that of first‐order logic, for mereology. The only substantive assumption of plethynticology…Read more
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21Which Modal Models are the Right Ones (for Logical Necessity)?Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 18 (2): 145-158. 2010....
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21Consistency proofs in model theory: A contribution to JensenlehreAnnals of Mathematical Logic 14 (1): 1. 1978.
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21Which Modal Models are the Right Ones (for Logical Necessity)?Theoria 18 (2): 145-158. 2010....
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21Chapter One. IntroductionIn José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth, Blackwell. pp. 1-15. 2005-01-01.
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