Bryan Van Norden

31 The choice of human goals cannot be completely subjective, because 32 there are some (even ones that motivate many humans) that are simply 33 unintelligible as ultimate goals. For example, wealth is rational as an 34 intermediate goal, a means to achieving some further end, but it is simply 35 unintelligible to suggest that wealth is an ultimate goal in itself. Second, 36 we have seen that some things are reasonable to pursue as aspects of 37 our ultimate goals (like prestige and pleasure), but they are conceptu- 38 ally dependent on some other goal to give them concrete form. In this 39 essay, I argue in favor of six candidates for ultimate goals

This dissertation is an investigation of the philosophic psychology of Mengzi , a Chinese Confucian of the 4th century B.C. As such, it is concerned with the role of desires, emotions, and practical reasoning in Mengzi's conception of self-cultivation and ethical flourishing. In chapter 1, I discuss why Mengzi is still worth studying by philosophers, certain hermeneutic issues, and the historical factors that account for some of the characteristic differences between Chinese and Western philosophy. ;In chapter 2, I proceed to problems of philosophic psychology, examining Mengzi's views on desire and its role in both the perfected and developing moral agent. I also contrast Mengzi's attitude toward the role of desires with that of Xunzi in order to bring out what is distinctive of both views. ;Chapter 3 discusses the role of practical reasoning in the Mengzi. I first critique one important interpretation of the role of practical reasoning in the Mengzi--that of Kwong-loi Shun. Shun, developing some ideas implicit in the work of David S. Nivison, argues that Mengzi emphasizes analogical reasoning and consistency in ethical deliberation, but I attempt to demonstrate that the text will not support Shun's reading. I then proceed to offer my own view of Mengzian practical reasoning. I conclude that Mengzi is a sort of intuitionist, but of an interestingly different kind from classic Western intuitionists such as Sidgwick, Moore, and Prichard. ;Finally, in my appendix, I translate and comment upon some quotations which are attributed to Mengzi, but which are not found in the text of the Mengzi as it has come down to us

In the Inner Chapters, arguments for a variety of different philosophical positions are present, including skepticism, relativism, particularism, and objectivism. Given that these are not all mutually consistent, we are left with the problem of reconciling the tensions among them. The various positions are described and passages from the Inner Chapters are presented illustrating each. A detailed commentary is offered on the opening of the Inner Chapters, arguing that it is best understood in an objectivist fashion. An interpretation is presented of Zhuangzi's view of sagehood that reconciles the various arguments in the text

Self-cultivation is a topic that has been largely ignored by Western moral philosophers. In contrast, it is a central concern of philosophers in the Confucian tradition. In this brief and highly readable book, Ivanhoe introduces the theories of self-cultivation of some of the most important figures in the Confucian tradition. (See the table of contents, below.) Although Confucianism is sometimes presented as a monolithic movement, Ivanhoe stresses the diversity within the Confucian tradition over more than 2,000 years. In addition to being a work of sound scholarship, this book is an excellent source for anyone seeking a philosophical introduction to the Confucian tradition as a whole.

nnas' article is the first of three in a "Symposium on Ancient Ethics." She begins with the observation that ancient ethics are "eudaemonist" in form. That is, they assume "that each of us has a vague and unarticulated idea of an overall or final goal in our life," which we label eudaimonia or happiness, "and the task of ethical theory is to give each person a clear, articulated, and correct account of this overall goal and how to achieve it" (p. 241; Annas defends this generalization, which is controversial as applied to Stoic and Epicurean ethics, in her The Morality of Happiness [Oxford, 1993]). Furthermore, whereas modern ethical theories (e.g., those of Kant and Sidgwick) typically distinguish between "moral reasoning" and "prudential reasoning," ancient ethical theories do not. How come? One "widespread" and "traditional" view (pp. 244, 245) is that ancient ethics assimilate morality to prudence: "ethical theory guides the agent from an intuitive, restrictive view of what is in her interests (money, power) to a more expanded and elevated view (the virtues)" (p. 244). This interpretation is sometimes joined with the claim that the Greeks took for granted what Nicholas White terms "fusionism": the view that individual good is not ultimately distinct from social or collective good (p. 245). However, Annas notes, ancient Greek literature provides ample illustration that "fusionism" was not taken for granted.