Ignacio Angelelli

After presenting the ordinary and the Fregean formulations of the ancestral, I raise the question of what is their relationship, the natural candidate being that the Fregean version is an analysans intended to improve upon, and replace, the common notion of ancestral (the analysandum). Next, two types of circles that arise in connection with the Fregean ancestral are presented, and it is claimed that one of the circles makes it impossible to maintain the just described (“replacement”) interpretation. A reference is made to Kerry, who was the first to point out a circularity in Frege’s ancestral. Some of Frege’s remarks are examined in order to tentatively sketch, an answer to the issue of the relationship between ordinary and Fregean ancestral; the latter, if not as an analysans replacing the common notion, can still be seen as a profound enrichment of the former.

En 1967, Ignacio Angelelli publie un ouvrage pionnier: la bibliographie fregeenne est encore assez mince quand l'etudiant du Professeur Bochenski soutient, a Fribourg en Suisse, sa dissertation doctorale. L'essentiel des ouvrages, articles et recensions du grand logicien est encore disperse et non reedite. Mais le principal interet de l'ouvrage dont nous donnons ici une premiere traduction francaise ne tient pas seulement au fait qu'il marque une date importante dans le champ des etudes fregeennes et qu'il peut constituer a sa maniere un classique; son importance est directement liee a son objet et a sa methode. L'objet est clairement assigne des la premiere phrase de l'introduction. Si l'Ideographie est bien le document fondateur de la logique contemporaine, digne de prendre rang aux cotes des Analytiques d'Aristote, comment determiner plus precisement la signification et la portee de cette rupture fregeenne par rapport a la tradition philosophique? Autrement dit, il ne s'agit pour l'auteur ni de presenter un expose general de la pensee de Frege, ni de discuter de questions techniques que son oeuvre aura laisse ouvertes dans une riche posterite (Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine...), mais bien de situer cette percee en vue de mieux la comprendre, quitte a critiquer certains de ses aspects ou de ses attendus.

This volume contains a critical edition and English translation of the Latin text of the twenty-second treatise of part 1 of Paul of Venice's Logica Magna, De Scire et dubitare, "On Knowing and Being Uncertain." The issue of the treatise is "whether something known by someone is uncertain to him or not known to him". Paul of Venice presents about thirty arguments aimed at showing that indeed there are propositions that one both knows and is uncertain about. Let us take a look at the first three arguments.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 138-139 [Access article in PDF] Erich H. Reck, editor. From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. xv + 470. Cloth, $65.00. The volume is divided into four main parts: I: "Background and general themes," II: "Frege," III: "Frege to early Wittgenstein," and IV: "Early Wittgenstein." Part I includes the following essays: Erich H. Reck, "Wittgenstein's 'great debt' to Frege: biographical traces and philosophical themes"; Gottfried Gabriel, "Frege, Lotze, and the continental roots of early analytic philosophy"; and Steven Gerrard, "One Wittgenstein?". Part II includes: Hans Sluga, "Frege on the indefinability of truth"; Sanford Shieh, "On interpreting Frege on truth and logic"; Marco Ruffino, "Logical objects in Frege's Grundgesetze, section 10"; and Joan Weiner, "Section 31 revisited: Frege's elucidations." Part III includes: Warren Goldfarb, "Wittgenstein's understanding of Frege: the pre-tractarian evidence"; Danielle Machbeth, "Frege and early Wittgenstein on logic and language"; Thomas Ricketts, "Wittgenstein against Frege and Russell"; and Cora Diamond, "Truth before Tarski: after Sluga, after Ricketts, after Geach, after Goldfarb, Hylton, Floyd, and Van Heijenoort." Part IV includes: Ian Proops, "The Tractatus on inference and entailment"; Juliet Floyd, "Number and ascriptions of number in Wittgenstein's Tractatus"; Matthew B. Ostrow, "Wittgenstein and the liberating word"; and James Conant, "The method of the Tractatus."Reck, while opposing the "widespread view" that Wittgenstein's "debt" to Frege was "rather minimal," warns the reader against going too far in the contrary direction (exemplified by Geach). Gabriel maintains (39) the thesis that "at least early analytic philosophy has its roots in the tradition of continental philosophy, especially in the philosophy of Hermann Lotze" (the founder of neo-Kantianism). Gerrard argues against the common distinction of an "early" and a "late" Wittgenstein.Sluga writes in favor of the significance of Frege's remark (rather neglected in the Fregean literature) that "the content of the word 'true' is altogether unique and indefinable." Shieh's "principal question," observing that Frege's philosophy of logic has been interpreted in two opposite ways: "semantical" (Dummett), and "antisemantical" (Ricketts), is: "Did Frege provide an explanatory justification of logical laws in semantic terms?" The "central result" of the essay is that "the substance of the disagreements between the antisemantical interpreters and their perceived opponents is not what they suggest it to be" (97). Ruffino focuses on the Fregean attempt to determine the nature of the extensions introduced by his (in)famous Axiom V, and compares Frege's handling of this issue with the seemingly analogous issue of determining the nature of numbers introduced by what is nowadays called "Hume's principle." Weiner attacks another crucial portion of Frege's work: Grundgesetze I §31, and proposes to read it as "elucidation" rather than as proof.Goldfarb intends to "cast doubt on the assessment of Frege's influence on Wittgenstein" expressed by several scholars. Goldfarb holds that Frege and Wittgenstein arrive at views that "have many similarities" but that they do it independently (187). Rather, in Wittgenstein "the basic framework and the basic stance are thoroughly inherited from Russell" (197). Macbeth argues that Frege and Wittgenstein have radically different conceptions of meaning: inferentialist and representative respectively. Ricketts argues that Wittgenstein's critique of Frege "is mounted from within his own distinctive approach to language and logic," so that "while Wittgenstein does not meet Frege on Frege's own terms, neither does he straightforwardly misunderstand Frege" (228). The content of Diamond's paper is more than hinted at by its long title.Proops aims at investigating "Wittgenstein's well-known, yet obscure, objection to the views of Frege and Russell on deductive inference and its justification," (283) an objection set out in Tractatus5.132: laws of inference are senseless, superfluous. Floyd intends to highlight the philosophy of arithmetic found in the Tractatus against a "tendency to pass over the Tractatus remarks on arithmetic in silence" (309). Ostrow points out that "it is not at once apparent" how the "Wittgensteinian liberation" is to be conceived (353), and his...