•  31
    Common sense and "relevance"
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 24 (1): 41-53. 1983.
  •  312
    On a derivation of the necessity of identity
    Synthese 191 (7): 1-19. 2014.
    The source, status, and significance of the derivation of the necessity of identity at the beginning of Kripke’s lecture “Identity and Necessity” is discussed from a logical, philosophical, and historical point of view
  •  117
    Truth
    Princeton University Press. 2011.
    This is a concise, advanced introduction to current philosophical debates about truth. A blend of philosophical and technical material, the book is organized around, but not limited to, the tendency known as deflationism, according to which there is not much to say about the nature of truth. In clear language, Burgess and Burgess cover a wide range of issues, including the nature of truth, the status of truth-value gaps, the relationship between truth and meaning, relativism and pluralism about …Read more
  •  20
    Adapated from talks at the UCLA Logic Center and the Pitt Philosophy of Science Series. Exposition of material from Fixing Frege, Chapter 2 (on predicative versions of Frege’s system) and from “Protocol Sentences for Lite Logicism” (on a form of mathematical instrumentalism), suggesting a connection. Provisional version: references remain to be added. To appear in Mathematics, Modality, and Models: Selected Philosophical Papers, coming from Cambridge University Press.
  •  160
    What is the simplest and most natural axiomatic replacement for the set-theoretic definition of the minimal fixed point on the Kleene scheme in Kripke’s theory of truth? What is the simplest and most natural set of axioms and rules for truth whose adoption by a subject who had never heard the word "true" before would give that subject an understanding of truth for which the minimal fixed point on the Kleene scheme would be a good model? Several axiomatic systems, old and new, are examined and ev…Read more