John Burgess

In justifying Russian aggression against Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin asserts that Ukraine is neither a distinct nation nor a viable state. In response, this essay will establish a Christian account of Ukraine’s right to self-defense not only via just war criteria but also in relation to its purpose theologically as a nation-state. This essay, after reviewing Christian ethical positions that either reject or embrace the nation-state, draws on the Niebuhr brothers and Karl Barth to develop key theological criteria for judging whether particular nation-states are true to their divine purpose. While affirming the role of the nation-state in protecting a people’s distinct identity, Christians will call on the nation-state to direct its people outward, toward their shared humanity with the world’s other nations. The essay concludes that the Ukrainian nation-state is fulfilling these criteria, whereas the Russian nation-state is not.

This article explores the role of logic in philosophical methodology, as well as its application in philosophy. The discussion gives a roughly equal coverage to the seven branches of logic: elementary logic, set theory, model theory, recursion theory, proof theory, extraclassical logics, and anticlassical logics. Mathematical logic comprises set theory, model theory, recursion theory, and proof theory. Philosophical logic in the relevant sense is divided into the study of extensions of classical logic, such as modal or temporal or deontic or conditional logics, and the study of alternatives to classical logic, such as intuitionistic or quantum or partial or paraconsistent logics. The nonclassical consists of the extraclassical and the anticlassical, although the distinction is not clearcut.

This long-awaited volume is a must-read for anyone with a serious interest in\nphilosophy of mathematics. The book falls into two parts, with the primary focus of\nthe first on ontology and structuralism, and the second on intuition and\nepistemology, though with many links between them. The style throughout involves\nunhurried examination from several points of view of each issue addressed, before\nreaching a guarded conclusion. A wealth of material is set before the reader along\nthe way, but a reviewer wishing to summarize the author’s views crisply will be\nfrustrated. The chapter-by-chapter survey below conveys at best a very incomplete\nand imperfect impression of the work’s virtues, and even of its contents, falling\nshort even of supplying a full menu for the banquet of food for thought that Parsons\nserves up to his readers.

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action.

David Lewis in the short monograph Parts of Classes (PC) undertakes a fundamental re‐examination of the relationship between mereology, the general theory of parts, and set theory, the general theory of collections. Given Lewis's theses, to be an element of a set or member of class is just to have a singleton that is a part thereof. Lewis in PC adds a claim of kind of ontological innocence, comparable to that of first‐order logic, for mereology. The only substantive assumption of plethynticology is that for any condition there are some things such that they are precisely the things for which the conditions hold. All the alternatives, making do with a single domain of individuals, have in common that they involve the axiom of choice. Restated in Hazen's terminology rather than Frege's, the fallback assumption is that there are no more small species than individuals.

Thomas Kelly, “Quine and Epistemology”: For Quine, as for many canonical philosophers since Descartes, epistemology stands at the very center of philosophy. In this chapter, I discuss some central themes in Quine's epistemology. I attempt to provide some historical context for Quine's views, in order to make clear why they were seen as such radical challenges to then prevailing orthodoxies within analytic philosophy. I also highlight aspects of his views that I take to be particularly relevant to contemporary epistemology.

I aim to show how and why some definitions can be benignly circular. According to Lloyd Humberstone, a definition that is analytically circular need not be inferentially circular and so might serve to illuminate the application-conditions for a concept. I begin by tidying up some problems with Humberstone's account. I then show that circular definitions of a kind commonly thought to be benign have inferentially circular truth-conditions and so are malign by Humberstone's test. But his test is too demanding. The inferences we actually use to establish the applicability of, e.g., colour concepts are designed to establish warranted assertability and not truth. Understood thus, dispositional analyses are not inferentially circular.

For the sentences of languages that contain operators that express the concepts of definiteness and indefiniteness, there is an unavoidable tension between a truth-theoretic semantics that delivers truth conditions for those sentences that capture their propositional contents and any model-theoretic semantics that has a story to tell about how indetifiniteness in a constituent affects the semantic value of sentences which imbed it. But semantic theories of both kinds play essential roles, so the tension needs to be resolved. I argue that it is the truth theory which correctly characterises the notion of truth, per se. When we take into account the considerations required to bring model theory into harmony with truth theory, those considerations undermine the arguments standardly used to motivate supervaluational model theories designed to validate classical logic. But those considerations also show that celebration would be premature for advocates of the most frequently encountered rival approach - many-valued model theory.

Computability and Logic has become a classic because of its accessibility to students without a mathematical background and because it covers not simply the staple topics of an intermediate logic course, such as Godel's incompleteness theorems, but also a large number of optional topics, from Turing's theory of computability to Ramsey's theorem. This 2007 fifth edition has been thoroughly revised by John Burgess. Including a selection of exercises, adjusted for this edition, at the end of each chapter, it offers a simpler treatment of the representability of recursive functions, a traditional stumbling block for students on the way to the Godel incompleteness theorems. This updated edition is also accompanied by a website as well as an instructor's manual.

One thousand stones, suitably arranged, might form a heap. If we remove a single stone from a heap of stones we still have a heap; at no point will the removal of just one stone make sufficient difference to transform a heap into something which is not a heap. But, if this is so, we still have a heap, even when we have removed the last stone composing our original structure. So runs the Sorites paradox. Similar paradoxes can be constructed with any predicate which, like 'heap', displays borderline vagueness. Although I have frequently heard it said that there is no completely credible and satisfying dissolution of the paradoxes of the Sorites family; and although there is no possible approach to dissolution which has not been at least partially explored, philosophers continue glibly to use vague language as though it were entirely unproblematic. Since no argument has ever been produced which would justify our ignoring the para~doxes, this situation is extremely unsatisfactory.

In 'Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood' David Lewis defends Gareth Evans against a widespread misunderstanding of an argument that appeared in his article 'Can There be Vague Objects?'. Lewis takes himself to be 'defending Evans' and not just correcting a mistake; witness his remark that, 'As misunderstood, Evans is a pitiful figure: a "technical philosopher" out of control of his technicalities, taken in by a fallacious proof of an absurd conclusion'. Let me say at the outset that I take Lewis to be exactly right in regarding as a misunderstanding the interpretation of Evans which he exposes as such. On Lewis's account, everything Evans says 'falls into place', and he quotes from a letter that 'settles the matter'

Extant semantic theories for languages containing vague expressions violate intuition by delivering the same verdict on two principles of classical propositional logic: the law of noncontradiction and the law of excluded middle. Supervaluational treatments render both valid; many-Valued treatments, Neither. The core of this paper presents a natural deduction system, Sound and complete with respect to a 'mixed' semantics which validates the law of noncontradiction but not the law of excluded middle.

Regardless of the theory of vagueness we adhere to, we all agree that no facts, known or practically knowable, suffice to determine the location of precise boundaries for vague concepts. According to the epistemic theory of vagueness, this ignorance is entirely an epistemic matter—vague concepts have sharp boundaries but we can never know their exact locations. Opposed to epistemicism is a view—or family of views—I shall call indeterminism. The indeterminist agrees with the epistemicist that we lack knowledge of the locations of sharp boundaries to vague concepts but holds that this ignorance has a somewhat more dramatic source—vague concepts have no sharp boundaries for us to have knowledge of. In recent years, the epistemic theory of vagueness has come to joint the various versions of indeterminism as a theory well-enough supported by argument to demand to be taken seriously. In this paper, I shall try to explain why I am unconvinced by the body of argument that has been marshalled in support of epistemicism; I shall try to explain why we should continue to endorse an indeterminist picture of vagueness.