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440Milne’s Argument for the Log‐Ratio MeasurePhilosophy of Science 75 (4): 413-420. 2008.This article shows that a slight variation of the argument in Milne 1996 yields the log‐likelihood ratio l rather than the log‐ratio measure r as “the one true measure of confirmation. ” *Received December 2006; revised December 2007. †To contact the author, please write to: Formal Epistemology Research Group, Zukunftskolleg and Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, P.O. Box X906, 78457 Konstanz, Germany; e‐mail: franz.huber@uni‐konstanz.de
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34Degrees of Belief as Basis for Scientific Reasoning?In W. Loeffler & P. Weingartner (eds.), Knowledge and Belief. Papers of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg. 2003.
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800Evidential Support and Instrumental RationalityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2): 279-300. 2012.NA
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476What Should I Believe About What Would Have Been the Case?Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1): 81-110. 2015.The question I am addressing in this paper is the following: how is it possible to empirically test, or confirm, counterfactuals? After motivating this question in Section 1, I will look at two approaches to counterfactuals, and at how counterfactuals can be empirically tested, or confirmed, if at all, on these accounts in Section 2. I will then digress into the philosophy of probability in Section 3. The reason for this digression is that I want to use the way observable absolute and relative f…Read more
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745Belief Revision I: The AGM TheoryPhilosophy Compass 8 (7): 604-612. 2013.Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I I will first present the AGM theory of belief revision (Alchourrón & Gärdenfors & Makinson 1985). Then I will focus on the problem of iterated belief revisions
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277The plausibility-informativeness theoryIn Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology, Palgrave-macmillan. 2008.The problem adressed in this paper is “the main epistemic problem concerning science”, viz. “the explication of how we compare and evaluate theories [...] in the light of the available evidence” (van Fraassen 1983, 27).
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557Ranking Functions and Rankings on LanguagesArtificial Intelligence 170 (4-5): 462-471. 2006.The Spohnian paradigm of ranking functions is in many respects like an order-of-magnitude reverse of subjective probability theory. Unlike probabilities, however, ranking functions are only indirectly—via a pointwise ranking function on the underlying set of possibilities W —defined on a field of propositions A over W. This research note shows under which conditions ranking functions on a field of propositions A over W and rankings on a language L are induced by pointwise ranking functions on W …Read more
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621Hempel’s logic of confirmationPhilosophical Studies 139 (2): 181-189. 2008.This paper presents a new analysis of C.G. Hempel’s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation [Hempel C. G. (1945). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York: The Free Press, pp. 3–51.], differing from the one Carnap gave in §87 of his [1962. Logical foundations of probability (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.]. Hempel, it is argued, felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at true hypotheses and anoth…Read more
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609Structural equations and beyondReview of Symbolic Logic 6 (4): 709-732. 2013.Recent accounts of actual causation are stated in terms of extended causal models. These extended causal models contain two elements representing two seemingly distinct modalities. The first element are structural equations which represent the or mechanisms of the model, just as ordinary causal models do. The second element are ranking functions which represent normality or typicality. The aim of this paper is to show that these two modalities can be unified. I do so by formulating two constrain…Read more
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66Why follow the royal rule?Synthese 194 (5). 2017.This note is a sequel to Huber. It is shown that obeying a normative principle relating counterfactual conditionals and conditional beliefs, viz. the royal rule, is a necessary and sufficient means to attaining a cognitive end that relates true beliefs in purely factual, non-modal propositions and true beliefs in purely modal propositions. Along the way I will sketch my idealism about alethic or metaphysical modality.
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375The Logic of Theory AssessmentJournal of Philosophical Logic 36 (5): 511-538. 2007.This paper starts by indicating the analysis of Hempel's conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation (Hempel, 1945) as presented in Huber (submitted). There I argue contra Carnap (1962, Section 87) that Hempel felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at plausible theories and another aiming at informative theories. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative theories. The main pa…Read more
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23Assessing Theories. The Problem of a Quantitative Theory of ConfirmationDissertation, University of Erfurt. 2004.
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659Belief Revision II: Ranking TheoryPhilosophy Compass 8 (7): 613-621. 2013.Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I, I have first presented the AGM theory of belief revision. Then I have focused on the problem of iterated belief revisions. In part II, I will first present ranking theory (Spohn 1988). Then I will show how it solves the problem of iterated belief revisions. I will conclude by sketching two areas of future research.
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227Review of Vincent F. Hendricks, Mainstream and Formal Epistemology (Cambridge University Press 2006) (review)Philosophy in Review 26 (4): 257-259. 2006.NA
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329Reply to Crupi et al.’s ‘Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence’British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2): 213-215. 2008.Crupi et al. propose a generalization of Bayesian confirmation theory that they claim to adequately deal with confirmation by uncertain evidence. Consider a series of points of time t0, . . . , ti, . . . , tn such that the agent’s subjective probability for an atomic proposition E changes from Pr0 at t0 to . . . to Pri at ti to . . . to Prn at tn. It is understood that the agent’s subjective probabilities change for E and no logically stronger proposition, and that the agent updates her subjective…Read more
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65How to Learn Concepts, Consequences, and ConditionalsAnalytica: an electronic, open-access journal for philosophy of science 1 (1): 20-36. 2015.In this brief note I show how to model conceptual change, logical learning, and revision of one's beliefs in response to conditional information such as indicative conditionals that do not express propositions.
University Of Erfurt
Department Of Philosophy
Alumnus
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
General Philosophy of Science |
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Probability |