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39The completeness of intuitionistic propositional calculus for its intended interpretationNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22 (1): 17-28. 1981.
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44Alan Weir. Truth through Proof: A Formalist Foundation for Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010. ISBN 978-0-19-954149-2. Pp. xiv+281: Critical Studies/Book Reviews (review)Philosophia Mathematica 19 (2): 213-219. 2011.Alan Weir’s new book is, like Darwin’s Origin of Species, ‘one long argument’. The author has devised a new kind of have-it-both-ways philosophy of mathematics, supposed to allow him to say out of one side of his mouth that the integer 1,000,000 exists and even that the cardinal ℵω exists, while saying out of the other side of his mouth that no numbers exist at all, and the whole book is devoted to an exposition and defense of this new view. The view is presented in the book in a way that can ma…Read more
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38No requirement of relevanceIn Stewart Shapiro (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, Oxford University Press. pp. 727--750. 2005.There are schools of logicians who claim that an argument is not valid unless the conclusion is relevant to the premises. In particular, relevance logicians reject the classical theses that anything follows from a contradiction and that a logical truth follows from everything. This chapter critically evaluates several different motivations for relevance logic, and several systems of relevance logic, finding them all wanting.
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17Careful choices---a last word on Borel selectorsNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22 (3): 219-226. 1981.
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43KripkePolity. 2012.Saul Kripke has been a major influence on analytic philosophy and allied fields for a half-century and more. His early masterpiece, _Naming and Necessity_, reversed the pattern of two centuries of philosophizing about the necessary and the contingent. Although much of his work remains unpublished, several major essays have now appeared in print, most recently in his long-awaited collection _Philosophical Troubles_. In this book Kripke’s long-time colleague, the logician and philosopher John P. B…Read more
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32Synthetic mechanics revisitedJournal of Philosophical Logic 20 (2). 1991.Earlier results on eliminating numerical objects from physical theories are extended to results on eliminating geometrical objects
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48Review of B. Hale and A. Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (10). 2010.
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238E pluribus unum: Plural logic and set theoryPhilosophia Mathematica 12 (3): 193-221. 2004.A new axiomatization of set theory, to be called Bernays-Boolos set theory, is introduced. Its background logic is the plural logic of Boolos, and its only positive set-theoretic existence axiom is a reflection principle of Bernays. It is a very simple system of axioms sufficient to obtain the usual axioms of ZFC, plus some large cardinals, and to reduce every question of plural logic to a question of set theory
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135Charles Parsons. Mathematical thought and its objectsPhilosophia Mathematica 16 (3): 402-409. 2008.This long-awaited volume is a must-read for anyone with a serious interest in philosophy of mathematics. The book falls into two parts, with the primary focus of the first on ontology and structuralism, and the second on intuition and epistemology, though with many links between them. The style throughout involves unhurried examination from several points of view of each issue addressed, before reaching a guarded conclusion. A wealth of material is set before the reader along the way, but a revi…Read more
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78Probability logicJournal of Symbolic Logic 34 (2): 264-274. 1969.In this paper we introduce a system S5U, formed by adding to the modal system S5 a new connective U, Up being read “probably”. A few theorems are derived in S5U, and the system is provided with a decision procedure. Several decidable extensions of S5U are discussed, and probability logic is related to plurality quantification.
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110Quick completeness proofs for some logics of conditionalsNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22 (1): 76-84. 1981.
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12It is shown that for invariance under the action of special groups the statements "Every invariant PCA is decomposable into (1 invariant Borel sets" and "Every pair of invariant PCA is reducible by a pair of invariant PCA sets" are independent of the axioms of set theory.
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