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35The C account of assertion: a negative resultSynthese 197 (1): 125-137. 2020.According to what Williamson labels ‘the C account of assertion’, there is one and only one rule that is constitutive of assertion. This rule, the so-called ‘C Rule’, states that one must assert p only if p has property C. This paper argues that the C account of assertion is incompatible with any live proposal for C in the literature.
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27Inquiry, Knowledge, and UnderstandingOxford University Press. 2021.This study takes inquiry as the starting point for epistemological theorising. It uses this idea to develop new and systematic answers to some of the most fundamental questions in epistemology, including about the nature of core epistemic phenomena as well as their value and the extent to which we possess them.
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23Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of AssertionCambridge University Press. 2021.Assertion is the central vehicle for the sharing of knowledge. Whether knowledge is shared successfully often depends on the quality of assertions: good assertions lead to successful knowledge sharing, while bad ones don't. In Sharing Knowledge, Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion investigate the relation between knowledge sharing and assertion, and develop an account of what it is to assert well. More specifically, they argue that the function of assertion is to share knowledge with others. It is th…Read more
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21Good Thinking: A Knowledge First Virtue EpistemologyRoutledge. 2018.Process reliabilism -- Virtue reliabilism: justified belief -- Virtue reliabilism: knowledge -- Knowledge first virtue reliabilism -- The competition -- The safety dilemma -- Lottery cases.
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21Knowledge and SafetyJournal of Philosophical Research 34 21-31. 2009.This paper raises a problem for so-called safety-based conceptions of knowledge: It is argued that none of the versions of the safety condition that can be found in the literature succeeds in identifying a necessary condition on knowledge. Furthermore, reason is provided to believe that the argument generalizes at least in the sense that there can be no version of the safety condition that does justice to the considerations motivating a safety condition whilst, at the same time, being requisite …Read more
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15Defeat and proficienciesPhilosophical Issues 32 (1): 82-103. 2022.Virtue epistemology is the view that beliefs are attempts at truth (or perhaps knowledge) and, as a result, can be assessed as successful, competent, and apt. Moreover, virtue epistemology identifies central epistemic properties with normative properties of beliefs as attempts. In particular, knowledge is apt belief and justified belief is competent belief. This paper develops a systematic virtue epistemological account of defeat (of justification/competence). I provide reason to think that defe…Read more
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14Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of FallibilismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2): 221-244. 2008.This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know on the basis of merely inductive grounds. No matter how strong such theories require inductive grounds to be if a belief based on them is to qualify as knowledge, there are certain beliefs (namely, about the outcome of fair lotteries) that are based on even stronger inductive grounds, while, intuitively, they do not qualify as knowledge. This paper discusses what is often regarded as the most promi…Read more
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10It has recently been argued that, contrary to first appearances, knowledge is not distinctively valuable. The argumentative strategy of value sceptics in epistemology is to identify a challenge that any satisfactory account of the distinctive value of knowledge will have to meet and to argue that no viable theory of knowledge does the job. This paper argues that the value sceptical argument is unsuccessful in that it does not establish that a virtue epistemological account of the value of knowle…Read more
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8How to be a capacitistSynthese 201 (5): 1-16. 2023.Capacitism is the view that capacities come first in epistemological theorising: they are explanatorily basic and key epistemic phenomena are to be analysed in terms of capacities. This paper develops a problem for capacitism and outlines a motivated way of solving it.
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8Review of Jennifer Lackey's Learning from WordsThe Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237): 748-750. 2009.status: published.
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8No Justification for Lottery LosersPacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2): 205-217. 2014.Igor Douven has recently developed a challenge for accounts of justification according to which beliefs about lottery losers are never justified. This article argues that champions of such accounts can rise to Douven's challenge and, what's more, that they can turn Douven's argument around in the sense that they can legitimately take it to provide a vindication of their preferred view.
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Introduction: Virtue theoretic epistemologyIn Christoph Kelp & John Greco (eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches, Cambridge University Press. 2020.
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
General Philosophy of Science |
Value Theory |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |