-
131Structuralism reconsideredIn Stewart Shapiro (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, Oxford University Press. pp. 563--589. 2005.The basic relations and functions that mathematicians use to identify mathematical objects fail to settle whether mathematical objects of one kind are identical to or distinct from objects of an apparently different kind, and what, if any, intrinsic properties mathematical objects possess. According to one influential interpretation of mathematical discourse, this is because the objects under study are themselves incomplete; they are positions or akin to positions in patterns or structures. Two …Read more
-
129NeoFregean MetaontologyIn Philip A. Ebert & Marcus Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism: Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 94-112. 2016.According to neo-Fregeans, an expression that is syntactically singular and figures in a true sentence is guaranteed to have some existing thing in the world to pick out. But this approach is confronted by a dilemma. If reality is crystalline, has a structure fixed independently of language, then the view that reality is guaranteed to contain a sufficient plenitude of objects to supply referents for the relevant expressions is left hostage to cosmological fortune. Whereas if reality is plastic t…Read more
-
109Can the property Boom last?Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3). 2001.The contemporary Humean programme that seeks to combine property realism with the denial of necessary connections between distinct existences is flawed. Objects and properties by their very natures are entangled in such connections. It follows that modal notions cannot be reductively analysed by appeal to the concept property, not even if the reducing theory posits an abundant supply of entities to fall under that concept.
-
108Four new ways to change your shapeAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1). 2001.This Article does not have an abstract
-
104Ramsey on universalsIn Hallvard Lillehammer & David Hugh Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy, Oxford University Press. pp. 83-104. 2005.According to philosophical folklore Ramsey maintained three propositions in his famous 1925 paper “Universals”: (i) there is no subject-predicate distinction; (ii) there is no particular-universal distinction; (iii) there is no particular-universal distinction because there is no subject-predicate distinction. The ‘first generation’ of Ramsey commentators dismissed “Universals” because they held that whereas predicates may be negated, names may not and so there is a subject-predicate distinction…Read more
-
103The Cambridge Revolt Against Idealism: Was There Ever an Eden?Metaphilosophy 43 (1-2): 135-146. 2012.According to one creation myth, analytic philosophy emerged in Cambridge when Moore and Russell abandoned idealism in favour of naive realism: every word stood for something; it was only after “the Fall,” Russell's discovery of his theory of descriptions, that they realized some complex phrases (“the present King of France”) didn't stand for anything. It has become a commonplace of recent scholarship to object that even before the Fall, Russell acknowledged that such phrases may fail to denote. …Read more
-
102
-
99The Julio césar problemDialectica 59 (2). 2005.One version of the Julius Caesar problem arises when we demand assurance that expressions drawn from different theories or stretches of discourse refer to different things. The counter‐Caesar problem arises when assurance is demanded that expressions drawn from different theories . refer to the same thing. The Julio César problem generalises from the counter‐Caesar problem. It arises when we seek reassurance that expressions drawn from different languages refer to the same kind of things . If th…Read more
-
97Review of The Metaphysics of Relations, Edited by Marmodoro & Yates, OUP, 2015 (review)Philosophy. forthcoming.In this review I take to task the related views of E.J. Lowe, John Heil and Peter Simons according to which relations don't exist because they're dispensable qua truth-makers. I argue that this view is methodologically unstable because we also have reason to believe that relations exist because our best mathematical and scientific theories say so, i.e. quantify over them.
-
92Whence the particular-universal distinction?Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (1): 181-194. 2004.
-
91The Julius caesar objection : More problematic than everIn Identity and Modality, Oxford University Press. pp. 174. 2006.This paper investigates the meta-ontological problem, what is the Julius Caesar objection? I distinguish epistemic, metaphysical and semantic versions. I argue that neo-Fregean and supervaluationist solutions to the Caesar objection fails because, amongst other flaws, they fail to determine which version of the problem is in play.
-
88How Hochberg Helped Us Take the Ontological Turn: An IntroductionDialectica 68 (2): 163-169. 2014.In this paper I briefly describe Hochberg's role in helping bringing about the ontological turn through his critique of Quine's ostrich nominalism and his arguments in favour of truth-making. I compare Hochberg and Armstrong's fact-centred metaphysics, where the former was an influence for the latter, before charting some of Hochberg's contributions to the history of philosophy.
-
83On finite humePhilosophia Mathematica 8 (2): 150-159. 2000.Neo-Fregeanism contends that knowledge of arithmetic may be acquired by second-order logical reflection upon Hume's principle. Heck argues that Hume's principle doesn't inform ordinary arithmetical reasoning and so knowledge derived from it cannot be genuinely arithmetical. To suppose otherwise, Heck claims, is to fail to comprehend the magnitude of Cantor's conceptual contribution to mathematics. Heck recommends that finite Hume's principle be employed instead to generate arithmetical knowledge…Read more
-
82THE TRANSCENDENTAL METAPHYSIC OF G.F. STOUT: HIS DEFENCE AND ELABORATION OF TROPE THEORYIn A. Reboul (ed.), Mind, Value and Metaphysics: Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan, Springer. pp. 141-58. 2014.G. F. Stout is famous as an early twentieth century proselyte for abstract particulars, or tropes as they are now often called. He advanced his version of trope theory to avoid the excesses of nominalism on the one hand and realism on the other. But his arguments for tropes have been widely misconceived as metaphysical, e.g. by Armstrong. In this paper, I argue that Stout’s fundamental arguments for tropes were ideological and epistemological rather than metaphysical. He moulded his scheme to fi…Read more
-
77"On The Origins of Order: Non-Symmetric or Only Symmetric Relations?"In M. J. Loux & G. Galuzzo (eds.), The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. pp. 173-94. 2015.In this paper I contribute a further element to the case for admitting non-symmetric relations by dismantling the case against them. Armstrong and Dorr have both argued (1) that asymmetric relations give rise to ‘brute necessities’, whilst Dorr further argues (2) that admitting non-symmetric relations generates spurious possibilities and (3) that exploiting work of Goodman and Hazen, we can do without non-symmetric relations anyway. Against (1) I argue that neither Armstrong nor Dorr succeed in …Read more
-
77Particulars, modes and universals: An examination of E.j. Lowe's four-fold ontologyDialectica 58 (3). 2004.Is there a particular‐universal distinction? Ramsey famously advocated scepticism about this distinction. In “Some Formal Ontological Relations” E.J. Lowe argues against Ramsey that a particular‐universal distinction can be made out after all if only we allow ourselves the resources to distinguish between the elements of a four‐fold ontology. But in defence of Ramsey I argue that the case remains to be made in favour of either the four‐fold ontology Lowe recommends or the articulation of a parti…Read more
-
76Introducing analytic philosophy: Its sense and its nonsense 1879–2002 by Herbert Hochberg (review)Dialectica 59 (1). 2005.
-
74Lewis's animadversions on the truthmaker principleIn Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate, Clarendon Press. pp. 117-40. 2005.The early David Lewis was a staunch critic of the Truthmaker Principle. To endorse the principle, he argued, is to accept that states of affairs are truthmakers for contingent predications. But states of affairs violate Hume's prohibition of necessary connections between distinct existences. So Lewis offered to replace the Truthmaker Principle with the weaker principle that ‘truth supervenes upon being’. This chapter argues that even this principle violates Hume's prohibition. Later Lewis came t…Read more
-
71Extreme Metaphysics: Hossack on Logical Objects, Facts, Propositions and UniversalsDialectica 65 (1): 87-101. 2011.
-
69Lewis’s Global Descriptivism and Reference MagnetismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1): 192-198. 2020.In ‘Putnam’s Paradox’, Lewis defended global descriptivism and reference magnetism. According to Schwarz [2014], Lewis didn’t mean what he said there, and really held neither position. We present evidence from Lewis’s correspondence and publications which shows conclusively that Lewis endorsed both.
-
69Truth-Making and Analysis: A Reply to Rodriguez-PereyraPhilosophical Papers 31 (1): 49-61. 2002.Philosophical Papers Vol.31(1) 2002: 49-61
-
63Review of Gonzalo Rodriguez-pereyra, Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (2). 2004.
-
61Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Roger White (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (5). 2009.
-
55Facts and universals: Besprechungsaufsatz zu: Herbert Hochberg, Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein: The revival of realism. Frankfurt, A. M.: Hänsel-hohenhausen, 2001 (review)Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1): 207-222. 2002.
-
54Introduction to Foundations of Logic & Mathematics, Special IssuePhilosophical Quarterly 54 (214). 2004.Frege attempted to provide arithmetic with a foundation in logic. But his attempt to do so was confounded by Russell's discovery of paradox at the heart of Frege's system. The papers collected in this special issue contribute to the on-going investigation into the foundations of mathematics and logic. After sketching the historical background, this introduction provides an overview of the papers collected here, tracing some of the themes that connect them.
-
49The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy Edited by Michael Beaney (review)Philosophy 90 (1): 152-156. 2015.
-
48Articulating reasons: An introduction to inferentialismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2). 2002.Book Information Articulating Reasons: An Introduction To Inferentialism. By Brandom Robert. Harvard University Press. Cambridge. 2000. Pp. 230. Hardback, £23.95.
Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
1 more
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
History of Western Philosophy |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
20th Century Philosophy |