William O. Stephens

This well chosen collection of essays written by recognized scholars addresses many of the intriguing aspects concerning the controversy over meat consumption. These aspects include not only eating meat, but also hunting animals, breeding, feeding, killing, and shredding them for our use, buying meat, the economics of the meat industry, the understanding of predation and food webs in ecology, and the significance of animals for issues about nutrition, gender, wealth, and cultural autonomy. Dombrowski rightly notes that the contemporary debate regarding philosophical vegetarianism has been profoundly shaped by the historical figures who have rejected or embraced the anthropocentrism entrenched in Western thought. Three anthropological-medical essays compare meat with vegetarian diets. Eight essays treat the recent philosophical debate over the moral status of animals and whether vegetarianism is obligatory. Several essays discuss religious views on meat-eating and vegetarianism. Three essays explore meat, patriarchy, and the exploitation of nature and animals with respect to race, gender, sexual orientation, and socioeconomic class. The last four essays debate how to understand predation, environmental ethics, and animal protection. This collection is a fine entrée for all readers of this journal, since the debate over meat must by now figure into every thinking person’s diet.

I show that in Epictetus’ view (1) the wise man genuinely loves (στέργειv) and is affectionate (φιλόστoργoς) to his family and friends; (2) only the Stoic wise man is, properly speaking, capable of loving—that is, he alone actually has the power to love; and (3) the Stoic wise man loves in a robustly rational way which excludes passionate, sexual, ‘erotic’ love (’έρως). In condemning all ’έρως as objectionable πάθoς Epictetus stands with Cicero and with the other Roman Stoics, Seneca and Musonius Rufus, and against the Greeks of the early Stoa. Epictetus’ conception of love excludes erotic passion because of its intrinsic excessiveness and uncontrollableness, which inevitably endanger mental serenity, but includes and emphasizes the soberly rational, purely positive joy of interpersonal affiliation. Epictetus’ account of how the Stoic Sage loves is, I think, more consistent and less problematic than that of the Greek Stoics.

This chapter reconstructs Epictetus’ account of Stoic love and asks whether the Stoic sage can genuinely love. Against the common suspicion that Stoic apatheia makes love impossible, the chapter argues that Epictetus allows, and indeed requires, a rational form of love grounded in natural affection, social roles, and the proper use of prohairesis. The Stoic sage is not unfeeling. He is affectionate toward family, friends, and fellow human beings, but his love does not become an irrational passion that destroys serenity or enslaves his will. Epictetus therefore rejects erotic love when it becomes emotional servitude, while preserving a free, giving, and joyful form of affection compatible with virtue. The chapter distinguishes Stoic love from grief, dependency, and the desire to possess loved ones permanently, since all persons and relationships outside one’s prohairesis remain externals. It also analyzes Epictetus’ claim that only the wise person truly has the power to love, because only the wise person knows what is genuinely good, evil, and indifferent. The chapter concludes that Stoic love is practical and pedagogical. The sage loves others chiefly by sharing his wisdom, helping them overcome spiritual poverty, and encouraging them toward virtue and mental freedom.

This review examines Michael Gelven’s Why Me? A Philosophical Inquiry into Fate, a philosophically ambitious study of fate written from an existentialist perspective. Gelven treats the question “Why me?” not as a request for causal explanation but as a question about how human beings should understand themselves as fated beings. The review praises Gelven’s analysis of four figures: the Gambler, the Historian, the Birthday Celebrant, and the Tragedian, through which he explores fate as chance, destiny, personal fortune, and inevitability. It also summarizes his account of fate as abandonment and his claim that fate discloses a truth about human existence. The review raises doubts about Gelven’s arguments that inheritance and fate show that human beings matter absolutely, and criticizes his neglect of scholarly engagement with prior philosophical treatments of fate. Special attention is given to his inadequate treatment of Stoicism. Against Gelven’s portrayal of “stoicism” as shallow indifference to misfortune, the review reconstructs the ancient Stoic account of fate, freedom, externals, prohairesis, and rational agency. It concludes that Gelven’s inquiry is gripping and often insightful, but that his caricature of Stoicism weakens his existentialist account of fate.

This work is the latest contribution to the Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers series edited by Jonathan Barnes and A. A. Long. As with the earlier volumes (John Dillon's Alcinous, The Handbook of Platonism, R. J. Hankinson's Galen, On the Therapeutic Method Books I and II, Richard Bett's Sextus Empiricus, Against the Ethicists, and D. L. Blank's Sextus Empiricus, Against the Grammarians), D(obbin) provides an introduction, an English translation, and a critical commentary predominantly focused on the philosophical content of the text of an author from the period ranging from the first century BC to the fifth century AD. A bibliography of a dozen earlier editions of E(pictetus), a painstaking bibliography of secondary literature, an index nominum, a generous index locorum, and a brief subject index are also included. Overall this edition maintains the high standards characteristic of the CLAP series.

Up to now scholars have not approached E[pictetus] as author, stylist, educator, and thinker, according to the eminent scholar of Stoicism Tony L[ong]. The aim of this book is to fill precisely this gap. L wants "to provide an accessible guide to reading E, both as a remarkable historical figure and as a thinker whose recipe for a free and satisfying life can engage our modern selves, in spite of our cultural distance from him" (2). This goal is met admirably. Not only does L succeed in presenting E on his own terms, but in the process, he fairly demolishes the view, held by many since Adolf Bonhöffer,1 that E is a sturdy but unoriginal moralist who basically rehashed the same ideas, with an emphasis on practical application, that were articulated in a more sophisticated, theoretically fastidious form by Chrysippus and the early Stoics.